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The main contributions of this thesis to existing literature is the introduction of a new
methodology for researching the effect of copyright law on creative output using dy-
namic markets created in a lab experiment. The markets of interest are creative indus-
tries1 where copyright is an important part of how the markets operate. Motivating cre-
ative production in such industries is more complex compared to motivating production
in industries with more mechanic or algorithmic tasks. The methodology presented in
the thesis is a contribution to existing literature on copyright and motivation, as previous
literature does not utilise a dynamic experimental environment.
The results of this research indicate that both pay structure and the availability of
information regarding the actions and performance of other competitors can influence
creativity. There is some evidence that public information/attribution was important
to market participants, as it in some cases provides an incentive for higher production
and in other cases it cancels out an effect which are otherwise found when only tour-
nament pay/economic rights were present. There is evidence of lower satisfaction in
tournament pay/economic rights groups which suggest that individuals exert overcon-
fidence before participating in the market causing lower satisfaction due to below ex-
pected performance. This might also result in over supply in winner-takes-all markets
as participants overestimate the probability of their own success when entering the mar-
ket. Besides this, the lower satisfaction could increase turnover in the creative industries
and thus decrease overall human capital in the market as the unsuccessful experienced
individuals leave the market due to low satisfaction.
1Examples of these markets are markets such as, book and music publishing
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
The thesis is widely focused on the influences of reputation and tournament pay struc-
tures on creative performance. Which has applications in both creativity and copyright
research. The aim is to study motivation and creativity as they pertain to and contribute to
the discussion of the influence of copyright on creative production. A new experimental
methodology is introduced to study these phenomena, using copyright as a foundation
for the rules or boundaries of the experiment. Copyright is simplified as two external mo-
tivator’s economic rights and attribution rights. In order to fit into a stylised market in
experiments, the concepts of economic rights and attribution rights are further simplified
to tournament pay and, reputation or performance pay, and public information respec-
tively. The general question asked is: What motivates an individual to work on a piece
of art or to come up with new publishable works/theories. How does pay structure and
public information regarding the artist and other artists influence the way they compete
in the market and their quantity and quality of the work?
The thesis is divided into six chapters. The current chapter being the first chapter
introduces the motivation for the research in this thesis. The second chapter introduces
and defines important concepts relevant to the research, the background of copyright and
the markets in which they operate. The second chapter also discusses the advantages of
using experiments in interdisciplinary research in more general terms. The third chapter
focuses on the specific methodology of the experiments used, while the forth and the fifth
chapters focus on discussing the results in terms of creative performance1 and the influ-
ences of the market for individual participants2, respectively. The sixth and final chapter
concludes the thesis with a discussion summing up the findings and their relevance to
other related findings available at the present time. Ultimately the goal of the thesis is
to introduce a new experimental methodology for studying creativity in a market con-
text and to demonstrate what these results can tell us about what motivates individual
performance.
1Found in Chapter 4
2found in Chapter 5
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1.1 Motives of the Research & Background Discussion
The current research evolves from the general question of why individuals want to be-
come artists. This was due to my personal perception of the average artist earning less
than the average individual3 leading to questions such as: Why do people participate in
these industries if they are paid poorly? What motivates artists? If artists are poor, then
what motivates them; if not money, could it be reputation? Intellectual property rights
are very closely tied to these questions and to some extent can even inform what artists
view of how to induce creation as artists had a hand in creating copyright.
A background discussion to issues discussed in the thesis is found in Chapter 2. The
full copyright discussion can be found in section 2.3. The philosophical justifications of
copyright are discussed in section 2.3.1 which can give context to the arguments which
underpin moral rights and the non-monetary perspective into copyright. The formation
of what was considered the base common law copyright is discussed in 2.3.2 which men-
tions the artists role in the creation of copyright. The discussion in Chapter 2 continues
with a discussion on fairness and satisfaction perceptions and how they can affect market
outcomes and follows onto focus on interdisciplinary research in section 2.7. The section
defines interdisciplinarity and discusses interdisciplinary research conducted when com-
bining law, psychology, and economics and how the lab experiments can be used in order
to promote a new interdisciplinary experimental methodology. The discussion contin-
ues to section 2.8.1 which focuses on cultural economics and welfare and highlights how
cultural economics as a field, which the research in the thesis fits into, is different from
economics more generally. The literature review chapter then moves to discussing differ-
ences between the experimental approaches of psychology and economics in 2.9. Finally,
the chapter ends with a discussion on the difference between law and economics as sub-
jects in 2.10. The discussion at the end of the chapter is designed to give some context
to the research and show how it is interdisciplinary, how it fits into the three fields, and
what type of methodology was used when designing the lab experiments in the thesis.
1.2 Contributions to Existing Literature
The main contribution of this thesis does not necessarily lie in the general questions which
motivated the research4 even though this research does contribute to what has already
3The research results showed that this assumption was generally correct. The market structure and
overall monetary incentives for artists in the market are discussed in the section 2.4
4Questions such as, what motivates individuals? What motivates creativity or the production of creative
goods? How do markets for creative markets operate? How does copyright influence these markets and
influence the decision making of market participants?
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been studied on the topic 5. Existing research on the topics are discussed in sections 2.2,
2.5, 2.7, and 2.4. However, the main contribution of this thesis to previous research lies in
the way the questions are approached detailed in the Chapter 3.
With the aid of the new methodology the thesis also aims to further the discussion
found in previous experimental research in fields such as, economics more generally but
specifically motivation6, creativity7, and copyright8. What is studied that is not found in
current research is the individual, and especially the combined effect on the individual of
the influence of performance pay and reputation on creative output. The observation of
that potential combined effect contributes to existing research because it does not include
any potential interaction effects between tournament pay and public information as a
motive for creative production even though they have previously been studies separately.
Results are reported in Chapter 4 and in Chapter 5. How pay for performance and rep-
utation influence the participants fairness and satisfaction perceptions are also observed
as a part of the thesis, as found in section 2.6. The results and further discussion on the
results are found in sections 4.4 and 5.4. The aim of this line of inquiry is to observe how
the different market environments due to the existence or lack of tournament pay and
public information influence the individual’s perceptions of the market and how these
perceptions could influence their future behaviour. The previous literature on the sub-
ject of fairness and satisfaction does not study these two variables combined effects in
a dynamic market which is where the methodology contributes to past research. This
past research on fairness and satisfaction is discussed in section 5.2 and the results and
contribution to past literature on the subject is clarified in section 5.4.
1.2.1 Creativity, Creation, and the Market
The process of writing a book, composing a piece of music, or producing art has many
aspects to the process that may be unique to the piece of work or process. Motivating
the production of new and creative output in such industries can be complex. How in-
dividuals produce is highly dependent on environment and the individual themselves
as discussed in 3.3. In the creative and innovation/innovative industries, laws exist that
are designed to induce production and productivity9. This encouragement to create and
innovate is then thought to contribute to the greater good by expanding the knowledge
5The results sections in chapter 4 and in chapter 5 discuss the results of the experiment in context of the
relevant literature on the respective topics.
6Discussed in 2.2.
7Discussed in 3.4 and relevant studies cited in 2.2.
8Discussed in 2.5.
9Copyright and patent law both aim to induce productivity. Differences in these laws are discussed in
sections 2.3.9.
4 Chapter 1. Introduction
and skill base of the industry these creators exist in. In turn this expanding knowledge
base helps to fuel further creative thought, which again feeds the process of innovation
and social advancement.
The aim of the thesis is to observe the influence of market mechanics on the creativity
and productivity of market participants in the market for creative goods. More specifi-
cally, to deconstruct market incentives and observe how the incentives within the market
influence creative performance and the production of creative goods. Copyright and the
creative industries are historically closely interconnected, and market structure is heavily
affected by copyright law. This is why there is a section devoted to copyright in Chapter
2 and a deep dive into the justification for, and the history of copyright which will give
context to the experimental structure detailed in Chapter 3.
The market for creative goods is simulated in an experimental or stylised market by
manipulating the information and pay structure present in the market, as copyright af-
fects both elements by guaranteeing attribution rights and economic rights, respectively.
Attribution rights, the right to be named as the author, is manipulated in the experiment
by controlling information available in the stylised market. Individuals in a treatment
group with attribution had full and instant information about who is creating what in the
market. Those individuals who were not in such a treatment group were not informed of
the author of the creations they were observing. In the economics rights treatment groups
the individuals were paid based on performance, whereby the pay structure present in
the market for creative goods was either a tournament pay structure or a winner-takes-all
pay structure. An individual not in an economic rights treatment group did not receive
performance pay, but rather a set payment. Thus the economic right treatment group
is referred to as the tournament pay group and the attribution treatment groups will be
referred to as the public information treatment groups.
The stylised market is not designed to be a perfect proxy for the creative marketplace,
but rather a tool to better understand how creativity is affected by performance pay and
attribution. To put this question in more general terms, how do tournament pay and pub-
lic information influence creative performance? Do incentives present in a tournament
pay structure have any influence on the overall creativity of output? Does the availability
of public information about the actions of other market participant affect the creativity of
individuals in the market? What about when both of these incentives are present simul-
taneously rather than individually, will there be interaction effects? The creative markets
are unique, as it is not fully known how successful or financially lucrative a song, book,
or film will be. This is referred to as the “nobody-knows” principle by Caves and is an
important principle when discussing the markets for creative goods (Caves, 2002, p. 3).
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The study examines both creativity scores using an existing rubric found in psychol-
ogy literature to judge creativity and also uses subjective scores submitted by participants
during the experiment to observe how varying market environments influence creativity
and given subjective judgements of the output. The combination of the two types of cre-
ativity i.e. rubric based and subjectively measured creativity is an important part of the
methodology. This adds to current research because not only can the markets influence
be measured by comparing different market environments, but the measurement method
is multidimensional and can strengthen the reliability of the results. This highlights the
contribution of this research as it combines previous tired and tested research from the
field of economics, law, and psychology into one experiment. The market analysis is
from economics, a tried and tested methodological base for creativity research found in
psychology, and the context for the market being analysed i.e. the creative markets rele-
vant to copyright law. This type of multidisciplinary and multidimensional approach is
what gives the research found in this thesis a promising potential for a unique research
agenda in the future.
It can be argued that to create something ingenious or awe-inspiring there must be
some type of kind of equivalent pain or manic devotion to one’s craft. This aspect of
creation will also be discussed in order to gain more insights into what is creative or
creativity and what type of people succeed in the field of creative production. To gain in-
sights into the individuals within the markets for creative goods, questions are discussed
such as, is creativity genetic? or are all artists poor? This in turn will support a discus-
sion of market mechanisms with the individual market participant in mind to try and
understand what can inspire creativity.
1.3 Conclusion
The part of the thesis which is most likely to be a contribution is the experimental set-up.
Experiments are used in creativity research, and they are common in economics, but it is
a relatively rarely used tool in the field of copyright law10. The type of dynamic market
created is a completely novel set up which has its foundations in creativity research and
copyright research and contributes new experimental methods for potential use in all
three of the mentioned fields. The aim has been to step away from a relatively rigid
classic experimental set-up with few moving variables towards a more dynamic market
like structure with instant interaction and feedback. The motivation for this was to work
toward being able to simulate markets more effectively using experiments which could
in turn be extended and implemented more generally.
10Some examples of such experiments are discussed in section refdirectly related studies
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The methodology has its foundations in creativity research and in copyright law along
with what is found in industrial organisation literature related to creative industries.
These subjects are essential for laying the groundwork for the thesis and so the following
chapter will be devoted to background discussion preparing for the methodology section
and results sections. The discussion will begin by defining the key concept, creativity. Af-
ter that the discussion will delve into the history of copyright which will help to explain
the history of copyright and how copyright has been justified. This is important because
it will provide wider context to a later discussion of creativity and the problems arising
when trying to boost creative production. The discussion will also include sections on
how the study fits in with similar studies in subject areas such as, law, economics of law,
psychology, and cultural economics research.
7Chapter 2
Literature Review
The focus of the beginning of this chapter is to walk through the concepts of creativity
and measuring creativity. The relevance of these concepts when discussing copyright
law, based on the justifications of this law, and the history of the law itself are addressed.
Differences in the philosophy behind the law in continental Europe and the U.K. is also
discussed. This allows for an elaboration on the discussion of attribution rights and eco-
nomic rights, or public information and tournament pay respectively, and their potential
effects on creative performance. In addition the chapter includes a discussion on the
subjects of law, economics of law, cultural economics, psychology, and experimental eco-
nomics in order to help place where the thesis sits in respect to these subject areas.
2.1 Defining Creativity
Before we can look deeper into the factors affecting creativity we must first have a work-
ing definition of creativity. Definitions of creativity from the 19th century provide good
foundation to start the search for a working definition, they described creativity as some-
thing new and important, focusing on issues, such as, types of creativity, intellectual com-
ponents, and the creative process (Baker and Cunningham, 2009). Creativity can be seen
as process involved with sensing gaps/missing elements, forming ideas or hypothesis
based on the ideas, testing the hypothesis and communicating the results, and possibly
modifying the original hypothesis if necessary (Torrance, 1962, p. 3). This definition of
creativity is slightly more science specific with references to hypothesis testing and find-
ing “gaps” in the knowledge, although this thought process can also be applied to creat-
ing art as the idea must first be created and tested to see if it is in some way novel, and if
not then modified or discarded.
For a more general definition it is theorised that creativity should contain four main
points: It should contain attributes that are novel and useful, have attributes of the person
generating the creation, attributes of the people assessing the creativity of the creations,
8 Chapter 2. Literature Review
and attributes of the environment, such as, source of evaluation, resource and inspira-
tion for creation (Batey and Furnham, 2006). This is quite a comprehensive way to define
creativity as it considers the internal and external influences of the creative endeavour.
Where most definitions differ is the extent to which their proponents/creators are at-
tempting to identify creativity as a generic human characteristic or to define what makes
creative individuals somehow different from the rest of the population (Sharp, 2006). Us-
ing this definition there is an assumption that creativity is somehow exclusive to those
who have creative talent or abilities, which is not strictly true as people have been found
to be creative without needing to have creative talent, although the more creatively tal-
ented might be consistently more creative. Overall, when talking about creativity it is
assumed that there is a greater importance of describing those qualities that enable a per-
son to visualise unrecognized associations and invent new ideas (Karlsson, 1978, p. 98). In
the context of an experiment it is more appropriate to use a more operational definition of
creativity compared to a conceptual definition since conceptual definitions do not trans-
late into assessment criterion as operational definitions do (Amabile, 1983). It is, however
useful to have a conceptual definition as well to have a more rounded understanding of
the concept of creativity more generally. Thus, for the sake of simplicity creativity can
be thought of as something made using old or existing knowledge and material to create
something new and novel. The operational definitions are task specific and are discussed
in more detail when the creativity tasks are discussed in the method chapter, for example,
creativity tests are judged based on concepts that are defined, and those concepts define
creativity in the context of the test.
2.1.1 Creativity Versus Novelty Seeking
Novelty seeking is seeking to create something novel, the difference here is that it can
be novel is not necessarily creative but simply new. It can be more exploratory than cre-
ative where a someone who is novelty seeking is something new to them. For example,
if an individual makes a simplistic rude joke it might not be creative, but it can be nov-
elty seeking. Whereas a creative joke is often more complicated in its use of allegory
or metaphor and is likely something which requires a unique perspective or expression.
Novelty seeking can be considered a necessary but not sufficient condition to creativity,
as something creative is new but the newness itself is not enough for something to be
creative. Innovation on the other hand is close to what one might consider creativity but
has a transformative quality to it. For example an invention can be creative but ultimately
useless, while an innovation is an invention which is useful and fill an existing need or
a creates something which transforms the way individuals live. Examples of such in-
novations include computers, phones, and the internet to name a few. To some extent
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creativity can be considered a necessary but not a sufficient factor for innovation as one
needs to be creative to be innovative but creativity itself is not enough for something to
be innovative.
The experiments presented in the thesis study what influences creativity and does
avoid the testing for novelty seeking while to some extent capturing what could influ-
ence innovation as well. The experiments avoid studying only novelty seeking because
there are specific creativity criterion used to measure creativity which measure 4 different
aspects of what can be considered creativity1. To some extent these measures are measur-
ing the novelty seeking aspect of creativity, and the measures can all be relevant to both
novelty seeking and creativity however something novelty seeking is likely to only be
relevant to a few of the measures while something creative will be relevant to all 4 mea-
sures. For example, something novelty seeking might be humorous but is unlikely to be
original and be something which is categorically completely different to what the person
has already submitted. This is because novelty seeking is simply seeking something new
without a focus on the overall quality of the newness.
Creativity and innovation are connected and in the experiment, there is a task, the
divergent thinking task, where they are quite closely connected. This because the point
of the task is to find uses for a stimuli item, in this case a paper clip. This thought process
is close to innovativeness because there needs to be some use created for an existing item
which is a part of what an innovation is. As discussed before this is not only what inno-
vation is but there are strong parallels which is why the results can help to inform how
innovative behaviour could be influenced by the treatments in the experiments. This is
not to say that there would be a one to one correlation between how the treatments in-
fluence the creativity tested in the experiment and innovative quality. However, there
is likely to be some parallels because of the closeness of the two processes in the first
creativity task.
2.2 Constituents of Motivation
This section focuses on motivation and what influences an individual to start and com-
plete a task. Specifically, the discussion focuses on what influences creativity. Creativ-
ity is something new and important or it can be seen as a process involving sensing
gaps/missing elements, forming hypothesis and testing them (Torrance, 1962; Baker,
1978, p. 3). This can be extended to art and novels, among others, to say that they are
creative products or products which aim to highlight a new perspective or bring out a
new aesthetic or theme. What is new or novel can be quite subjective and can depend
1There 4 measures are fluency, flexibility, originality, and humour as detailed in chapter 3.
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on the task. Giving a situation specific definition of creativity can be especially useful
if individuals are given creativity contingent rewards or rewards which depend on the
creativity level of the individual’s products or output.
The current section continues on to discuss motivation varying circumstances and
lays the ground work for a more detailed discussion about market incentives later in
the chapter. To lay some groundwork for the discussion on motivation a few concepts
are outlined. Firstly, when performance or completion goals are discussed they refer
to thresholds or benchmarks of performance below which the goal has not been met.
Completion goal is a goal of completing whatever the task is at hand. This is similar to
creativity contingent pay which is pay based on how creative one’s product is. These
are different as a goal is a set level while creativity contingent, or any other contingent
pay, is pay based on the overall level of creativity. This distinction is important as the set
goals are known and fixed while creativity contingent pay is not fixed and increases as
the level of creativity increases. The creativity contingent goals can potentially be relative
to others performance, although they can be a combination of set levels also. Tournament
pay based on creativity is a very specific type of creativity contingent pay where the top
performers in the group or population earn most if not all of the possible rewards. This is
inherently unequal and interesting to discuss how these types of pay structures motivate
performance, be it creative or not.
2.2.1 Goal Setting
A goal can come from two types of sources; they can be given from an external source,
such as a manager or be from the person themselves in which case it is an internal mo-
tivator. Who sets the goal, and how it is implemented, is important. If the goal is from
an external source it can be viewed as controlling. If it is from an internal source, the
person themselves, their performance is more effective in heuristic tasks such as creativ-
ity (Deci and Ryan, 2008). This can help explain why success in long term goals has been
associated not only with talent but with a “grit” describing the individual’s level of “stick-
to-itiveness” (Duckworth et al., 2007). External motivators are not all counterproductive,
because if a payment scheme, which tolerates early failure and rewards long-term success
is implemented, it can perform better than pay-per-performance or fixed-wage incentive
schemes (Ederer and Manso, 2013). It is important to keep goals in perspective and if
possible to avoid effects such as narrowing focus which leads to the neglect of non-goal
areas and reduction in intrinsic motivation (Ordóñez et al., 2009). One must set the cor-
rect type of goals for example a learning goal, to foster persistence and task enjoyment
and avoid performance related goals which can cause lower performance (Dweck, 2000;
Mueller and Dweck, 1998, p. 16-17). This can also be relevant to the standards of what
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type of product is popular in the market, because it depends on how these market incen-
tives are perceived by the creators. If they are perceived as performance goals and not
learning goals it could be problematic in terms of optimality of the motivator.
2.2.2 Motivating Creativity
Motivating creativity can be very different compared to motivating other types of tasks
or performance and can be divided into many different aspects. How exactly creativity
can be motivated is the focus of the next section to give some background about how
complex it can be and how this complexity can then be used to inform debate about cre-
ative markets and the philosophy of copyright law. Copyright law specifically, as detailed
later, is designed as an incentive for the arts and creativity. Thus, justification for copy-
right law is best discussed after a discussion about motivating creativity to create a solid
background for the discussion of incentives promoted by copyright. When motivation is
discussed it is split into two types, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation
is motivation that comes from within the person themselves. Extrinsic motivation is mo-
tivation which originates from outside the individual and can include monetary rewards
or feedback from others, for example.
Creativity is a process that requires a heuristic or open-ended approach compared to
algorithmic tasks that have a single obvious solution (Amabile and Pillemer, 2012). Cre-
ativity, when it comes to the cognitive process, is unique. It would be logical to think that
motivating creativity could also be different to motivating tasks that are algorithmic in
nature and so deserves to be considered separately. In general, there is agreement in the
literature that intrinsic motivation is an important part, if not the most important part, of
motivating creativity (Amabile, 1997; Eisenberger, Haskins, and Gambleton, 1999; Grant
and Berry, 2011; Lakhani and Wolf, 2003; Morningstar, 2012; Shalley and Perry-Smith,
2001; Stanko-Kaczmarek, 2012).When individuals contribute to non-profit projects like
open source software the most prominent driver is enjoyment-based intrinsic motivation
even though 40% of respondents were being paid for their efforts (Lakhani and Wolf,
2003). When intrinsic qualities and external motives are emphasised before subjects took
part in a creativity task it was found that subjects in the intrinsically motivated group
performed better than the extrinsically motivated ones (Stanko-Kaczmarek, 2012). How-
ever, the study did not use money as an extrinsic motivator which, intuitively speaking,
can be seen as the strongest of the extrinsic motivators. Even though monetary incentives
might be the strongest extrinsic motivator in some cases other extrinsic motivators, such
as prosocial motivators, can be just as effective if not more effective. Prosocial meaning,
to benefit others, such as charity or volunteering, and a prosocial motive being a moti-
vation to help others. How the external motivator is administered is important, if it is
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administered in a controlling way it could decrease intrinsic motivation and thus per-
formance. However, if the external motivator is administered in a constructive fashion
which recognises people’s competence, the motivators effect on creative performance is
more likely to be positive (Amabile and Pillemer, 2012). This is supported by findings
that prosocial motivators i.e. motivators, such as, helping a cooperative unit, encourages
employees to develop ideas and strengthens the association between intrinsic motivation
and independent creativity (Grant and Berry, 2011).
When monetary external motivators are used to motivate creativity, the picture be-
comes slightly complex as it also depends on what kind of external motivator is used (By-
ron and Khazanchi, 2012; Chen, Williamson, and Zhou, 2012; Eisenberger and Cameron,
1996; Eisenberger, Haskins, and Gambleton, 1999). When creative, performance, and
completion goals were incentivised using monetary incentives it was found that the cre-
ativity contingent rewards increased creativity while performance and completion con-
tingent rewards had slightly negative effects on creative performance (Byron and Khaz-
anchi, 2012). Extrinsic rewards, in tasks that were adaptive style/complex and innovative
style/simple jobs, decreased creative performance as extrinsic motivators increased, sup-
porting the idea that extrinsic rewards are detrimental in heuristic tasks, but did not affect
creativity in innovative style/complex tasks (Baer, Oldham, and Cummings, 2003). This
shows that researchers need to be careful what type of goals or instructions are given
when testing for the effect of extrinsic motivators on performance since the outcome can
be different if creative contingent rewards are used instead of performance contingent
rewards. It is also relevant in the markets for creative goods as the effectiveness of the
motivators present can depend how they are perceived.
A possible explanation for the difference in performance and creativity contingent
tasks could be that when instructed to “be creative” the creative performance increased
(Harrington, 1975; Niu and Liu, 2009). The increase in creativity in the creative contingent
condition could be due to the knowledge of being judged in terms of creativity, in essence
being told to “be creative”. This could motivate to be more creative in contrast to it be-
ing just the monetary incentive increasing creative performance. Pay-out structure also
matters, for example, tournament structured rewards for group creativity were found to
be more effective than piece-rate rewards, i.e. fixed pay regardless of performance, in
inducing creative production (Chen, Williamson, and Zhou, 2012).
If incentives are given in an environment where there is tolerance for early failures
and reward for long term success then the incentives are more effective in motivating
innovation compared to fixed-wage or pay-for-performance incentives (Eisenberg and
Thompson, 2011). The importance of the type of incentive and the environment the re-
ward it is administered in further highlights the importance of how market participants
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perceive the incentives. The results detailed in the following chapters can help to give
more information about how market participants view the incentives present in the mar-
ket. They can also help to pinpoint what type of incentives are perceived to be present in
the complex market. The subject’s prior experience with the relevant task also influences
how effective the rewards are, if the subject has had prior experience in the creative task,
and were then given a reward to do it again, their creativity increased compared to if they
did not have prior experience (Eisenberger, Haskins, and Gambleton, 1999). Simply say-
ing that monetary rewards are or are not effective ignoring the intricacies of the different
types of monetary rewards and the context in which they are given which also has an
effect on the overall effectiveness of the rewards.
2.2.3 Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Motivation
The correlation between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation is not always clear when in-
centivising creativity as detailed by the over justification theory which describes how ex-
trinsic constraints, in the form of extrinsic motivators, can decrease intrinsic motivation
(Glover, Ronning, and Reynolds, 1989). In addition to this it has been found that when
extrinsic motivators such as, the quality and creative measures are introduced in a creativ-
ity weighted pay scheme the creative production was lower than when there was only a
quality measure (Kachelmeier, Reichert, and Williamson, 2008). This would suggest that
if an extrinsic motivation was introduced it would decrease performance. However, it is
not certain because extrinsic motivators can be effective, but when compared with intrin-
sic motivators, been found to be less effective (Morningstar, 2012). This however does not
mean that extrinsic motivators are not effective, but care needs to be taken when talking
about their effectiveness in motivating creativity. This is especially relevant in terms of
the effectiveness of copyright in incentivising creation. If the motives are assumed to in-
crease creativity over all categories of creativity in a wide variety of situations it should
be robustly proven through empirical evidence.
This is especially relevant as constraints, such as an imposed theme, constrained infor-
mation, or certain objectives, have been found to increase creativity only in cases where
the constraint was malleable (Medeiros, Partlow, and Mumford, 2014). However, con-
straints like copyright and high licencing fees2 and the orphan works3 problem brought
on by it could be too rigid to work around. The interaction between intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation is a key aspect of the impact of market incentives and copyright on creativity.
2licensing fees are fees which are paid in order to be able to use or display a copyrighted work. It also is
relevant for patents where a patent can be licenced and then used in a product, for example.
3Orphan works are works, such as books or art pieces in copyright but which have fallen out of use to
the point that it is hard to find the copyright holder. This is especially problematic for sequential production
where an artist may want to license a work but be unable to find the copyright owner of the work.
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It is useful to focus on these two main groups when discussing incentives in the markets
for creative goods. This helps to streamline the discussion for later chapters but also is a
solid foundation for the discussion of the philosophy of copyright. Copyright has a large
influence on the market for creative goods as it creates an artificial monopoly for the cre-
ator of a copyrighted work, this in turn can change how an individual acts in the market
compared to a scenario with no copyright. For example, they might change their current
effort decisions, and change what they create based on existing works.
2.3 Review of Copyright Law and Related Issues
The philosophical ideals behind copyright are important to understand the underlying
justifications for the laws and the philosophical reasoning behind them. The philosoph-
ical background also gives some insight into what is prioritised in different countries
and how these priorities formed the legal systems within the country, specifically differ-
ences between civil and common law countries4. Knowing the philosophical background
makes it easier to dissect the arguments used to justify copyright. This makes it clearer
to see why copyright manifests itself in the way it does. For example, if the copyright in
a country is justified using the utilitarian argument rather than the natural rights argu-
ment then it is more understandable that there is more of an emphasis on economic rights
rather than authors or moral rights.
2.3.1 Rights and Background Philosophical Ideas
Before going into copyright related issues, it is important to set out what is meant by
“copyright” or even a “right”. The Stanford encyclopaedia defines rights as follows:
“Rights dominate modern understanding of what actions are permissible and which in-
stitutions are just. Rights structure the form of governments, the content of laws, and
shape of morality as it is currently perceived. To accept a set of rights is to approve a dis-
tribution of freedom and authority, and so to endorse a certain view of what may, must
and must not be done.” (Wenar, 2011). Thus, if life was seen as a right, then laws would
be written to distribute these rights for everyone under the jurisdiction of the law. In-
stitutions like the police and the court system would be created to protect these rights,
and individual freedoms would not be extended to allow for murder. By extension legal
rights are rights which are extended to people under the rules of legal systems or by a de-
cision of an authoritative body (Wenar, 2011). Rights are more general and legal rights are
4An example of a common law country is the UK or Australia, a civil law countries include France or
Germany. All Continental European countries are civil law countries.
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rights in context of the law or authoritative body so legal rights are slightly more specific
and exist in slightly more constrained circumstances than rights in general.
A copyright is a monopoly given to authors over their works, in order to give author’s
the incentive to create and disseminate work of social value, it also can be given to an
author who is seen to “deserve” compensation for their contribution even if it did not
induce them to create (Sterk, 1996). One of its purposes is to address the problem of free
riding which is when “pirates” copy the creators work without needing to pay for any
fixed costs, thus being able to undercut the price set by the original creator. To combat
this problem the creator is given a monopoly over their work so that they can charge
a higher price compared to marginal cost and recover their fixed costs5 (Towse, 2014).
Copyright attempts to solve problem of free copying by giving the author property rights
over their creation and so control of their work, this way the author is given the potential
to financially benefit from their work and potentially have more opportunity to create
more socially valuable works later. This argument is heavily based on Locke’s argument
for property rights, where he argues that the fruits of one’s labour are their property and
that they have an exclusive right to it because it is earned through their labour (Locke
and Laslett, 1988, p 289-290). Locke outlined the right to property or a property by stating
that people had a natural or automatic right to their body. Therefore by extension they
have a right to the product of their labour. Addittionally, if an individual mixed their
labour with an unowned object then the individual became entitled to that object as their
property (Locke and Laslett, 1988, p. 287-288).
Moral rights are a part of the continental European author’s rights which are non-
monetary in nature, many countries, like the United States, do not recognise moral rights
which was a large reason why the United States did not ratify the Berne Convention6
until much later (Drahos, 2002, p. 196; Mills, 2011). Moral rights include a collection of
four legal entitlements; the right of disclosure which allows the artist to refuse to expose
his work, the right to retraction i.e. right to retract their work from the public view, the
right of attribution or right to be named the author, and the right of integrity which al-
lows the artist to prevent destruction and alteration of their work (Mills, 2011). Moral
rights have been strongly influenced by Kant who argued that creation was a manifesta-
tion of the creator’s personality and thus the author had inalienable right to their creation.
This is derived from their right to communicate their ideas and so is a personality rather
than property right (Suhl, 2001). Interestingly the United States, a country where free-
dom of speech is strongly protected, they do not have a strong culture of moral rights
5Thee fixed costs can include anything from time spent creating to costs of materials. Thus the extrinsic
motive of copyright is a catch all in terms of the types of costs of creation which it coveres.
6The Berne Convention is an international copyright agreement where countries agreed to enforce copy-
right from any member state in all member state.
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in copyright, even though moral rights derive from the idea of freedom of expression
the same freedom that is guaranteed by the first amendment of the United States Con-
stitution. This phenomena could be partially explained by Thomas Jefferson, who was
an important figure in drafting the constitution, rejecting any natural rights foundation
for granting control to authors and so focusing more on the economic rights of copyright
(Moore, 2003).
A natural right is a right which is automatic and given without formalities, in con-
text of copyright, when an artist finishes a work the copyright is a natural right if the
author automatically receives a copyright in the work without needing to register the
work (Bently, Suthersanen, and Torremans, 2010). Both Kant and Locke use the concept
of a natural right when they argue for an existence of artist’s rights and property rights
(Locke and Laslett, 1988, p. 289-290; Mills, 2011). Thus there is more importance put
on the artistic work compared to other forms of property because there is an idea that the
work is a manifestation of a person’s personality. This is similar to intrinsic value given to
object like gifts that can be connected to the personality of the gift giver. Conversely Locke
argued that the individual’s labour separates private property from the commons. Addi-
tionally, once the individuals labour was mixed with an unowned resource, the product
would be the labourer’s inalienable property and hence permits the individual a natural
right to the fruits of their labour (Locke and Laslett, 1988, p. 287-288).
Economic rights, according to the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988, include
the right to copy, issue, rent, or lend copies to the public, perform, to communicate work
in public, and to make adaptations of the work (Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988).
Anglo Saxon copyright law such as, the UK and US copyright, emphasise economic rights
while in civil law countries the emphasis is on authors’ rights with moral rights an inte-
gral being an integral feature of those rights (Towse, Handke, and Stepan, 2008). However
the difference in these two rights is shrinking due to a deliberate policy of harmonisa-
tion and by the trade in cultural goods and services (Towse, Handke, and Stepan, 2008).
Economic rights are important when talking about the utilitarian rationale since the ra-
tionale depends on incentive to create stemming from economic incentives given by a
monopoly over one’s creation. The utilitarian argument for copyright being when cre-
ators are granted control over their work is argued to give them incentive to create. This
way society can maximise social utility as the benefit from the policy is seen to be larger
than any other alternative action or policy (Moore, 2003).
2.3.2 Historical Background of Common Law Copyright
Given that there is a clear philosophical background to explain and rationalise copyright,
it is worth looking more closely at the origins of modern copyright, and the rationale used
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to justify it, specifically in the UK. The reason the UK is a worthwhile point of reference is
that it has provided the base for mny of the world’s copyright regimes. This is due to the
UK being a former colonial power and therefore it has influenced the legal institutions
adopted in its former colonies. Countries like India, Australia, and the US have been
directly influenced by copyright laws enacted in the UK and their copyright laws are
specifically heavily influenced by the Statute of Anne (Bracha and Syed, 2013; Davis, 2012;
Panda, 2007). The US being one of the largest and most influential economies in the world
makes the Statute of Anne, and the rationale for it especially crucial if one is to understand
modern copyright and why it is structured the way it is globally. A brief history of UK
copyright is discussed before delving into the rationale used to justify the Statute of Anne
and modern copyright in the UK. After which the effect of the Berne Convention and
TRIPS agreement7 has on global copyright and thus developed and developing nations
is discussed.
Legislation comparable to copyright has existed in the UK for many centuries and has
evolved along with the times reflection the political climate and popular opinion of the
times. After royal charter of 1557 there was no copyright, per se, in the UK, but a system
of censorship where stationers companies were given control of what to print and who
could print it by the government in return for adhering to the rules set by the government
on what could and could not be printed. This monopoly over book printing was not done
to secure stationers or publishers rights but rather to establish a more effective system of
government surveillance (Rose, 1993, p. 12). Therefore this was similar to a copyright in
the sense that it granted a monopoly over printing but the rationale was based on control
rather than the encouragement of ideas. This reflected the crowns wishes to quash politi-
cal and religious dissent by controlling who could publish and what they could publish.
The stationers’ company, on the other hand, wanted to regulate trade, restrict reprints,
and consolidate market power over publishing to concentrate power among its mem-
bers. These two entities shared the same motive and coincided for years being regulated
by star chamber decrees (Alexander, 2010, p. 18). This dynamic slowly started to change
as the book trade became more competitive between publishers who started to recognise
authors’ rights (Feather, 1994, p. 4-5). This change was evident when the world’s first
copyright statute, the Statute of Anne, was enacted in 1710 it shifted overall focus from
censorship to ownership reflecting a shift overall in mind set toward the authors’ over-
all interests compared to the interests of stationers’ and government censorship (Feather,
1994, p. 4; Rose, 1993, p. 48).
There were a few crucial differences after the Statute of Anne was enacted, the right
7Is a legal agreement among nations of the WTO which sets out minimum standards for intellectual
property protection.
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to copy was no longer in perpetuity but confined to an initial terms of 14 years and ad-
ditional 14 years if the author was still alive for new works and 21 years, until 1731, for
old works. The act also transferred the property right to the authors instead of to the
stationers who had the property rights assigned to them before the act (Bonham-Carter,
1978, p. 16). This was influenced with authors like Defoe pushing for a law that gave
authors the right to their work in order to encourage learning, which in turn inspired the
stationers to lobby parliament using similar rhetoric in order to secure publishing rights
(Deazley, 2004, p. 32-33). The reason this is especially significant because it is the first
time the utilitarian rationale was used to justifying the need for a copyright and the first
copyright law which set a president for future rationale for copyright.
2.3.3 Utilitarian Argument
The utilitarian argument hinges on the idea that economic incentives given by copyright
promotes the creation of new works which are then granted a monopoly to allow the au-
thors to recover their fixed costs. Knowing this, the authors receive a monopoly which
gives them the incentive to create and dissemination of new works and ideas by authors.
This benefits society by protecting private returns, increasing overall knowledge, and
amount of welfare increasing creations within society as a whole. Thus the argument
states that copyright provides the greatest utility for the greatest number of people espe-
cially when compared to a situation with no copyright. This is where the thesis research
contributes to the realm of the copyright discussion. The research focuses on the influence
of attribution or public information and economic rights or tournament pay on creative
performance. Creativity tests are used to mimic the process of creation in the market for
creative goods and with varying treatments, with and without, economic and attribution
rights to measure their influence on creative performance. More specifically the focus is
on the effects of tournament pay and public information on the creativity of the partic-
ipants. The aim is thus to observe if the rights increase production and overall creative
production as argued by copyright proponents.
2.3.4 Utilitarian Argument in Context of the Experiments
Given the results from the experiment conducted for the thesis it is possible to say if fi-
nancial incentives do in fact increase creative performance or if they have any affect at
all. In other words, if the results support the utilitarian rationale of copyright or not. It
should be specified that using the results no judgments can be made about the legitimacy
of copyright but rather about the utilitarian argument used to rationalise it. Whether cre-
ativity or the subjective success of the participants is, or is not, affected by the tournament
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pay or public information is discussed in terms of the utilitarian argument for copyright.
The newest extension of copyright in the US, named the the Sonny Bono Act8, has been
theorised to have a negligible impact on incentives and the creation of new works. This
is based on the small increase it would have on the present value of any new works and
thus could actually decrease the total amount of works in the public domain (Akerlof et
al., 2002). The term extension was not found to increase the incentive to create new works
either, even when considering the effect of optimism bias (Tor and Oliar, 2002). The re-
sults from the experiment can inform not only the discussion about the effectiveness of
the utilitarian argument but also the discussion about the optimal term of copyright.
2.3.5 Rationale and Copyright
The utilitarian argument is often used to justify the existence of copyright. For example,
when both the stationers and the publishers lobbied for the Statute of Anne, basing the
need for copyright on an underlying assumption that monetary rewards incentivise cre-
ation (Feather, 1994, p. 4; Rose, 1993, p. 48). There is some doubt that this is the case
however since there seems to be a distinct lack of empirical evidence that the monetary
incentives brought on by copyright law spur creation (Atiq, 2013; Boldrin and Levine,
2013; Howe and Griffiths, 2013; O’Hare, 1982). In fact, there is evidence that monetary
incentives, similar to the incentives brought on by copyright, can crowd out already ex-
isting motivation and causes a decrease in overall creative performance (Amabile and
Pillemer, 2012; Atiq, 2013; Deci, 1971; Deci, 1972).
Copyright is also subpar when it comes to allocating earnings among creators. It is
not the stated purpose of copyright according to the utilitarian rationale, but it does bring
up the question if copyright is necessary, because it’s found to widen the gap between
superstars and other artists (Kretschmer, 2012). This is relevant because the monopoly
that copyright awards over a work causes market distortions that cause copyright as a
solution to piracy, to be a second-best solution. Especially in the digital age where it af-
fects user privacy and ability to browse the internet freely (Palmer, 1990; Towse, Handke,
and Stepan, 2008; Zimmerman, 2002). Term extensions of copyright point to it being more
of a mechanism of rent collection for copyright holders rather than a tool to incentivise
creators, since it was a retroactively extended copyright (Tor and Oliar, 2002). There is
also doubt as to the necessity of a copyright regime as it is not the only way to promote
creation, depending on what the industry is, there are numerous alternatives to copyright
which would not carry the same market distortions (Atiq, 2013; Gallini and Scotchmer,
2002; Palmer, 1988; Stiglitz, 2008). There are additional legal alternative which could
8increased the copyright term of copyright protection by 20 years(Akerlof et al., 2002)
20 Chapter 2. Literature Review
be more effective in protecting copyrightable works without carrying many of the trans-
action costs of the current system (Atiq, 2013; Boldrin and Levine, 2006; Palmer, 1990).
Considering a copyright or IP regime is judged by the ease of transactions and the way it
strikes a balance between incentives and access, any unnecessary increases in roadblocks
to rights exchanges, such as transaction costs, would not be a desirable externality (Lan-
des and Posner, 1989; Towse, Handke, and Stepan, 2008). If there is more information
about what promotes creation then steps can be taken toward a more effective copyright
regime. This is where the results in the later chapters can shine more light on what incen-
tivises creation and so allow for a better idea of how policy could be structured to help
spur creation.
It is important to be aware of the copyright systems strengths because in certain sit-
uations it can be the most efficient system, like when the cost and value of a project are
not observable by the sponsor (Gallini and Scotchmer, 2002; O’Hare, 1982). There are
also ways to make the current copyright system more efficient which would only require
relatively small adjustments like forming a registry for copyrighted works which would
decrease the tracing costs for creators (Landes and Posner, 1989). Copyright is not op-
timal and is an example of a second best solution (Towse, Handke, and Stepan, 2008,
p. 12). This does not mean that copyright is not necessary or that it’s an inefficient way
to incentivise or protect creators’ products, it could be the best system available, at least
in some cases. However, it is necessary to look closer at the rationale used to justify it,
because if this rationale is found to be incorrect then the foundation on which copyright
has been created is weak. This can cause copyright to address the issues of incentives
and property protection in the copyright industries in a way which might not be effi-
cient, possibly even fixing a problem which does not exist. Causing externalities brought
on by monopoly power and transaction costs. The argument behind the justification for
copyright is crucial to fully understand it and to fix any potential inefficiencies/problems
brought on by it, if they are to be addressed appropriately. If researchers can get closer
to answering the question of what incentivises creation, then it becomes easier to create a
legal environment based on the findings that can be more efficient than simply going by
past legal precedent.
2.3.6 Copyright Globally: Berne & TRIPS
To round up the discussion about copyright, the origins of global copyright is discussed
which will help to give perspective on the global influence of copyright. In terms of inter-
national copyright, one must start the discussion with the Berne Convention, which was
signed in 1886 with the original signatories being exclusively from Europe (Story, 2003;
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WIPO, 2013). The first signatories were developed countries, but gradually more devel-
oping countries joined due to the colonial clause (Malkawi, 2013). There is a clear colonial
influence when it comes to IP protection since there is a positive correlation between IP
protection and colonial history (Peukert, 2012). The Berne convention was influenced by
the French droit d’auteur or authors rights which contrasts with common law countries
like the US where copyright deals with economic concerns (Malkawi, 2013).
In civil law countries copyright is concerned with authors rights while in common
law countries it is used in a broader sense extending to related rights where the rights
are not connected to the author (Sterling, 2000, p. 14). It took until 1988 for the US join
the Berne, but quickly evolved into TRIPs9 and this included most substantial provisions
of the Berne Convention but left out moral rights due to US fears of inadequate moral
rights protection (Malkawi, 2013, p. 21;Sterling, 2000, p. 78). Thus, it’s safe to say that the
Berne Convention has had a large influence on modern global copyright especially with
Berne serving as the conceptual framework for treaties like the WIPO10 (Story, 2003, p. 21;
Sterling, 2000, p. 78).
It is important to understand the historical context of the law to fully understand
the differences in motives for copyright in the developed and developing countries and
effects of global copyright on the developing world. The developed world has an incen-
tive for strong copyright to protect their works abroad while in the developing world it
would be more advantageous to have more relaxed IP laws (Malkawi, 2013; Shi, 2010;
Story, 2003). Historically speaking developing countries have sought lower IP protection
because they might impede economic development (Malkawi, 2013). This claim has some
support as some developing countries have substantial difficulties providing affordable
education due to inflexible international copyright laws which cause the educational ma-
terials to be prohibitively expensive for educational institutions to purchase (Story, 2003).
It is interesting, as a case study, to note that when the US was in its development stage in
the 19th century it didn’t give copyright protection to foreign works (Plant, 1934).
However, developing countries no longer have the same freedom to resist interna-
tional agreements like TRIPs as developed countries have the power to coerce developing
countries to sign by threatening to pull foreign aid (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000, p. 215).
This is done because TRIPs mainly benefit industrialised countries with harmonisation
lacking flexibility for developing countries which find long term benefits from TRIPs il-
lusive (Shi, 2010). Traditionally monopoly rights associated with copyright, which are
granted by international trade agreements, are mostly used as method to extract revenue
9TRIPs or the agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. It is signed by all
WTO members (wto.org).
10The WIPO being the World Intellectual Property Organisation tasked with encouraging creativity and
protecting intellectual property globally.
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from the developing countries (Boldrin and Levine, 2006). In light of this information it
should be no surprise that copyright industries use substantial sums of money to lobby
the WTO and WIPO (Towse, Handke, and Stepan, 2008). This is why there have even
been calls to abolish the Berne convention completely as it promotes inequality between
developing and developed countries that use the agreement to protect their intellectual
property at the expense of development in, for example, Africa (Story, 2003).
It is also argued that neither TRIPs nor Berne offer adequate protection and that al-
though copyright might be an unfair competition law, it should be strengthened as it
would be more efficient than an alternative IP law paradigm (Lehmann, 1994). The prob-
lems caused by inflexibility of provisions and the abuse of power by developed coun-
tries could also be solved by decentralising power and deferring to national legislatures
in order to balance protection against societal values (Helfer, 1998). It is worth noting
copyrights global and local effects to fully understand the wide reaching implications of
copyright and how it is important to have an effective global copyright system to create
a globally conducive environment for innovation.
2.3.7 Copyright Arguments: Brief Introduction
Landes and Posner (1989) and Boldrin and Levine (2013) forward conflicting arguments
regarding the effectiveness of copyright. Both pairs of authors have a series of papers
that bring forward their theories on the role and effectiveness of copyright. Landes and
Posner argue that without copyright there would be inefficient incentive for artists to
create (Landes and Posner, 2003). They also state that the point of copyright is to max-
imise creating new works while minimising costs of limiting access and so the point of
copyright is to balance access and incentive (Landes and Posner, 1989). In contrast to the
point brought forward by Landes and Posner Boldrin and Levine argue against a copy-
right. Bouldrin and Levine argue that copyright increases rent seeking behaviour and that
there is no convincing evidence that copyright increases innovation (Boldrin and Levine,
2013). The authors also argue that an incentive to create is best done through prizes or
grants and that it would be best to eliminate copyright altogether (Bandura, 2006). These
arguments help to frame the intended discussion in two sides of the debate, with one set
of authors arguing for the effectiveness of copyright to the point of arguing for it to be
indefinite. Compared to the other set who argue that the incentives to create are market
incentives which copyright, if anything, is distorting and causes an overall decrease in
creative production.
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2.3.8 Efficiency v. Justice and Economic v. Legal Arguments
Copyright outcomes can be judged two broad themes efficiency and justice. The effi-
ciency judgements focus on the efficiency of copyright outcomes while the justice judge-
ments focus on the justice of copyright outcome. The efficiency discussion of copyright
focuses on whether the benefits associated with copyright are higher or lower compared
to the costs. A large part of the discourse associated with the efficiency argument is how
the costs and benefits are measured and whether these measures are reliable. Ultimately
the efficiency argument is closely associated with the economic arguments for copyright
and the field of economics of law. This field has a large set of researchers who focus on
quantifying/modelling costs and benefits as best as possible in order to make some judg-
ment on efficiency. However these methods and conclusions can vary quite drastically as
discussed in section 2.10 and 2.3.7.
Justice in reference to copyright is what is considered a just outcome for authors. The
argument for moral rights is to some extent an example of the justice argument being used
because it centres around the author having a personality right and it is just to protect this
right in law. It can be viewed as just for the author to have some control of a work even
after its sale because the work is a part of the author and their personality. This argument
is not so much about what is efficient in a market context or in the context of an incentive
and more to do with what is right or just. It serves justice for the author to have some
control of what is ultimately viewed as an extension of the author or an extension of the
self. The origin of this type of argument is closely tied to a Kantian view of the self and
how a person and their rights can extend to their creations because a person’s creation
and personality or person is directly linked11.
This is very different to a market approach where the value of a piece of work is dic-
tated by the willingness of individuals to pay for it. Concepts like sentimental value are
assumed to be captured by the willingness of the author to sell the work, as the higher the
sentimental value of the work is, the higher the sale price will be. Efficiency would dic-
tate the best outcome will be largely ordered by the market automatically as the buyer’s
willingness to buy and the seller’s willingness to sell will already take into account any
considerations of value, even sentimental value, of a work of art. The economic argu-
ments around copyright very closely based on efficiency of the law which is dictated by
the estimated costs versus benefits of copyright. Justice is more closely linked to the le-
gal arguments surrounding copyright, and more closely with the moral rights arguments
of copyright. However, it should be said that efficiency is not the only concept interest-
ing to economists studying copyright and that justice is not the only concern in the legal
arguments for copyright. There are arguments regarding just outcomes of copyright in
11Moral rights are discussed in more detail in section 2.3.1
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economics and legal arguments citing the efficiency of the law but overall justice is closer
to what the field of law view important in outcomes while efficiency is largely the concern
of economists. The differences between the arguments in law and economics is discussed
in more detail in section 2.10.
2.3.9 Patents, Copyright, and Industrial Organisation
The following is a short discussion regarding the differences between copyright and
patents and its influence on the general organisation and dynamics of the industries un-
der the two IP regimes. These differences are argued to be large enough to require dif-
ferent experiment structures for both which is why the experiment structure introduced
in chapter 3 is more relevant to the field of copyright. The experiments also discuss the
effect of reputation on creativity and its potential influence on innovation more generally.
Thus, some points regarding reputation discussed in the results in chapters 4 and 5 can
be relevant to both IP regimes even though the market dynamics of the stylised market
are more relevant to copyright industries.
Copyright and patent law can fall into the category of industrial organisation literature
because both types of IP law influence market mechanics and the efficiency of market dy-
namics. However, the two have differences in the way they protect intellectual property
and influence the market. Copyright is instantly granted without the need for an appli-
cation process and grants a copyright, or a monopoly on the expression, for the life of
the author plus 70 years (ws for a maximum period of protection of 20 years (Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988). Patent mean while is not automatic and the inventors of
the patent need to apply for the patent by showing non-obvious improvements on exist-
ing patented inventions and only allows for a maximum period of protection of 20 years
(Patents Act 1977). These few aspects of patent and copyright law already highlight the
major differences in the two IP laws. Patents require proof of originality and requires the
patent to be made public once a patent is granted (Patents Act 1977). This is in stark con-
trast to copyright law where as soon as a work is created there is an automatic copyright
(Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988). Excluding other differences in the laws between
patents and copyright the process of gaining the two IP protection already differs in such
a way that it affects the market dynamics. Firms can use trade secrets instead of using
patents in order to protect their intellectual property which allows them to keep their cre-
ations secret (Acemoglu, 2009, p. 521). This type of decision on the part of the IP creator is
not as necessary in the copyright fields as there is automatic protection of works12. When
12Even though an aithor under copyright protection might still want to keep the work secret but does
not face the same type of choice as under patent protection. This is partly due to the long term of copyright
protection.
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focusing on the creation process this difference makes a large impact on the way a lab
experiment on the subject of patents would be set up which is why the experiments de-
tailed in this thesis focus on copyright law and are not necessarily as directly applicable
to the patent market. The decision to keep secret or to apply for a patent is a complicated
decision to model where as an automatic copyright or IP law is simpler to recreate in a
stylised market. Which is why, although the results can to some extent be relevant for the
study of IP creation more generally, it is more relevant in the context of copyright law.
Acemoglu also points out that along with trade secrets, industry specific innovation
also makes the innovation excludable as patents would in a market where innovations
are more widely applicable (Acemoglu, 2009, p. 548). Interestingly he points out that the
market size is a crucial factor in explaining the prevalence of innovation in an industry.
Referring to studies by Newell, Jaffe, and Stavins (1999) on the effectiveness of market
incentives on innovation in the air conditioner industry, Popp (2002) on the influence of
energy prices on innovation in the field of energy efficiency, and Acemoglu and Linn
(2004) on the effect of increases in market size and the vaccine creation (Acemoglu, 2009,
p. 543-545). This is in interesting contrast to recent work by Christian Handke on the re-
cent innovation in the music industry where, even though the size of the market was de-
creasing in monetary terms, there was no decrease in the overall number of works being
created. This is an interesting finding although he does consider this effect could be due
to the significant decreases in the marginal costs of production in the industry (Handke,
2010). However, one key difference of copyright fields compared to patent fields is the
theorised need for self-expression as discussed by Hans Abbing which might not be as
strong of an influence in patent industries. He argued that artists are a very different
type of person where they feel a strong need to express themselves even when there is
a very large income penalty compared to other existing work. Although the willingness
to participate in an industry with a large income penalty was at least partly attributed to
(over)confidence in their own ability and not just the need to express ones self13 (Abbing,
2011, p. 113-119).
Patent fields have a prevalence of patent assertion entities “PAE’s” also referred to
as patent trolls. These entities do not use the patents themselves but rather make their
money by licencing their IP (Kiebzak, Rafert, and Tucker, 2015; Orsatti and Sterzi, 2018).
Once a PAE has acquired a patent it has been found to decrease the amount of citations
the patent receives. This happens because once a PAE acquires a patent innovative firms
reduce their activity in the fields where these patents have been acquired (Orsatti and
13There could be a need to invent in patent fields as there is a need express ones self in copyright fields.
However I am not aware of such theories in the patent markets.
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Sterzi, 2018). With copyright it is also possible to acquire IP and create copyright cat-
alogues, as record companies generally do. Although there is generally less possibility
to limit a competitors ability create in copyright fields compared to patent fields where
it can be more difficult to work around existing IP. It is worth noting that in copyright
industries it is often the case that there are large fixed costs but low marginal costs, take
films or music as an example, however in patent industries there can be high variable
costs of producing the products which patents are protecting. Take cell phone production
as an example. Not only does the production process require multiple patents or licences
to create the phone with multiple individual parts but the procurement of materials and
production of parts can be very costly. Although making a movie can require licencing of
IP similar to the process of cell phones, once the production is done it can be copied at an
effectively 0 marginal cost. This is another key difference between the markets in the two
IP regimes as there is generally lower marginal costs of production in copyright industries
compared to patent industries. Higher variable costs of the products add another layer
of complexity to the competitive market which would need to be considered in order to
more accurately mimic patent markets. This is not to say that the experiment discussed in
chapter 3 does not have any relevance to the patent industry as there are similarities. For
example, computer programming operates using both in the patent and copyright to their
advantage (DiCola, 2013). However, there is a clear focus on the influence of financial and
public information/reputation effects in the copyright industry.
2.4 Market Structure in Creative Industries
The previous section discussed some impacts of attribution on the sales decisions of
artists and helped to gain some insight into how there might be some disparity between
willingness to pay and accept between offers to buy a piece of art. This suggested that
there is some value in attribution which was not completely explained by the endow-
ment effect. The next area of interest is then the pay structure of these markets and how
these can influence production decisions. The pay structure found in many copyright
industries is similar to a tournament pay structure where a large proportion of all the
earnings in the industry are concentrated at the top, with examples being found from
book and music publishing (Kretschmer, 2012; Kretschmer and Hardwick, 2007; Abbing,
2011, p 193). This creates unique incentives compared to a system of fixed pay where
there is no or little difference in pay between individuals. This introduces a race to the
top where multiple individuals compete for the very high rewards at the top while taking
the risk of being at the bottom end of the earnings spectrum.
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2.4.1 Patents, Copyright, and Intellectual Property
There is the same conflict between protection and allowing follow-on innovation at the
foundation of patent and copyright law. In copyright law there is the conflict between the
allowing individuals a copyright and the negative influences that copyright might have
on the ability to create derivative works14. The problem is that both copyright and patents
allow the holder a monopoly over their creation which can hinder further innovation,
especially as this could decrease the monopoly power of the patent or copyright holder.
It is even argued that allowing patents for airplanes in the early stages of its development
actually slowed down the speed of aviation innovation in the US (Boldrin and Levine,
2013). There is also the problem of patent assertion entities (PAE’s) also called patent trolls
which are entities which own patents but do not produce goods based on them. Rather
they make money through licensing their patents or by suing individuals or companies
who violate their patents. They have been found to cause decreases in innovation and
venture capital investment in fields which they operate (Orsatti and Sterzi, 2018; Kiebzak,
Rafert, and Tucker, 2015). This indicates that the patents which are designed to increase
innovative behaviour can have the exact opposite effect. These types of entities are less
likely to exist in copyright although there are some analogs in the copyright industries
where larger firms and entities with large catalogues sue artists which are seen to copy
existing works. However the mechanics of these two phenomena are different. Crucially
patents have a lifespan of 20 years while copyrights have a life span of the authors life
plus 70 years (Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988). This is, at least partly, due to the
relative cost of the monopoly which is granted in the two circumstances. Patents are also
used in fields which evolve relatively quickly such as, the aviation industry as detailed
previously. Thus long terms ownership of such as, the terms in copyright, would not be
2.4.2 Effects of Pay for Performance
To gain background knowledge of the effectiveness of pay as a motivator, performance
related pay and its effects on productivity is discussed before moving onto how pay and
performance related pay affects creativity specifically. Performance related pay is an im-
portant topic for businesses and policy makers who aim to maximise overall productivity.
There is vast amount of literature about the effects of performance related pay in general
(Deci, 1971; Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997) and in a business setting (Amabile and Pille-
mer, 2012; Amabile, 1997; Suff, Reilly, and Cox, 2007). Business performance related pay
14Works which are largely based on an existing work. The derivative work can be so similar or based
so directly on the original work that the author of the derivative work would need the permission of the
copyright/patent holder in order to publish/sell the new/derivative creation.
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(PRP) literature is reviewed in context of how it might affect performance in varying con-
texts.
Performance related pay, without considering its potential interaction effects with rep-
utation, has a large literature in business organisation, psychology and economics. There
are two concepts of interest related to PRP: crowding out and sorting. Crowding out can
occur when extrinsic motivators, such as, minimum performance requirements or perfor-
mance related pay are used to motivate individuals. These are then said to crowd-out
intrinsic motivation which arises from, for example, task enjoyment (Deci, 1971). Sorting,
on the other hand, is when performance related pay causes the less productive workers to
quit or produce low effort while attracting and motivating highly skilled labour (Eriksson
et al., 2007). These two effects help to explain how, in some cases, conventional wisdom
of “the more incentive the better” works, while sometimes PRP and other extrinsic incen-
tives can decrease overall performance.
Sorting is an interesting phenomenon as it explains well a key insight about PRP’s
affect on motivation. Individuals act strategically and react to the incentives of their envi-
ronment. Thus, when articles, such as, (Eriksson et al., 2007) or (Lazear, 2000) mention the
sorting effects due to PRP, it highlights a core question: who do you want to motivate? Is
it the talented who can then be pushed to increase their overall production and produce
something masterful, or is it that the best situation would be best would be when over-
all production is at its highest? It is also crucial to note the impacts of PRP on the work
environment or industry as PRP has been found to widen wage gaps and create conflicts
which can be detrimental to team effort (Lazear, 2000). In addition, the overall impact of
PRP can be offset by the sorting effect which would render the PRP’s pointless, although
organisational commitment seems to negate some of the demotivational aspects of PRP
(Marsden, French, and Kobi, 2000). This is echoed in business literature it suggests that
that external incentives are administered does matter i.e. whether they are prosocial and
increase production or controlling and decrease creative production (Amabile and Pille-
mer, 2012). The research thus attempts to answer how individuals perceive the two rights
and how do they affect performance? Do we observe a higher variance and a sorting
effect? Or is there overall increase in production which would hint to the rights being
perceived as prosocial motivators.
Crowding out and sorting are very similar effects since the sorting effect has the intrin-
sic motivation of the lower performers is crowded out while seemingly supporting it for
the higher performing groups. It can thus be theorised that how people perceive them-
selves matters when observing PRP as if people think they are in the top group in talent
they will increase their total production, but this might not work after feedback about the
individual’s relative performance has been received. This could be a contributing factor
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as to why PRP is less frequently found in long term employment relationships (Lazear,
2000). It is thus interesting to note how performance or tournament pay and attribution
rights might affect performance in the long term, although it is out of the scope of the
current study some general comments are made on the issue.
The Structure of the Creative Markets
Observing the structure of the market for creative goods it is possible to gain insights into
the environment where most art is created, and although the different fields within the
creative markets are different there are many overarching similarities which are worth
going into in more detail. Taking book and music publishing as an example they have
been found to be markets where the average pay is considerably lower when compar-
ing to other industries and where the median pay is far below the average (Kretschmer,
2012; Kretschmer and Hardwick, 2007). The same skewness of income due to the con-
centrated earnings for performers is argued to be the case for artists in general (Abbing,
2011, p. 113). This income penalty for artists in general is thought to be the case due
to an oversupply of creative goods which would make the market structure imperfectly
monopolistically competitive (Menger, 2001).
It is common for artists to hold jobs outside of the market for creative goods to the
point that a significant proportion of the artists income comes from these sources (Alper
and Wassall, 2006, p. 825, 829; Kretschmer and Hardwick, 2007; Throsby, 1994). In fact in
some industries such as music the proportion of income from these sources are very low
(DiCola, 2013). Suggesting that artists in the market are either participating in the market
as a hobby or funding their artistic endeavours by finding outside sources of income. The
former claim is supported by findings that artists have a positive cross price elasticity
between non-arts income and spending on the artistic endeavour (Towse, 2006). Thus
artists are willing to accept the low pay of the career, at least in the short run, and rely on
their income from outside sources but when this income from outside sources increases
the artist increases their time/money spent on their art. Outside income acts as a subsidy
and increases the overall supply of goods in the market diluting the demand base and
decreasing average earnings. The ‘oversupply’ has any consequences on the quality of the
artistic product necessarily. In winner-takes-all markets the important factor in market
success is relative performance and a limited attention, memory, and overall mental shelf
space of the consumer further skews demand toward the successful producers (Frank and
Cook, 1996).
This market structure is important to take into account when discussing incentivis-
ing creativity because, for a subset of people, financial incentives might only incentivise
one type of production over another. Furthermore, the initial motivation for being in
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the creative industry is important as financial incentives, such as copyright, can cause
people to keep out of the market. Artists are thought to create for a variety of reasons,
fame, wealth, or self-expression with the joy of creation cited as important (Cowen and
Grier, 1996). Artists are generally thought to be more intrinsically motivated and create
as a selfless act (Abbing, 2011, p. 81-82). Taking this into account analysing the impact
of economic incentives becomes more imperative because there is a possibility that one
motivator could crowd out the other. Economic rights or the ownership of a good can
also discourage further innovation or creation in the fear of possibly violating anothers
intellectual property as discussed earlier.
If creativity is increased in the market how might this affect the market, and is this
even interesting or important? In pure monetary terms quality of the creative product the
value of the product corresponds to the quality of the art (Frey and Pommerehne, 1989).
If this is the case then an overall increase in the quality of the product in the creative mar-
kets would increase the value of those markets. However the increase in market value
is not the only component of interest when discussing any market or even economy as a
whole. This is similar to discussing real GDP growth for an economy since the growth
of the real GDP does not mean an increase in the overall living standards of the market
participants. The key to fully understanding the effects of an increase in value, whether it
be real GDP or market value, is how this increase is distributed in the market. For creative
products this increase in market value can be very lucrative but if the increase in incomes
is concentrated at the top of the distribution then the benefits of this type of increase in
market value can be limited. Although a boost in revenue, through interventions such
as copyright, can increase the value at the top of the income distribution and so increase
incentives for creators at the bottom of this distribution to work hard to get to the top (Di-
Cola, 2013). However the question remains, is the increase in market value and incentive,
increasing living standards, producer welfare, or even welfare overall?
Winner takes all or a tournament pay structure can be an efficient way to encourage
effort in fields where it is hard or expensive to observe output but easy to observe workers
rank or relative performance (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). This is especially relevant for mar-
kets for creative goods where it is easy to observe output, but can be hard to quantify or
accurately predict its value, as evidenced by the ‘no-one-knows’ principle. Considering
this it might not be a surprise that creative markets tend to be winner takes all markets,
i.e. markets where earnings are highly concentrated at the top. The central tension in
such pay schemes is the trade-off between encouraging effort on the part of the worker or
market participant and balancing the burden of risk which makes winner takes all mar-
kets fairly unattractive (Krishna and Morgan, 1998). This is also important as copyright
allows artists to recover their fixed costs more easily compared to a market environment
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where there would be no such rights (Towse, 2014). This reduces the risk to the creator
and thus would facilitate creative production, which is the essential part of the utilitarian
argument.
2.5 Directly Related Copyright Studies
A recent 2014 study empirically tests how different thresholds, like the ones for patents
and copyrights affect the creative performance of subjects in an experiment where the
test subjects completed different creativity tasks under varying threshold conditions. The
aim of the study being to see how these different threshold levels incentivised creativity
and so conclusions could be drawn on whether these threshold conditions spurred cre-
ativity or not. What the researchers found was that there was little difference between
the control group and the low threshold condition designed to mimic copyrights legal
threshold for creativity. They found that performance increased significantly between the
copyright and patent conditions, where the threshold was significantly higher compared
to the copyright condition, concluding that if sufficiently strong thresholds and monetary
incentives tied to them do incentivise creativity (Buccafusco et al., 2014). What this means
is that monetary incentives are more effective the harder it would be to gain a copyright or
the higher the creative standards in to gain economic ownership of an idea. This finding
in the context of copyright markets would suggest that whatever the market was looking
for, in terms of style or quality for example, would be delivered with the higher quality
the higher the thresholds for success were. If we take these results as given the ques-
tion remains is the market producing what it socially optimal and are the incentives that
are in place promoting creativity and socially optimal production? It also implies that if
the market were to demand higher quality goods then this would create an incentive to
increase creativity or the product/output which would support the utilitarian rationale.
This thesis adds to the previously mentioned research by taking into account the at-
tribution or public information aspect in creation. How does the fact that a person can
indicate themselves as the creator of an expression influence the way participants interact
in the market place? There are interesting studies related to the effect of attribution rights
on the price of art works and the cognitive biases involved in selling one’s art works
which affect the efficiency of the art market. These studies find that there is a significant
difference between what people are willing to buy an artwork for and what people are
willing to sell an artwork for, which suggest there is personal value to the work apart form
an endowment effect (Buccafusco and Sprigman, 2010; Sprigman, Buccafusco, and Burns,
2013). Similar studies support the findings of an endowment effect that exist due to some
default rules, of which attribution could be one (Marcin and Nicklisch, 2014). Thus there
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is an endowment effect which is found more generally15 but there is also a part of Studies
such as these help map the cognitive biases involved in valuing one’s work and could
go a way to explain why the art market can be inefficient at times, even without taking
into account the effects of copyright. It can also help explain how people overestimate
the value of their work or their chance to succeed and this could increase incentive to
create even without monetary rewards (Buccafusco and Sprigman, 2010). The research
in this thesis on public information and tournament pay, along with the existing research
on cognitive biases involved in the creation and pricing of art, can help shed light on
what drives creation and if copyright laws incentivise it. The interaction between attri-
bution/public information and economic rights/tournament pay as an extrinsic reward
can help to further inform the discussion on the impact of incentives and their influence
on creativity.
2.6 Fairness and Satisfaction Literature and Utility
Along with the creativity implications of aspects of copyright, the thesis discusses how
the individual perceives the differing market environments. How do the market partic-
ipants perceive the fairness of the market rewards? Does the satisfaction in one’s per-
formance depend on the market environment? Is there evidence of differing levels of
enjoyment or envy which is present in differing market environments? What are the con-
sequences of these market environments on perceived or experienced utility? The follow-
ing discussion will briefly introduce these concepts and discuss previous research on the
subjects. Chapter 5 discussed these questions using the results from the post-experiment
survey to gain some insights into how individual’s perceptions can depend on the market
environment.
2.6.1 Satisfaction
According to the oxford dictionaries satisfaction is “Fulfilment of one’s wishes, expecta-
tions, or needs, or the pleasure derived from this.”. It is important to note that there is
an explicit reference to expectation, and the fulfilment of one’s expectations. This is es-
pecially important when discussing the relation of satisfaction to utility. Satisfaction is
defined as the difference between the experienced utility of an outcome and the expected
utility of an outcome (Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin, 1996). This means there is also the
distinct possibility of there being negative satisfaction or dissatisfaction if the expected
15Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (2010) is an example of a paper where this is discussed in a general
context.
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utility is higher than the experienced utility. This is also important in terms of the frame
individuals will perceive the market it. It is already known that framing of a question
or situation has a significant influence on how people perceive them and what decisions
they would make (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). In addition, if one’s work is perceived
as interesting and challenging it can increase job satisfaction, but it is not then high per-
formance with low satisfaction is possible (Ramser, 1972). Thus, the way individuals
perceive the market can have very real effects on their perceived satisfaction.
So what consequences might satisfaction have? Satisfaction has been found to have a
partial mediating role in the relationship between effort and turnover (Devonish, 2018).
Furthermore, job satisfaction has been found to indicate turnover intention (Eidukaite,
2016) and findings suggest there is a relation between satisfaction and retention of labour
(Mitchell and Albright, 1972). In turn, turnover can influence job culture negatively
(Posada, Martín-Sierra, and Perez, 2017). This indicates a strong relationship between job
satisfaction and the long-term job environment and even productivity in an organisation,
as turnover can cost companies due to the training costs in money and time16. Interest-
ingly performance and satisfaction have also been found to strongly correlate where job
performance has been found to dictate job satisfaction (Judge and Thoresen, 2001; Chris-
ten, Iyer, and Soberman, 2006; Ramser, 1972). In addition, pay rank or how much one is
paid compared to coworkers has been found to influence satisfaction (Card et al., 2010).
This brings up the possibility the same will be the case in the experiment conducted in
this thesis. It is also interesting to observe how the varying market environments influ-
ence job satisfaction and how the conditions on tournament pay and public information
interact and influence perceived satisfaction.
2.6.2 Fairness
Fairness and satisfaction have a strong relationship with each other. Price fairness has
been found to influence satisfaction (Herrmann et al., 2007). Fairness perceptions regard-
ing a service have also been found to dictate satisfaction in the service (Sindhav et al.,
2006). Hence, there is strong evidence of fairness and satisfaction being connected con-
cepts where fairness perceptions have a strong influence on satisfaction. This is strong
evidence that satisfaction can be relative due to the fact that fairness influences satis-
faction and itself has a strong aspect of relativism to it. In addition, uncertainty has been
found to moderate the effect of fairness on satisfaction (Diekmann, Barsness, and Sondak,
16The above studies are specifically on job satisfaction and chapter 5 focuses on the performance satisfac-
tion, as they are not in a job and so job satisfaction would not be an appropriate measure. However, there
is strong evidence that the results in chapter 5 strongly correlate with existing evidence on the relationship
between job satisfaction and performance.
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2004). This brings up interesting questions about how individuals will perceive fairness
in the stylised market for creative goo present in the experiment.
Distributive fairness perceptions are also found to influence satisfaction as the man-
ner in which rewards are distributed matters (Lau, Wong, and Eggleton, 2008; Perista
and Quintal, 2010). These findings suggest that if satisfaction levels are to be constant
throughout treatment groups, then there is possibility that individuals in the market view
the market mechanism as a fair way to distribute rewards. However, this is likely not the
case based on the research regarding performance pay cited earlier. This perception of
fairness has been found to largely depend on whether individuals perceive rewards are
due to hard work or luck, where a distribution is found to be fair if it is due to hard work
and unfair if a reward is found to be due to luck (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005). This is
an important mechanism that dictates the fairness perceptions especially in the context of
the research as the “nobody knows” principle is likely not only to cause some uncertainty
but also make it hard to observe if success and rewards are due to luck or hard work.
2.6.3 Envy and Fun
The role of envy and fun as measurements in the study are largely to support findings of
fairness and satisfaction and to get a more informed idea of how the different treatment
groups influenced perceptions of fairness and satisfaction. The measure of envy for ex-
ample was the willingness to trade places with an individual given that they would have
to put in the same effort as the person they are trading places with. This measure is based
on the idea of envy free and is able to gauge is individuals felt that the success of others
was due to luck or a difference in effort. This is because if an individual states they are
willing to trade they are effectively stating that the difference in outcome or pay is, at
least in part, due to luck.
Fun as a measure is in order to see how satisfaction and fairness perceptions influence
the perceived fun or enjoyment in the treatment groups. If there are strong correlations
then there are is evidence that the concepts are closely linked which would make the
utility discussion regarding the market straight forward in terms of the three concepts.
However if there is deviation it would point to satisfaction, fairness, and enjoyment being,
to some degree, separate concepts which are derived from different sources. That is to say
if satisfaction is low but the individual reported to have fun then there is some evidence
of the possibility of varying expectations or differences in the expected success which in
turn can enlighten the discussion regarding the influence of the market for creative good
on individuals.
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2.6.4 Relevance to Markets for Creative Goods
What does any of this have to do with markets for creative goods and incentives within
this market? A large part of markets is not only consumer welfare but prodcer or worker
welfare. Often when we speak of producers we think of companies and workers as the in-
dividuals working within the companies and these workers are entitled to some welfare
as a basic human right. The same applies in the markets for creative goods as the work-
ers can be considered the artists who have contracts at record companies, or publishers.
However, the markets for creative goods are unique in the sense that they have much
more potential for freelance work where individuals are their own boss and can partner
up with entities that offer the best business or personal relationships. This is, at least
to some extent, discussed by Klamer and Petrova (2007) where they outline three main
ways or spheres of financing the arts along with their consequences. The three spheres
of finance were the government, markets, and what they called the third sphere which
consists of voluntary support from individuals and corporations where the contribution
is no strings attached and based on generosity and the trust that the artists use the money
to further their art. The third sphere is not completely unlike the patronage system in the
sense that it would be private individuals but the difference would be that the ‘patron’
in this case would not commission works or attempt to influence the work of the artists.
This can be found, at least to some extent, in sites such as Patrion or GoFundMe although
it can be argued these are more to do with the market demand than the third sphere and
the values of generosity or trust.
The key here is that when variables, such as, economic rights/tournament pay or
attribution rights/public information they have an effect on how the individuals view
the market. This is interesting especially in context of previous research about motivating
creativity where the way individuals perceived the motivator influenced its effectiveness.
The purpose of the first half of the chapter is to set up the discussion for the method
chapters to have a solid foundation of understanding of the issues being addressed by the
experiments. The key is to understand the importance of the market structure of the mar-
ket for creative goods and how copyright was designed to work in these circumstances.
The history of copyright helped to inform the justifications for it, both in the common law
countries and globally, which in turn helps to place the motives highlighted by copyright
in context of more traditional economic market analysis. Thus steps have been taken
in order to discuss copyright in terms of public information and tournament pay rather
than attribution and economic rights. This is done to be more precise with what type of
motivators are present in the stylised market present in the experiments, rather speaking
about copyright more generally. Thus, some concessions of realism have been made in
order to be more precise about the motivators being discussed. This does not make the
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results from the experiment irrelevant to copyright law but rather helps to narrow down
the variables of interest into two main areas, information and pay structure, which are
influenced by copyright.
2.7 Introduction to Interdisciplinary Research
Interdisciplinary research can be defined as the combination distinctive components from
two or more disciplines where there is the possibility of levels of interdisciplinary de-
pending on how different the combined research areas are viewed as (Nissani, 1995).
This section will focus on the relationship between economics and psychology and the
way each discipline uses experiments in their research. The aims is to discuss the intri-
cacies of experiments as a research method and the advantages and challenges of using
experiments effectively in interdisciplinary research. The end of the section focuses on
the intersection between law and economics. The focus will be on the philosophy behind
law and how it is reconciled with the philosophy and methods and economics. There
is no separate discussion for experimental methods used in law research as the experi-
mental method is used very sparsely in the law and only recently has it gained traction.
Experimental research in law is discussed in the method section when referring to similar
studies which exist in law research.
Given these definitions, why are experiments a useful tool for Interdisciplinary Re-
search? To gain more insight into the discussion of experimental economics as a method-
ology for interdisciplinary research, it is worth going into detail about the scientific method
more closely and how specifically scientific knowledge is created or can be accumulated.
Specifically how economic and psychology experiments can be utilised in this context to
gain insights into the effectiveness of laws. Falsification, as advanced by Karl Popper, is a
concept where scientific knowledge can be forwarded by creating a falsifiable statement
which can then be falsified or there can be an attempt to falsify it. This is important as
it also states that a scientific theory or statement only needs to be proven false and not
proven true, that is to say if it is proven false it can be regarded as an incorrect statement
and discarded from scientific knowledge (Popper, 1992, p 32-42). This is important in
the context of experiments as they can then be used to test scientific theories through the
process of falsification. For example, if there is a theory that states that if A then B in all
cases and there is experimental evidence which suggest A does not equal, then to state
that A equals B in all cases has been proven to be false and so may be incomplete or need
modification. Thus experiments are a useful tool to test the strength of economic theories,
although there are caveat’s to this statement.
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Economics has been seen as a subject area which has a lack of controlled and repeated
lab experiments (Davis, Hands, and Mäki, 1998) and this is especially true for copyright
where there is a more general lack of empirical evidence (Atiq, 2013). Although this state-
ment is not as true for economics, especially as behavioural economics is becoming more
popular, in the field of copyright there remains a the need for further empirical evidence.
There exists many ways how empirical evidence could be gathered and so experimental
evidence is by no means the only way. Especially when a growing literature exists in
the field of copyright research where empirical evidence is gathered from sources rang-
ing from using publishing data to predict the value of the public domain (Erickson et al.,
2015) and photos on Wikipedia (Heald, 2014). It is also collected from surveys on au-
thors earnings (Kretschmer, 2012; Kretschmer and Hardwick, 2007). In addition, there
are studies on the impact of copyright penalties on file-sharing (Maffioletti and Ramello,
2008) the impact of file-sharing on music sales, supply, and the incentives to produce mu-
sic (Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf, 2007) and the cultural effects of file-sharing (Huygen
et al., 2009).
There is a push within the subject area of copyright to focus on increasing the amount
of empirical evidence on the subject. With this push, experimental methods have been
used to test for effect of copyright thresholds on creativity (Buccafusco et al., 2014) and
the impact of attribution on willingness to accept and the pricing of art (Sprigman, Buc-
cafusco, and Burns, 2013; Marcin and Nicklisch, 2014). There is clear value in applying
experimental methods in the field, but it is important to understand the method before
we know why this is the case. Experiments can provide a middle ground between the
theoretical and the empirical reality where researchers can test alternative theories that
may not be possible using naturally occurring data (Croson, 2002). This is because real-
ity can be too complex unless some simplifying abstractions are made in order to study
variables and their effects in isolation (Machlup, 1978). Using for example investment
data, it can be difficult to deduce what the effect of some new information might be on
a price of a stock as the information can be important in determining the price of some
other stock which then might affect the price of the original stock in question. This is a hy-
pothetical situation but non-the-less describes a very real issue possible issue with using
“real world” data compared to experimental data. This is obviously not to say that there
is no use in using real world data, quite the contrary, the external validity of real world
empirical data is very high and it can and should be used to inform policy decisions.
However the strength of experimental economics is the ability to single out effects and
thus it is easier to observe the relationship between specific variables in a more controlled
environment of the experiment.
An especially fruitful subject area in regards to experimental/lab research is the study
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of risk and uncertainty. Here experiments and surveys have been used very effectively
to shed light on how individuals react to risk and uncertainty and how the frame or de-
fault is especially important when observing individual decision making. There exist a
wide range of experiments from the willingness to pay for insurance to risk and uncer-
tainty and the firm (Elliott, 1998). Probably the most well-known paper regarding the
subject area is Prospect theory by Kahnemann and Traversky 1979. Strictly speaking it
was survey based research and did not rely on interaction within the lab and so was not
what people might traditionally think of as an experiment (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
Non-the-less it the paper would greatly influence future experimental research. The pa-
per used surveys in order to elicit information about individual preferences between risky
and certain outcomes. Although not experimental economics, the paper served to show
the importance of surveys in eliciting risk preferences by demonstrating the importance
of frame on the risk preferences of individuals. The important point being that a gain
of a given magnitude increases utility less than a loss of the same magnitude decreases
utility. A later paper by the same authors uses surveys to show how the same problem,
just framed differently, can have different answers depending on whether the situation
was framed as a loss or a gain (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). So much so that wording
and framing of a question is important to consider when creating experiments (Boumans
and Davis, 2015).
The influence of these papers did not stop at the theories they informed but extended
to the way pre and post experimental surveys were presented to the participants. The
research shows how framing of a question and the defaults that they set can affect the
way a person answers questions that are mathematically identical. Taking into account
research, such as, the previous it is clear that not only can experiments be exact in the
way that information is elicited but they can provide into insights of human behaviour.
This is especially pertinent when there is a lack of such evidence, thus an interdisciplinary
approach can used to gain insights into previously unstudied phenomena/market condi-
tions.
2.8 Cultural Economics
What is cultural economics? Cultural economics is the combination of economics and
culture, even though they can be considered polar opposite concepts, the economic reali-
ties of the cultural industries are very real individuals operating within them (Towse and
Khakee, 1992). An important discussion in the field of cultural economics is the difference
between market valuations, dictated by prices of cultural good such as movie tickets or
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art, and cultural or intrinsic valuations of culture and cultural goods. This topic is espe-
cially interesting when discussing what motivates individuals to make art or participate
in the cultural industries since how individuals value this output can inform what might
motivate individuals to produce it. Care is taken to separate the intrinsic value of a good
and the market value of the good, or the value of the process of creation compared to the
market value (Klamer and Petrova, 2007). This is especially important when differentiat-
ing between the culturalist17 view from the economists view.
Cultural economics and cultural research in general is a wide field which spans areas
of research, such as, archivists, the arts, law, cultural heritage, and economics. These
fields have fundamentally different views on value and where value is derived. Value at
its core is the worth to an individual or a groups of a good, service, or experience. In the
cultural fields value can be defined in terms of shared customs, ways of life deriving from,
for example practicing of the arts, while in economics value is defined by the economic
consequences of actions which in are ultimately expressed in financial terms (Throsby,
2010, p. 17). Economics for example view the value of art as the market price, combining
the value of all the processes of making a piece of art and boiling it down to the market
price of the good. However it is also argued that this type of valuation ignores any value
derived from the process of creating itself (Klamer, 2001). In some ways the value derived
from art works, socially speaking, could be thought of as an externality of production
which is not fully taken into account in the market price18. These externalities can include
aspects, such as the importance of the work in the cultural heritage of a city or country, or
its representation of a point in time which can be important in fields such as art history.
These values are often not taken into account in the market price as the market price only
reflects the personal valuation of the buyer and not the value to society as a whole.
The discussion regarding valuation of art is important when extended to the decision
making process of artists to create art. If there is value derived from the process itself
and not just from the economic outcome of the production, which way would be the best
way to motivate production or to avoid disincentivising this type of production? Neo-
classical economic assumption and regarding production of art may not hold if artists are
oriented towards the intrinsic rewards of production then the traditional neoclassical ra-
tionality assumption of economics is inadequate to explain production decisions (Towse,
2010, p. 314-315). This is to say that the classical economic assumption of profit max-
imisation and strict rationality in decision making is not enough to explain what is the
17Culturalists focus on the study of culture but are not economists and so view value as a combination
of intrinsic value and market value. This is compared to economists who focus on market value because in
their view all value is expressed in the market value.
18The social benefit from the art work is higher than the private benefit/market value and so can be
viewed as a positive externality.
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driving force for creative production. If this is the case, a large proportion of the existing
economic analysis on the influence of, for example, copyright law or market structures on
the production of creative goods is lacking. The key to a more wholistic approach could
thus be from the intrinsic aspect of the production process, which cultural economics and
more specifically the culturalists can shine a light on. The economists viewpoint on issues
of motivation is well documented and intrinsic motivation has been studied in psychol-
ogy literature extensively starting around the 1970. One goal of this thesis is to discuss
this intrinsic motivation in terms of its contribution to the discussion within cultural eco-
nomics about motivating the production of art and culture. If intrinsic motivation is an
important motive to produce art/cultural goods then policies to promote the production
of cultural goods can gain from the focus of maintaining this intrinsic motive or even pro-
moting it. This can be independent from or in addition to, focusing on external motives,
such as, government funding of the arts or copyright law.
Artists operate in a winner-takes-all market where the large majority of artists earn be-
low average wages (Abbing, 2011, p. 133; Kretschmer, 2012; Kretschmer and Hardwick,
2007). It is as if the artists have entered into a tournament where most of the value is
concentrated at the top. This begs the question why do artists take art in this type of mar-
ket willingly? Could the answer be that individuals are motivated by the potential for
higher payoffs? This would be the traditional answer of an economists. In fact Levitt and
Venkatesh found that the tournament pay structure in gangs dealing drugs is the same
(Levitt and Venkatesh, 2000). The top of the pay structure motivates the individuals on
the lower end to work harder even if they are making only around minimum wage in
their current roles. This same argument is then extended into the cultural industries to
explain how the market structure induce productivity. However traditional economics
does not look into other sources of motivation, such as, intrinsic motivation or the mo-
tivation which is intrinsically present in the process of creation. This might not be very
relevant when observing industries overall but can be convincingly argued to be the case
in creative industries. This is exactly the milieu which cultural economics, and cultural
studies more generally, operate in, and where non-monetary values are reconciled with
the world of market prices derived from various market equilibriums.
2.8.1 Cultural Economics and Welfare
Cultural economics and the field of law and economics have many similarities that over-
lap quite considerably. One obvious crossover point are the discussions around copyright
and the effectiveness of copyright19 another is the discussion surrounding welfare and the
19Although interesting these aspects such as, a wider discussion on copyright term length, have either
been left out of the thesis as they are not directly the topic being discussed.
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Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and the Kaldor-Hick compensation principle. The discussion of
the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency principle within cultural economics is used to show how the
it is an interdisciplinary subject where law, economics, and the arts are central20. Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency is similar to pareto efficiency which states that a allocation is efficient if
there exist no trades where someone can be made better off. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is a
variation of pareto efficiency, but states allows for individuals to be made worse off by
trades as long as the total improvement of the trade to welfare is positive and the losers
of the trade are reimbursed for their loss. This would make some people better-off while
ultimately not decreasing utility for anyone else, thus increasing efficiency. The previ-
ous is a strict interpretation, however the Kaldor-Hicks Compensation Principle dictates
that as long as the welfare gains of a policy change, or other influence, is larger than the
welfare losses then there has been an overall pareto improvement, even without compen-
sating the losers (Towse, 2010). Policy discussions, including cultural policy, is discussed
in terms of its financial costs and benefits to the economy (Throsby, 2010, p. 33) which
makes the Kaldor-Hicks Compensation Principle a useful tool for when arguing for pol-
icy changes or increases in the support for the arts. This formulation the issue of efficiency
and economic welfare is argued to derive from the rising cultural values of modernism
outside of economics which became influential in economics which turned away from a
verbal description of economic problems to a more mathematically focused one (Klamer,
1996, p. 137).
The economic agenda of cultural policy is derived from the idea of a "creative econ-
omy", the proposition is that creativity, in areas from the arts to technology, is a key factor
in generating economic success by arguing that creativity is the prerequisite to innovation
which in turn boosts economic growth (Throsby, 2010, p. 5-6). This implies that funding
for arts and cultural goods can increase the amount of creative production in the economy,
expanding the size of the economy and increasing welfare. Cultural and arts advocates,
when arguing for government funding of the arts, also use the merit good argument
which states that cultural goods are intrinsically good and should be supported in order
to increase the quality of the output. This argument however implies that some individ-
uals tastes are better than others, and so, violates an individuals right to sovereignty and
equality as it is not the market and the tastes of the people deciding what is popular but
an official deciding where the funding is allocated (Klamer, 1996, p. 17). Both cultural
economics and law and economics are similar in the sense that economics economists are
20This is not to say they are the only subject areas within cultural economics but they are in a central role
in research in the field.
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more likely to be using mathematical tools with some philosophy underlying the mod-
elling to argue their point while in law and the arts they are more likely to be more heav-
ily focusing on the philosophy in their arguments. However cultural studies or the arts
seem to have been more proactive in using economic arguments in their research and
policy recommendations as there has been a observed trend where policy discussions are
largely being discussed in the language of economics. In turn it seems that in the policy
discussion in regards to cultural industries are more likely to use economic arguments
while in law economics might be a tool of discussion but it not as popular of a tool for
argumentation.
2.9 Economics and Psychology
Economics and psychology, at their core, are very similar research areas which focus hu-
man behaviour and the study of why we do what we as humans do i.e. why do we make
the decisions we make? In fact much of the methodology of experimental economics
derives from experimental psychology (Croson, 2002). Both subjects are in the field of
social sciences and neither of the two are exact sciences, such as, math or physics could
be viewed as such. As in social sciences in general, both the subject areas study human
behaviour and as such struggle with finding exact causal links between behaviours and
their causes. This is due to the fact that as a human we have a subjective experience
of our surroundings which can be influenced by various factors. For example, why do
some people decide to save and others not, even though they might be in identical sit-
uations in life with access to the same resources? Although economics and psychology
are very similar at their core and both study humans who experience their surrounding
subjectively, which in itself causes methodological difficulties, the methods used in the
two subjects vary vastly. Six different areas of experimental research will be discussed
in order to juxtapose how the fields of psychology and economics differ in the way they
utilise the experimental method in their respective research. This will then shed light on
the motivations behind the methodologies used in the two fields and specifically why the
methodologies used in the experiments to generate data, which is the foundation of this
thesis, were used. The six aspects of experimental discussed will be, incentives, market
mechanisms, repetition, recruitment of participants, context, and deception (Madsen and
Stenheim, 2015).
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2.9.1 Incentives
Psychologists and economists have very different views of incentives and these differ-
ences can be largely attributed to the relative prevalence of experiments within the field.
In psychology students are asked to take part as course credit or given fixed sum pay-
ments, while in economics the incentives are often defined according to a specific theory
being tested (Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001; Smith, 1976) it is argued that the whole point
of paying participants is to gain control of their incentives and to create an environment
where their incentives are known (Kagel and Roth, 1995, p. 67). In economics theories
being tested are often to do with incentives specifically or market outcomes which de-
pend on how individuals react to the stylised market incentives (Madsen and Stenheim,
2015; Smith, 1976; Plott, 1982). For psychologists an individual’s decisions are highly
context and situation specific and thus use more subtle manipulations, such as sublimi-
nal primes, in order to mimic the real world influences. In addition psychologists believe
that the costs and benefits of different situations are not necessarily clearly defined and
so defining incentives can make the experiment less real world like (Ariely, Bracha, and
Meier, 2007). Thus monetary incentives are integral to research in economics, especially
as the area of study focuses largely their influence on individual decision making while
psychologists place less emphasis on incentives and rather focus on ways to test decision
making.
The following subsections closely follow the six aspects of research outlined by Mad-
sen and Stenheim (2015) which are market mechanism, recruitment, incentives, context,
anonymity, and deception. Incentives and recruitment have been combined into a single
section as they are relatively closely related especially in terms of the research being dis-
cussed in the forthcoming chapters. Madsen and Steinheim outline the differences well
and organize them clearly and thus backbone of the discussion is borrowed from the pa-
per. However the discussion below updates some of the discussion by the authors along
with, in some cases substantial, additions to their discussion especially when referring to
the method of the research in the thesis.
2.9.2 Market Mechanism
Market mechanism simply refers to the market or experimental environment of the test
subject and how behaviour is rewarded and punished in order to create a feedback mech-
anism which disciplines non-optimal behaviour (Madsen and Stenheim, 2015). This is
especially important in economics as the theories tested can be in relation not only to in-
dividuals but larger markets or even industrial organisation more generally (Kagel and
Roth, 1995, p. 21). A good example of exactly of how economic theories are tested using
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experiments can be found in Smith (1976) where the author tests for the efficiency of mar-
ket convergence to a theoretical equilibrium in differing market conditions. This can be
argued to be a core article for experimental economists and is a good insight into the way
experimental economists use experiments. Economic experiments can be grouped into
three general categories, ones which focus on testing existing theories, ones which effects
of variables which existing theories know little about, and theories which are motivated
by questions raised by regulatory agencies (Kagel and Roth, 1995).
2.9.3 Repetition
Repetition in experiments is when participants are asked to play the same game repeat-
edly and results are then observed after every stage. This way it is possible to observe
how behaviour might change as the number of repetitions increased, in a sense the data
resembles time-series data. Economists generally use repetition in order to acclimatise the
participant to the environment and to afford the participants with the possibility to learn
how their choices interact with the choices of the other players (Hertwig and Ortmann,
2001). While psychologists do not typically use repetition in their experimental design
(Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001). This type of repetition will overtime cause behaviour to
tend toward the optimal and increase in external validity of the experiment in general
(Loewenstein, 1999; Madsen and Stenheim, 2015). However there is some doubt whether
the behaviour at the end of a series of repetitions is more representative of the behaviour
of economic agents as the previous statement would assume (Loewenstein, 1999). This
is supported by findings that show individuals find it difficult to transfer learning from
one economic situation to the next when there is only a superficial change in the context
(Bassok and Olseth, 1995). In addition it has been found that people have trouble transfer-
ring optimal behaviour from one situation or context to another (Hung, 2002). It has also
been found that the time between stages can alter the effectiveness of the learning/recall
potential brought through the use of repetition (Raaijmakers, 2003). The issue seems to
be that there are some assumptions which are help about learning in the experimental
environment which are assumed to transfer into the real world but might not transfer as
elegantly as is commonly believed. Loewenstein (1999) argues that even though humans
learn when they are in a tightly controlled experimental situation, this does not mean
that they learn in the same way outside of the lab. Repetition has also been found to af-
fect people’s interactive behaviour at the end of repetition periods as come become less
likely to cooperate at the later stages (Loewenstein, 1999). However there is evidence to
suggest the evolution and the speed of convergence of different equilibria can depend
on the group of participants and the type of game suggesting that fairness norms evolve
depending on the context and the individuals taking part (Binmore, 1999). The effects of
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repetition are heavily reliant on context. How much attention should be paid to results
which are from inexperienced people put in situations which they know little about? If
behaviour does not survive after participants have had time to familiarise themselves
with the environment the experimenter has made a bad link between the lab and reality
(Binmore, 1999). Although some might argue that it is not clear that repetition is more
representative of economic behaviour (Loewenstein, 1999). There are findings to show
that repetition can decrease the noise of the data in some, but not all, cases (Hey, 2001). In
general repetition can be a useful tool in economics and has been successfully used such
as in (McCabe, Rassenti, and Smith, 1998) or (Smith, 1976) to give some examples. In the
experiments as a part of this thesis the aim was not to have a repeated game setting and
gain time series like data but the idea was to rather get a cross section of different types
of creativity with an additional control task.
2.9.4 Recruitment
Recruitment techniques between psychology and economics vary which can, to some ex-
tent, be explained by the attitudes towards incentives. Traditionally university students
have been used as experimental subjects and can be argued to be good candidates as they
bring very few external influences to the experiment and can be quicker to learn the new
tasks (Duke, Huck, and Wallace, 2010, p. 8). University students are recruited for both
psychology and economics experiments, however in psychology students are often re-
cruited by giving them course credits (Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001; Croson, 2002). The
reliance of psychology on their students as participants causes some methodological is-
sues as the population is homogenous and the students are familiar with some of the
theories being tested (identities and attitudes) (Madsen and Stenheim, 2015). However
in the case of the experiments which were carried out as a part of this thesis the integral
point of the recruitment process was to gain a relatively homogenous population i.e. art
students in order to maximise external validity of the results21. Since use of experiments
in psychology is more prevalent compared to economics which can go some way to ex-
plaining why participants are being recruited from the student base. Using incentives to
recruit, as is done in economics, increases the chance of self-selection bias which can be
a real threat to the internal validity of the results (McDermott, 2002). Self-selection could
be decreased by having a system where participants are recruited from a selection of dif-
ferent courses or backgrounds and would conduct the experiment during their expected
lecture. In general the self-selecting bias would only be completely removed if partici-
pants were not able to select themselves in or out. This however has its own weaknesses
21Further discussion in the methodology section
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as not only is it unethical and illegal to force people to do experiments, but it can also
cause problems in the types of populations or the potential homogeneity of the popula-
tion which can be recruited. A good example of this is the use of psychology students in
psychology experiments where they are not self-selected but do the experiments as a part
of a course.
2.9.5 Context
Context, deception, and incentives are closely related as themes in experimental research
as deception and incentives greatly affect the context of the experiment. In psychology
deception is often used to disguise the real context or purpose of the research while in
order to increase the internal validity while in economics incentives are used in order to
create a certain market environment or make the experimental decisions more salient or
‘real’ (Ariely, Bracha, and Meier, 2007; Madsen and Stenheim, 2015; Duke, Huck, and
Wallace, 2010). Not using deception for psychologists can mean losing contextual cues
important real-world situations (Ariely, Bracha, and Meier, 2007). While in economics the
justification for incentives is that as long as the individual maximises utility according to
some given costs and benefits in the real-world, then as long as the incentives ae similar
in the lab then the results should be relevant in the analogous real world situation (Levitt
and List, 2007). This highlights how context is manipulated differently in the two fields
and how the psychologists and economists differ in their approach to their experiments
largely due to how their research interests diverge from one another.
2.9.6 Anonymity
Anonymity is associated as a part of a concept called social distance which refers to the
distance that people have between themselves, such as, anonymity which might affect
the way the people interact with each other (Charness and Gneezy, 2001). Anonymity is a
standard feature in many economics experiments and is often added in order to eliminate
observer effects and induce behaviour which would be exhibited under private circum-
stances (Charness and Gneezy, 2001; Bolton and Zwick, 1995). Psychology literature does
not view anonymous experiments as such a crucial aspect of the experimental research,
especially as the specific context of the social situation is considerably more important
for psychologists compared to economists. In fact psychologists typically argue that even
though incentives are used, other factors such as conformity or appropriateness norms
which influence participant behaviour, while these considerations are often overlooked
by economists who offer anonymity to avoid such influences (Madsen and Stenheim,
2015). Anonymity and privacy are different as anonymity allows the persons actions to
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be anonymous however the actions are still knows and thus not private. This is important
as a lack of privacy has been found to increase the shame in a selfish participant’s expe-
rience, although providing privacy did not affect actual behaviour (Winking, 2014). This
is supported by findings where introducing experimenter-subject anonymity had only
minor, insignificant, effects on prosocial behaviour (Barmettler, Fehr, and Zehnder, 2011).
Although these findings are not to say that increasing anonymity has no effect on
behaviour as increases in the level of anonymity have been found to increase the incidence
of selfishness in dictator games (Hoffman et al., 1994; Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith, 1996;
Charness and Gneezy, 2003). Anonymity was also found to decrease efficiency of auctions
as face-to-face auctions where found to be more efficient in generating gains from trade,
specifically they found that the face-to-face facilitated the gains from trade and not the
communication (Radner and Schotter, 1989). However anonymity or the lack there of did
not seem to affect the giving in ultimatum games which suggest strategic considerations
crowded out fairness considerations (Charness and Gneezy, 2003). The varying results in
regards to the experiments studying the effects of anonymity could be due to procedural
differences (Laury, Walker, and Williams, 1995). There can also be some loss of anonymity
due to incentives linked to behaviour within the experiment which would be evident in
the payment received by the participant (Zizzo, 2010)
2.9.7 Deception
Deception is a concrete point of divergence between economics and psychology experi-
mental research. Psychologists use deception to increase internal validity while economists
focus on the use of incentives and avoid deception altogether (Ariely, Bracha, and Meier,
2007). In addition psychologists often use deception while economists do not (Hertwig
and Ortmann, 2001). In fact papers which use deception are not publishable in economics
journals (Gaechter, 2009). However economists use non-deceptive obfuscation some-
times referred to as implicit deception, which is when the experimenter withholds some
information from the participant but does not give false information (Hersch, 2015; Zizzo,
2010). There exists scepticism about the blanket ban which economics have on explicit de-
ception and argue that such a ban is inconsistent with their views of implicit deception
(Hersch, 2015). Implicit deception or non-deceptive obfuscation is considered by some
to constitute deception as the participants are not given full information (Bonetti, 1998).
This claim however is disputed by arguing that only explicit deception can be consid-
ered deception while withholding information should not be considered deception (Hey,
1998). For economists the costs versus benefits of deception are tilted heavily toward not
using deception, at least the explicit kind, while psychologists often do and view it as
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essential to maximise internal validity, and presumably thus worth any costs associated
with it (Ariely, Bracha, and Meier, 2007).
The costs of deception are considered to be the loss of trust within the subject pool
which could foster mistrust for experiments within the subject pool. Psychologists con-
sider the costs of using deception to be outweighed by the potential loss of research in
areas, such as, conformity or racial stereotypes among others (Hertwig and Ortmann,
2008). There is little known about how much or to what extend participants in contem-
porary psychology experiments are suspicious or feel distressed by the use of deception
in experiments (Hertwig and Ortmann, 2008). It is hard to definitely say that deception
is or is not worth using in general and the benefit of deception seems to be more tied to
the type of research done and the aims of the research rather than the perceived costs of
deception in general. Deception was not used in the experiments as a part of this thesis
but the technique of non-deceptive obfuscation was used instead. The aim was to make
sure participants were not influenced by the copyright frame as it is likely that the partic-
ipants had strong opinions not only because they were art students but because it is also
likely many will be in copyright industries in the future.
2.10 The Cross Section Between Law and Economics
The first half of the section focuses on the intersection between economics and psychology
and how experiments are used in the two areas of research. The rest of the section focuses
on the intersection between law and economics and the advantages and the challenges
of interdisciplinary research between the two. Law and Economics, much like economics
itself, consists of many different subsections which differ in the assumptions they make
and the methods used. There are two major distinctions in style and method between
neoclassical economics, which rely heavily on the theory of a rational decision maker,
and behavioural economics where this assumption is often criticised and its weaknesses
highlighted. The neoclassical branch of economics draws its inspiration from the hard
sciences and the Popperian tradition of falsification by deriving models which are em-
pirically verified (Rowley, 1981). The behavioural branch of economics draws inspiration
from psychology and in fact many behavioural economists are psychologists, for exam-
ple, Kahnemann and Traversky who proposed prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979). Many of the criticisms of the neoclassical approach stem from the falsification of the
more strict interpretations of neoclassical theories arguing that it is problematic to stick to
imperfect and thus falsified theories (De Geest, 1996). What is meant by a strict neoclas-
sical theory is, for example, the theory of the rational actor who is fully informed and can
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choose the optimal, i.e. utility maximising, option from all the available choices. How-
ever there is considerable evidence suggesting that humans’ exhibit bounded rationality
where by the selection process between options is not exhaustive but rather heuristics or
rules of thumb are used to aspire to some level of satisfaction dictated by the individual
(Davis, Hands, and Mäki, 1998, 395). These discussions between factions of economic
thinking also occur in law and economics where authors employ varying methods of eco-
nomic analysis in order to discuss the effectiveness and justness of existing or proposed
laws and legal doctrines.
2.10.1 History of Law and Economics
The history of law and economics is a sensible place to start when discussing law and
economics as a subfield of economics because it gives a unique perspective on how the
field evolved and why the field evolved the way it did. If we look back to the late 1700’s
we can find a famous and not necessarily widely known example of law and economics
intermingling as subject areas. Adam Smith, who many consider to be, if not the father,
then at the very least a god father of modern economics, was himself a lecturer in Law
at the University of Glasgow and even gave lectures in jurisprudence (Hylton, 2005).
Although it can be argued that law and economics had its beginning even before the
1700’s with Thomas Hobbes who argued that the purpose of law was to maximise social
welfare (Hylton, 2005). The idea of law maximising social welfare is interesting and can
be found in copyright as well with the utilitarian arguments which laid the groundwork
for The Statute of Anne, as detailed earlier. Thus law and economics have historically
been closely related not only because of both being social sciences but also because of
their close relation in terms of the underlying philosophy.
It is argued that historically speaking the economy and law both evolve in a social
system which is subject to Darwinian evolutionary principles and that those evolution-
ary principles can be used to explain both business practices and the law (Atkinson and
Paschall, 2016). Economics and law have also been argued to be mutually influential on
each other to the point that they are not just related to one another but in fact influenced
by one another to the point that they are not separate (Samuels, 1988–1989). If taken to the
extreme this argument either suggest that a field of law and economics is crucial as the
two subjects are so intertwined or even that differentiating between the two might not be
necessary. It is useful to differentiate between the two as they are quite clearly different
but the previous does help to highlight the close nature of the two fields. The relation-
ship between law and markets has been recognized as early as Adam Smith and Jeremy
Bentham who were both late 1700th century legal scholars. Adam Smith focused on the
impact of regulation on economic activity while Jeremy Bentham focused on legislation
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from the perspective of utilitarian political philosophy (Posner and Parisi, 2016a para 1).
Utilitarian political philosophy, as discussed in the literature review chapter, focuses on
the idea of the greatest amount of good for the greatest amount of people. Utilitarian po-
litical philosophy would then refer more towards how this philosophy can be achieved
through law and political decision making.
2.10.2 Rationality Assumption in Law and Economics
When discussing economic modelling it is important to realise that economic models are
not necessarily describing exactly what is going on. Rather more like a map or illustra-
tion of the mechanics of some interaction, market, or environment described using math
in order to bring structure and clarity to the theory or explanation. Economic models are
not mechanistic tools, or predictive machines as such, rather tools for understanding eco-
nomic phenomena (Henry 1998 p.5). One issue in economics and in law and economics
is to decide which assumptions can or should be placed on behaviour when modelling
these phenomena. The crucial element is balance, it is important to balance the simplicity
the assumption provides, either mathematically or in terms of the explanation, with the
loss of realism or even loss of predictive power22. If the assumption is too strict or, for
lack of a better word unrealistic, it can make the model unusable when trying to model
“real world” behaviour, even though the model itself could be very eloquent. On the
other hand, if no assumptions are made or they are not strict enough, it can cause the
model to be too complex or convoluted to be understandable or even possible to model
properly. These models are inherently imperfect representations of the real world but fit
for purpose in the way they can help to explain a given phenomenon or be used to fore-
cast23 effects of a change in the economic or legal environment. One of the most hotly
contested an assumption which is often made when modelling economic phenomena is
the assumption that humans are rational which derives from the rational choice theory
(RCT). An assumption that follows from it is the assumption that individuals maximise
utility, in the case of companies this assumption is that they are profit maximising. To
maximise utility simply means to maximise happiness or wellbeing, what exactly this
means can differ from one situation. To give an example if we assume the only variable
where people derive utility from is money then to maximise utility would mean to max-
imise wealth. There can obviously be other considerations other that simply wealth but
if the environment is such that the only moving factors or variable is wealth then the two
would have to be equal.
22in the case of predictive models.
23The point of these forecasts is not to be perfect but give an good indication of the consequences of an
action or change
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Although there is a need for theoretical work much of the existing theories in eco-
nomics are, at least by some, thought to be based on hypothesis with ideal and logically
tidy considerations (Machlup, 1978). In the light of empirical evidence from behavioural
economics some argue that the assumption of a rational decision maker is not accurate
and that behaviour and observed choice making is not as consistent as the theory would
predict due to bounded rationality (Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 1998; Davis, Hands, and
Mäki, 1998). Behavioural economics24 has limited resemblance to a priori reasoning25
regarding rationality, competition, and competitive markets (Boumans and Davis, 2015).
Since behavioural economics is more focused on experiments and empirical evidence it
can be thought of as using posteriori reasoning. A significant amount of experimental ev-
idence which challenges the idea of rational choice comes from outside either outside of
economics or from the fringes of the field (Davis 1998). In fact empirical findings regard-
ing human behaviour form cognitive and social psychology lead to different predictions
and policy options compared with models using RCT (Ulen, 2014, p. 93).
This is relevant because law and economics typically does rely RCT which is a stan-
dard economic assumption (Posner and Parisi, 2016b). As a field it can be defined as
the application of the rational choice approach to law (Ulen, 2014, p. 797; Parisi, 2004;
Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 1998, p. 262) and its use in maximising expected utility (Pac-
ces and Visscher, 2011). The assumption of rational choice is thought to threaten the
validity of law and economics because of it being unrealistic core behavioural assump-
tion. The authors continue by suggesting that law and economics can reinvigorate itself
by replacing the rationality assumption with a more neuanced understanding of human
behaviour which takes into account fields, such as, cognitive psychology or sociology for
example (Korobkin and Ulen, 2000). The counter to this argument is that the theories do
not predict all behaviour but behaviour at the margin, or the people who would change
their behaviour due to a change in their environment (Pacces and Visscher, 2011). In
addition behavioural economics is already taken into account in law and economics lit-
erature and that the assumption of a hyperrational, emotionless, and unsocial economic
actor has been abandoned. The author continues by stating that the idea of knowledge
and imagination being bounded does not mean that the framework of a rational choice
theory cannot be used even if there are positive transaction costs (Posner, 1998). Thus ar-
guing that even thought it might be true that rationality is bounded it does not mean that
economic models could not use RCT as a framework. Economic theories, typically, are
24 which can be thought of as a mix between behavioural economics and experimental economics
25A priori reasoning is reasoning before an event, e.g. given some environment and variables some
prediction of the effect of a change in a variable can be made. This is an example of a priori which is
reasoning based on self-evident truths (but do not necessarily have to be truths it can also be based on
some assumptions of the state of the world in economics for example).
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considered to be based on strong assumptions of rationality and foresight and the quality
of the theories are evaluated on elegance and the sharpness of the prediction (Holt and
Sullivan, 2017, p. 80). Thus if this is indeed the case it would, at least to some extent,
explain the prevalence of RCT in economics. It is a theory which makes mathematical
modelling simpler and is to some degree an intuitive assumption to make, because after
all, humans do look for the best deals and put painstaking effort to get the best deal. But
it is also true that we are bounded by factors such as time, effort, and even our processing
power or IQ when we make economic decisions ranging from purchasing insurance to
which toothpaste to buy.
2.10.3 Normative versus Positive Law and Economics
Law and economics is often separated into two types, normative and positive law and
economics. Simply put positive law and economics seeks to explain the law and the legal
system as it is while normative law and economics describes how the law or legal sys-
tem ought to be (Hylton, 2005). To give another example positive analysis is focused on
how agents behave in response to a legal rule and how these legal rules should be shaped
while normative analysis is concerned with assessing more broadly the ends or goals of
the legal system itself. Although the same authors also forwarded a third suggested cat-
egory, prescriptive, which focuses on which rules should be adapted to advance specific
ends (Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 1998). It should be mentioned that prescriptive analy-
sis seems to be more relevant for behavioural economics but not necessarily as relevant
for the wider law and economics. The distinction can be important as there is a differ-
ence between attempting to say how a legal system should be (normative) and how it is
(positive). An author attempting to conduct positive research, for example, can stray into
normative territory by not only explaining their results as a matter of fact but also adding
their own analysis of the situation and its perceived effectiveness or efficiency as a legal
rule or reality. This can distort the authors message and make normative claims that are
presented as positive, thus it is important for the author to be clear in their intentions in
order to effectively communicate their agendas. This has been found to be problematic
when judging whether a study is positive or normative as the final interpretation is likely
to be swayed by personal opinion of the author or school of thought implemented in a
piece of work. The same author also found that the type of law in question can also in-
fluence the authors ability to stay within the scope of positive analysis without making
judgements about how the law ought to be (Bruce, 1988).
Observing the wider law and economics literature there seems to be some differences
between what is considered normative and what is considered positive. Some state that
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law and economics authors tend to painstakingly distinguish between positive and nor-
mative economics in order to protect themselves from normative criticism of their pro-
posed theories (Crespi, 1991). However the question is what really is normative and
what is positive? Can the interpretations of these change from person to person? Seman-
tics are important in law and being able to communicate the exact meaning of what is in-
tended is imperative, especially in areas such as contract law where a slight difference in
wording can change the contract completely. There is evidence of the two concepts being
interpreted differently, it seems especially contentious as to what is and is not “positive”
research. The Chicago school of law and economics or Posnerian law and economics will
be used as a type of mini case study. This is because there is a culture of using economic
theory in order to model and predict the impacts of law on society, which inspire prolific
debate within the field of law and economics.
When it comes to criminal law Posner states that “moral” theory is not as an effective
positive form of analysis of law as economic analysis is (Posner, 1985). Similar use of
economic modelling and the economic analysis of law can be found, for example, Landes
and Posner (2003).The use of microeconomic methods in law and economics has been crit-
icised as having limited usefulness and closer to an attempt at social engineering rather
than understanding legal phenomena as it is (Jackson, 1984). The claim that selecting
relevant concerns and identifying relevant assumptions are purely normative, not only
in law and economics, but economics in general (Hovenkamp, 1990). This is in essence
a criticism of the neoclassical economic approach also as the author seems to argue it to
be normative in the way the subfield discusses legal policies being analysed in a positive
fashion.
A significant argument against economic modelling being a positive form of law and
economics focuses on the assumptions made when modelling. It is argued that making
certain assumptions on what is and is not valuable, or what is value, already implies
certain judgements which makes a positive analysis using mathematical models very dif-
ficult in law and economics (Leff, 1974). In contrast it is argued that positive arguments
derived from a popperian approach, are testable and empirically verified and as such, not
only a positive approach but useful as a device for the economic analysis of law (Rowley,
1981). This rift seems to be largely derived from different authors views on the method-
ology of economic analysis which is then argued to either be an effective tool of positive
analysis or a normative analysis and subjective analysis which attempts to pass itself of
as objective. The views of the authors on both sides of the argument are far more nu-
anced but for the sake of argument have played the devil’s advocate but non-the-less it
seems to shows some division in how economic analysis of law is viewed within law or
by lawyers.
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2.10.4 Experimental Law and Economics
In economics experimental methods are relatively new with the method became more
well known in the 70’s with Vernon Smith’s Induced Value Theory in 1976 and Kah-
neman and Traversky’s Prospect Theory in 1979 (Smith, 1976; Kahneman and Tversky,
1979). It can be argued these two works were instrumental in elevating experimental
economics to a more accepted methodology within economics. Induced value theory an
important for tool for experimental economists and in some ways can be thought of the
foundation for welfare analysis using experimental data. The main idea of an induced
value is that participants exhibit some non-satiable preferences for some resource, usu-
ally money26, which can be induced to exhibit a preference ordering (Parisi, 2017, p. 82).
Alternatively an induced valuation means that participants are compensated according to
a theory being tested and the choices the individual in the experimental situation makes
(Smith, 1976). As discussed in earlier sections this induced value is closely tied to incen-
tives being used which are created to test a given theory. Using these induced values it
is then possible to measure economic efficiency by comparing the new wealth created27
(Parisi, 2017, p. 82-83). These tools allow theories to be developed about behaviour which
can then be tested and the effects quantified, at least approximated, which can be useful
when studying the effectiveness of law. The great strength of experiments are a high in-
ternal validity the potential to isolate single effect using experiments which can inform
a driving force of any differences between treatment groups (Engel, 2014, p. 135). Ex-
perimental economics although closely related to behavioural economics, e.g. Kahneman
and Traversky 1979, there are some distinct features of behavioural economics which are
worth discussing separately from experimental economics.
2.10.5 Behavioural Law and Economics
Behavioural law and economics contributes a substantial amount to the empirical ev-
idence within law and is a large contributor to the study of legal policy (Engel, 2014,
p. 126). Behavioural law and economics, like behavioural economics, can be seen being
more closely related to psychology than to neoclassical law and economics. Behavioural
economics has been used well in order to broaden the scope of law and economics with-
out losing coherence of the theory (Calabresi, 2016, p. 4). The methodologies used in
behavioural economics are often derived from psychology literature and are often cited
in the criticism of neoclassical or Posnerian law and economics (Posner, 1998; Korobkin
and Ulen, 2000; Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 1998). Behavioural economics is a relatively
26crucially this should be true at least in the context of the experiment
27This can also be other aspects such as, productivity of some resource and not necessarily limited to
wealth creation but rather creation more generally
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new subfield in economics and for it to be gain support and new theories from outside
of economics which makes sense as often new ideas or different approaches often arise
from a fresh new perspectives which might come from different fields.
An example of a deviation of behavioural law and economics from traditional law
and economics is the relaxation of some assumptions, such as the RCT, compared to the
standard law and economics (Engel, 2014, p. 125-126). Some see behavioural economics
not as a specific body of economic theory but rather a critique of the neoclassical theory
and methodology (Davis, Hands, and Mäki, 1998, p. 395). Psychologists and behavioural
scientists aim to create theories which are more in depth and only explain a behaviour
for a certain group or for a certain context (Madsen and Stenheim, 2015). The focus of
behavioural economics of law is the behavioural approach to the law and legal prob-
lems compared to advocating any given model of human cognition and motivation to
compete with the dominant existing models of economics of law (Mitchell, 2014, p. 168).
Behavioural economics has also recognised to be a useful tool for economic analysis on
law, although there is some disagreement on the validity of some of the criticisms of the
neoclassical method made by behavioural economists (Posner, 1998). All this taken into
account behavioural economics has contributed in the field of economic analysis of law
by answering questions previously left unanswered in the field (Calabresi, 2016).
2.11 Conclusion
How are experiments useful specifically for interdisciplinary research between the fields
of economics, law, and psychology? Firstly economics has been thought to provide both
behavioural theory and normative standards which law lacked (Cooter and Rubinfeld,
1989). Thus there is a very real added value of using economic theory when discussion
the effectiveness or impacts of law. A natural continuation of this is to introduce some
of the methods of economics, such as experiments, and use them to directly research the
impacts of law on behaviour. In addition economics has been thought of as a universal
grammar of social science, in relation to its structured organisation of equilibrium’s espe-
cially relating to social issues (Hirshleifer, 1985). It was natural to use economics as the
foundation and use tests derived from psychology in order to be able to comment on the
influence of law. Economics and psychology are closely related and allow for psychome-
tric performance to be measured and the influence of the external market environment
to be analysed. In turn can be used in order to comment on the influence of law on the
economy and economic behaviour. This is exactly the aim of the method discussed in the
subsequent chapters.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
3.1 Introduction
The previous section discusses interdisciplinary research and the strengths and weak-
nesses of the experimental method. The experiments conducted for this thesis will be
explained in detail along with the reasoning for the specific methodology chosen. Cre-
ativity research in general has a large element of subjectivity tied to it so by no means will
it be completely objective1, although steps have been taken to maximise objectivity in the
current research.
Creativity and creative output can be influenced by many factors and therefore it is
difficult to pinpoint why differences in creative output may occur. These differences can
be due to intellectual property regimes, openness of society, different cultural policies
among a long list of other factors which could influence output. These factors also limits
the ability to use natural experiments as it can be difficult to control for regional differ-
ences. This would make it difficult to observe if the differences were due to copyright
regimes or differences in environment/social structure. For example, if there are two re-
gions with different copyright regimes it would be difficult to control for differences in
their environments which is in itself hard to pinpoint how it affects creativity. Using ex-
periments allows one to control the creative environment. Varying the treatments would
cause differences in the environment but if individual idiosyncrasies can be accounted
for then the individuals’ in the different treatments are effectively the same. Making the
treatment the only variable to be concerned with.
The methodology of the experiments that provide the foundation of this research is
an amalgamation of methodologies from psychology, law, and economics. The tasks and
the methodology used to measure task performance are sourced largely from psychol-
ogy literature relating to creativity and creative performance. The experimental structure
and a large part of the experiment instructions are formulated using copyright law as a
1Although this can be said to some degree about all research, it is especially important to acknowledge
when researching creativity.
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base. The structure and mechanisms of the market are created using cultural economics
and economics of law literature. The stylised market for creative goods which partici-
pants operate in, is constructed using economics literature describing markets for creative
goods.
To give the research a clearer and wider scope, law concepts,such as attribution right
and economic right, are replaced with more general concepts which describe their effect
in the market. Attribution right is the right to be named as the author of a work2 and
affords the author of the work the control over their reputation3. This right influences
what information is given to individuals about the artists and so a treatment called public
information or (PI) treatment is added.
An economic right gives the holder of the economic right the ability to financially
gain from a creation. For example, if someone owns the economic right to a song they
are legally entitled to the revenues from it. The economic right influences the individ-
ual’s ability to economically gain from the work as it is a legal right to the returns4. The
right simplifies to whether it exists or not. If it does then individuals have the right to
returns and it depends on their success in the market which exhibits a tournament pay
structure. If it does not, then pay will not be influenced by performance since rights for
the returns would not be guaranteed in the market. The main aim of the research is to be
able to identify effects from public information (PI) and tournament pay structure (TP) on
creative performance or creative output. The results can contribute to the conversation
about the effectiveness of copyright in motivating creative production.
Public information in the context of the experiment is public information about who
is the creator of each expression. However in the public information treatment there
is no specific protection of anyone’s expression after the expression has been created.
The key to the attribution right is the ability to control/protect a work once it was been
created and the right to be named as the author of work/expression. This means that the
expression can not be modified unless the artist gives express permission for it. There is
also the right for the artist to be named as the author as the work which means someone
2This right can even include the right to maintain the work as it was when it was sold. This is to say the
creator of the work will have the right to restrict changes to the work once sold. This is especially relevant
to paintings.
3This is one of the arguments for an attribution right. The argumentation involves natural rights and
how an individual’s work is an extension of themselves. Thus is follows that the artist should have the
legal right to control themselves through being able to control their work and through that their reputation.
This is the simplified version and by no means constitutes a full overview of what an attribution right is.
For further discussion one can refer to chapter 1.
4This is a simplification of the economic right. Even when economic rights are granted to the artists’
the nature of the contract they sign can in effect strip them from this right in exchange for some royalties
or even a flat fee. Caves book ’Creative Industries: Contracts Between Art and Commerce’ or ’How to Fix
copyright’ by Patry. The aim however is not to perfectly mimic an economic right, rather to observe how
these monetary incentives might influence creativity.
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who bought the work can not take credit for creating it. None of the expressions can
be modified after the expression has been created and thus the way attribution right is
simulated in the experiment is through the naming aspect of the attribution right. Thus
the public information condition is mimicking attribution right because the authors of
each expression are given publicly.
Economic rights are the legal right to sell or licence an expression or work of art.
Strictly speaking this does not guarantee any income, even if someone has an economic
right to a work doesn’t mean anyone will want to buy or license the work. Thus the abil-
ity to exploit the economic right depends on the market performance of the expression.
Moreover the market for creative goods is generally a winner-takes-all market where
earnings distribution is close to a tournament pay structure where the top performers
make a lions share of the economic gains which are made in the market. Thus the tour-
nament pay structure condition has a top heavy pay distribution which is given to the
best performers in the market as decided by other participants who act as the consumers.
Thus the tournament pay condition is more closely tied to the economic rights afforded
to authors compared to the public information structure which focuses on the naming
aspect of attribution rights. This means that the tournament pay and public information
treatments are designed to mimic economic and attribution rights respectively, in order
to create a close as possible experimental analogue.
An important aspect of the research methodology is thus to mimic the market struc-
ture and incentives in the market as accurately and consistently as possible. However,
markets can be quite dynamic with multiple variables effecting the environment and the
incentives, and how the two interact. The best way to tackle the problems caused by this
dynamic market is to make abstractions and create a stylised market where individual ef-
fects can be studied as mentioned before. Thus, four treatment groups were organised in
order to study the individual and combined effects of both public information/attribution
and tournament pay/economic rights. The below table maps how the attribution rights
and economic rights map onto the two treatments of public information treatment (PI)
and tournament pay treatment (TP). If both PI and TP exist then both will have a check
mark. The control group had no (PI) treatment or (TP) treatment and so has no check
marks on thither row. The 4 columns represent the 4 different treatments used in the
experiment.
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TABLE 3.1: Public Information and Pay Structure in Treatment Groups
Control AR ER AR and ER
Rank Information Public (PI)
√ √
Tournament Pay Structure (TP)
√ √
AR is attribution rights, which is the right to be named as the
author of a work. ER is economic rights which is the right to
economic ownership of a work e.g. a piece of art or a song. Both
concepts derive from copyright law.
A good start when studying the effectiveness of copyright, the influence of public in-
formation and tournament pay on creative performance, is to combine research from the
field of psychology with economics of market analysis, and place this all in the context of
the copyright law. Interdisciplinary nature of the research is crucial in order to 1: ensure
measurements of creativity are as objective as possible, in the context of the creative mar-
kets and 2: maximise the research relevance to the discussion of effectiveness of copyright
law. As discussed in the earlier sections of this thesis, these subjects are not fully aligned
in their experiment methodologies. The methodologies used are akin to economics and
are combined psychology and law literature to make the research relevant to all fields.
3.2 Format
The influence of PI and TP on creativity are studied using an experimental setup mim-
icking the structure of creative markets, specifically financial incentives and information
available within the market. The first key aspect to a stylised market place is the abil-
ity to have instant feedback about relevant developments in the market, while allowing
information for the PI group and restricting information for the non-PI group. This is
achieved with a software that communicates the information to a server but relays only
the relevant information to each treatment group. It is essential to differentiate between
an idea and an expression since this is a crucial distinction between something that is not
copyrightable i.e. the idea, and something that is copyrightable i.e. an expression of an
idea. This means that the idea of, for example, a painting of a bowl of fruit is not copy-
rightable, however the way the bowl of fruit is expressed in the painting is copyrightable.
This means that, in general, if someone wants to paint a bowl of fruit they need to have
an original expression of that bowl of fruit and not simply copy an existing work. The
restriction of information is especially relevant to the PI treatment groups where infor-
mation on the author of an idea/expression is shown in groups with public information
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i.e. P.I. Groups. Conversely no information about the creator identity is shown to the
non-P.I. groups. In the following sections the specific method of how the experiment is
organised is explained using four areas of interest. These are information in the market,
infringement, market demand, and supply and demand in the market. Each section de-
tails a specific challenge of how to create a market for creative goods and how ’copyright’
is set up in the stylised market.
3.2.1 Information in the Market
In the market, determining what is and is not infringing a copyright is difficult as there
can be simultaneous creation. In this case individuals have the same expression of an
idea, but create them independently of each other, with no knowledge of the others cre-
ation. This situation would not be considered copyright infringement as there is no theft
of intellectual property. The logic is that one cannot steal something they do not know ex-
ists. However, if there is full information about creations and each creation takes a small
amount of time, it is unlikely that simultaneous creation will be an issue.
In this context full information means that each market participant knows of each
expressions which is created; expressions are public information for every market partic-
ipant in real time. The challenge is to take these nuances of copyright law into account in
the experimental set up and the stylised market place5. The assumption of full informa-
tion is critical to be able to simplify the setup and to discard cases, such as simultaneous
creation or cases where creators are not aware of the existence of works that are similar
or even identical to theirs.
In addition to full information about what expressions were created, the PI treatment
groups also received information about who created the work. Hence, there is full in-
formation available to all participants about the works or expressions created with an
additional set of information about the identity of the creator for only the PI treatment
groups. The information regarding the creator has no repercussions as to how copyright
is enforced in the stylised market. It does give an indication of who in the market is
being productive and thus potentially gaining a larger market share of all expressions.
The more expressions one creates in the market the larger their market share and the
larger their chance of being noticed. This notoriety can help them to be more popular in
the market, popularity which ultimately dictates their rank/success in the market. The
availability of information has been manipulated for two main reasons: First, to bring an
aspect of attribution into the market place which can potentially influence behaviour. Sec-
ond, create a simpler copyright environment where some of the nuance and uncertainty
5More detail about how the stylised market place is set up will be given in a later subsections
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of copyright is minimised to facilitate clarity. It is also essential that the non-PI conditions
do not give any information about the creator of the ideas shown and the same pressures
regarding who is creating the ideas does not exist. It is possible that the lack of the infor-
mation regarding the identity of the creator, of each expression in the market, makes the
competition aspect of the creation process less salient. Compare this to if full information
about the creator of each expression is public information.
3.2.2 Infringement
Given that assumptions of full information regarding the existing expressions can be
made6, it is possible to extend this and create a copyright environment where infringe-
ment is judged. Considering all ideas are known to the creator it is possible to observe the
list of expressions and identify similar and possibly infringing expressions. This simpli-
fies the problem of infringement to whether the expression is similar, and if they are which
was the "original". Simplifying the problem of infringement is crucial for the stylised
market environment. It helps to solidify the assumption of full information because the
expressions are either simultaneous creations if created within seconds of each other, or
copies7. If two creations are similar then the earlier expression remains and the later ex-
pression leaves8. This introduces a very real advantage for the first creator which can
induce people to submit ideas more quickly and consequently quality could suffer as ex-
pression are not thought through. These rules for infringement would not differ between
treatment groups but some level of copyright exists in all treatment groups. However, in
some treatment groups the first mover protection has no impact on either the individual’s
reputation or pay. In these groups it is assumed that the effect of first mover protection
on the expression created negligible.
3.2.3 Market Demand
Considering infringement and full information, the mechanism of deciphering success
within the market is the next aspect of the stylised market for creative goods. This re-
quires a type of ranking between market participants where they are ranked based on the
popularity of their expressions. For example Picasso can be judged to be more successful
in the market place compared to some unknown artist because of his works being more
6Full information of creation is important because then each participant knows what has been created
and can avoid creating the same expression.
7It could also be a mistake but even so the first creator would have the right to the expression. In the
case of simultaneous creations the first one to author the expression has the right to it and so the case of
simultaneous creations has been simplified in the stylised market.
8Normaly I woud say "is discarded" and note "leaves" but I couldn’t resist a reference to brexit.
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popular and therefore a willingness to pay for those works. However this popularity in
the market is heavily subjective and can sometimes even seem random, it is important to
mimic this quality of the market. To do this it is first important to know that the market
only consists of expressions which adhere to the rules of copyright. With the knowledge
of market participants are fully informed about other expressions in the market and in-
fringing expressions are discarded9 from the market place. The remaining expressions
can be subjected to the scrutiny of the consumer. This scrutiny, as discussed previously,
is subjective and need not be based on anything else but subjective judgments.
Market feedback is crucial as it informs the creators decision in the future about what
is popular or not. The information participants receive from the market is a key aspect
of how the treatment groups have been organised. Public information regarding market
feedback is just as crucial because participants are observing other market participant’s
actions in real time. Information such as what is being created and by whom, as is shown
in PI groups, allows participants to instantly adjust their strategy based on the market
feedback they receive of other participants output decisions. This information can change
the strategic decision making even before the feedback from the market, i.e. information
of ones own or other participants rank.
3.2.4 Supply and Demand in the Market
The specifics of exactly the experiment is set up in the "Experimental Design" Section
and related sub sections. The following is a general overview of the process designed
to give a broad insight into the dynamics of the experiment. The expressions or ideas
produced during the two creativity tests are used as a proxy for production in the market
for creative goods. The expressions created in the creativity tasks mimic the creation of a
song or a piece of art in the market place. The specifics of the process of creation within
the stylised market is explained in full in the ’Creation in the Market’ section. The next
important aspect of the market is how the property rights are enforced. This explanation
can be found in the ’Rights Enforcement’ section dictating how copyright is enforced in
the stylised market. Now that there is supply and rights enforcement in the market, there
needs to be a demand to round out the market. Participants from other groups are asked
to give their subjective judgments on the expressions created which would then dictate
performance. These judgments give relative value to each expression with more value
assigned to the expressions that were judged to be of quality. This process is explained
in detail in the ’Mechanism of Deciding Popularity’ section. These subjective judgments
proxy demand in the market as individuals largely base their spending decisions on their
9This process is explained in full in the 3.2.4 section.
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own subjective judgements. These two aspects, the ’Creation in a Market’ and ’Deciding
Popularity’ respectively guarantee that there is a supply and a demand in the market.
The supply and demand then interact to guarantee competition and a market pricing
mechanism for the supply.
This interaction is not as dynamic as it is in the real world market and not a dynamic
value for creations based on some aggregated demand in a large market. Rather there are
set awards for a given rank decided based on the popularity of submitted expressions.
The distinction is that the market size in the real world can increase or decrease based on
how ’trendy’ a type of art is or based on some relative quality compared to other art forms.
This would affect how many individuals would be interested in purchasing a type of art.
The market for a type of art can expand or contract based on its relative trendiness or
importance within the art lovers community, or even the art lovers community itslef could
expand or contract. This dynamic interaction between total demand in the market can
drastically increase or decrease the value of a market. In contrast the stylised market has
a set value and does not expand or contract. Meaning the value of the market is constant
and does not change due to competition for demand from other markets. The market is
assumed to have a set value and this set value is similarly distributed between the market
participants and the distribution found in creative markets. That is to say the distribution
of prizes between ranks has a fat upper tail similar to a tournament pay structure. The
rank is dictated by the popularity or simulated demand10 and the supply/competition is
simulated by the expressions created by the participant and the participants competition
in their group.
When conducting experiments it is vital to know that as many exogenous factors
which could affect the results are taken into account. Creativity can vary from one in-
dividual to another for many different reasons as shown later in the section. This is why
it is crucial to first identify aspects which can cause creativity to vary on an individual
level and then find ways to control for these differences. Surveys before and after the ex-
periment are used to elicit differences between participants which can then be taken into
account during the statistical analysis phase. The following sections run through research
on aspects which can cause creativity to differ on an individual level.
10Which is the quality of a participants expressions as judges by other participants. Thus assigning value
to their expressions and simulating demand in a market when these value judgments from all the judges
are combined.
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3.3 Individual Differences
3.3.1 Why Individual Traits Are Relevant
Success in the market for creative goods is associated with an almost random ’nobody-
knows’ principle which essentially argues that it is often hard to know what is successful
in the market (Caves, 2002, p. 3). However this does not mean that just anyone can jump
in and be successful, there are some requirements in order to succeed, a baseline skill or
talent level if you will. There are many variables which can affect creativity, as will be
discussed below, and it is important to control for these variables. Although the mea-
surement of these control variable are not going to be perfect it is important to construct
proxies wherever possible in order to maximise the strength of these controls. The 12
controls used are: Age, gender, creative efficacy11, math efficacy, ambiguous risk, risk
aversion, language, handedness, institution of study, arts hobby, preference over rich or
famous, and if the individual has family in the creative industries. These have been found
to influence or potentially influence creativity or creative thought. The better the variables
which affect creativity are controlled for, the more accurate the estimation of any poten-
tial effect of the control groups will be. Thus by controlling for individual differences
it will be easier to observe the real effect of changes in the market environment. The
explanations of the controls are included in the context of a general discussion of what
influences creativity in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of creativity
and its influences.
3.3.2 Age and Gender
There are some indications that age and gender do influence creativity, but exactly how
this is can be quite complicated. Overall both gender and age can influence creativity
thought many different channels, for example, age can influence performance through
more experience or practice. These both have to some degree been covered by the vari-
ables degree year and arts hobby and thus the influence of age would likely not take into
account these possible influences. As people get older it is not necessarily that individu-
als become less or more creative but are creative in different ways compared to younger
individuals (Abra, 1989). Interestingly men had higher public achievement12 but equal
private achievement to women (Runco et al., 2010). This indicates that men could poten-
tially have differences in performance in the public information conditions. Even though
11The concept is explained in the 3.3.7 section.
12Public and private achievement were derived from a survey responses. Public creative achievement
was creative achievement in a public forum or space.
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the influence of gender and age are likely to be very complicated it is useful to add them
to observe if there are other influences from gender or age outside of the other existing
influences already taken into account such as risk preferences, experience, and practice
or hobby.
3.3.3 Handedness and Brain lateralisation
The study of brain lateralization is the study of how different cognitive processes are
specialized to one side of the brain or the other like language or visuospatial processes
(Nielsen et al., 2013)13. In general it is beleived that creativity is a right brained activity
while logical thought a left brained process (Nielsen et al., 2013). The theory that left
handed individuals who would have a dominant right hemisphere of the brain would
be more creative follows. This can be tested for by collecting information describing test
subject’s dominant hand or if they are ambidextrous. If they are left or right-hand domi-
nant then the theory is that they are left brain dominant if right hand dominant and visa
versa, however if they are ambidextrous then no conclusions can be made about brain
lateralisation based on handedness. Although there is evidence of heightened communi-
cation between the two hemispheres in people who are ambidextrous (Moore et al., 2009;
Nielsen et al., 2013; Shobe, Ross, and Fleck, 2009
There is some evidence of lateralisation in type of thought processes; it was found that
right handed individuals preferred a local and executive thinking style while left handers
preferred a legislative, judicial and hierarchical thinking style (Alipour, Akhondy, and
Aerab-sheybani, 2012). When people have a local thinking style they prefer to work on
tasks that require concrete details compared to when individuals have an executive think-
ing style they prefer to work with clear instructions and structure and prefer to implement
with set guidelines (Zhang, 2015). On the other hand (pun intended), a legislative think-
ing style is when an individual prefers to work on tasks requiring creative strategies and
where they can choose their own activity (Zhang, 2015). A judicial one is one that allows
for one’s own judgement, and finally a hierarchic style is when people prefer to divide
their attention between multiple tasks ranked in priority according to their evaluation of
the tasks (Zhang, 2015). This would suggest that right handed (or left hemisphere domi-
nant) individuals prefer tasks which have clear instructions and structure and which re-
quire working with concrete details, tasks which are associated with a stereotypical “left
brained” thinking style. Conversely left-handers (right-hemisphere dominant) preferred
tasks which required creative strategies, one’s own judgement, and preferred to divide
13Simple definition found at the Free Dictionary http://medical-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/lateralization
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their attention between multiple tasks. These traits have been stereotypically been asso-
ciated with creative personality. There is evidence to support the hypothesis that right-
hemisphere dominant individuals are more creative as there does seem to be associations
between creative thought and predominant right hemisphere processing (Lindell, 2014).
Hemispheric preference has been found to be influenced by cultural factors in a study
where the researchers compared hemispherical processing preference and found that
in the same task Americans had a preference for left-hemispherical processing while
Japanese individuals showed a preference for right hemispherical processing in the same
task (Hiser and Kobayashi, 2002). The same study found that the Japanese were more
feeling oriented along with a preference of the left-hemisphere and the Americans were
more statistically oriented with a preference toward the right-hemisphere, which is con-
sistent with the left/right hemispherical model (Hiser and Kobayashi, 2002). This would
suggest that hemispherical preference is influenced by environmental factors assuming
that the genetic populations would be more or less the same in Japan and America when
it comes to brain lateralisation.
The evidence is not one sided when it comes to creativity and brain lateralisation how-
ever, there are studies which suggest creativity is more about connectivity between the
hemispheres of the brain (Moore et al., 2009; Nielsen et al., 2013) or that mixed handed
instead of strong-handers were found to be more creative (Shobe, Ross, and Fleck, 2009).
Interestingly although hand preference was related to creativity, hand performance was
not, suggesting that it is unlikely that there is a neuropsychological explanation for cre-
ative performance (Badzakova-Trajkov, Häberling, and Corballis, 2011). Studies which
link reported handedness and creativity (Preti and Vellante, 2007) could find a similar re-
lation between hand preference and creative performance but not hand performance and
creativity. There have also been findings from meta-analysis of lateralisation and creativ-
ity that suggesting it is not necessarily right hemisphere dominance in the brain which
causes people to be more equipped to handle creative tasks but hemispherical dominance
in general, not specifically associated to one hemisphere being dominant (Mihov, Denzler,
and Förster, 2010). There is enough evidence to suggest that handedness or lateralization
can affect creative performance, thus collecting data on handedness or ambidextrousness
could be useful in order to gain a well-rounded picture of what contributes to an individ-
ual’s creative production.
There was sufficient evidence to suggest handedness did affect creativity and a ques-
tion was added to the exit survey which asked individuals to state their handedness. It
was in the exit survey as this answer was not likely to be affected by the performance in
the tasks. The question asked which was the persons dominant hand and it had 3 options
"righthanded", "lefthanded", or "ambidextrous". The large majority or 149 individuals out
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of the total 198 answered that they were righthanded, 41 stated they were left handed, 7
whom were ambidextrous, and there was 1 unanswered. The decision was made to create
a dummy variable using this information where it was 1 if the person stated they were
right handed and 0 otherwise. This takes into account the 1 unanswered but is only likely
to cause an underestimation in the effect of the variable. This is because, although it is
very likely the person was righthanded, marking them as non-right handed is a way to
make sure the effect of the righthanded variable was reliable. It was not seen as necessary
to drop all the data from the non-answer but rather mark as non-righthanded as only the
people who explicitly stated to be right handed were marked down as such.
3.3.4 Intelligence
Although there is no direct measure of IQ used14 it is worth discussing the impact of
IQ on creativity in order gain insight into what creativity is. The aim of the following
section will thus be to discuss how cognitive ability, which is what IQ is a measure of,
impacts creativity. If creativity and IQ would be synonymous then it would be easy to
say that creativity depends on cognitive ability or the processing power that an individual
exhibits. If this is not the case, then it must follow that creativity is not simply a matter of
processing power but is a more complex issue. IQ has been linked with creative calibre by
defining individuals with an IQ of over 140 as genius; but the view that IQ is analogous
to creativity has since been amended and now IQ is thought to measure giftedness and
not creativity, at least not one to one (Jon L. Karlsson, 1978, pp. 97–98). There exists
a “threshold hypothesis” where it is theorised that beyond a threshold, such as an IQ
of 120, there doesn’t exists significant increases in creativity as IQ increases beyond the
threshold (Runco et al., 2010; Yamamoto, 1964).
However the threshold is not a concrete threshold where there is no increases in cre-
ativity beyond 120 IQ points but there is a weaker correlation between creativity and IQ
above 120 IQ points than below (Yamamoto, 1964). The relationship between creativity
and IQ also depends on the difficulty of the creativity task, because as the task becomes
more difficult the threshold for IQ significantly affecting creativity increases (Benedek et
al., 2014). In other words the effect of IQ on creativity is stronger for higher IQ levels as the
creativity task becomes more difficult, suggesting there is not a rigid threshold but a task
difficulty dependent one. It also seems to suggest that there are diminishing marginal re-
turns of IQ in respect to creativity, since the correlation between the two seems to weaken
as IQ increases. However the variance between IQ and creativity is very heterogeneous
meaning that there is a large variance in creativity at a given IQ level, at low level of IQ
14This is due to the measure being very hard and expensive to implement and thus was not controlled
for.
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creativity is also low but at high levels of IQ all levels of creativity are found (Amabile,
1983).
This suggests that intelligence is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of creativity,
i.e. with low levels of intelligence there will be low levels of creativity but a high level
of intelligence doesn’t mean that the individual will be extremely creative but is likely
to have at least average creative ability. This suggest thats creativity to some extent does
rely on the processing power of the individual but is only a part of the picture. In the
previous section the discussion regarding brain lateralisation showed that creativity is
not only a right or leftbrained activity but is likely to depend more on how the two sides
communicate between each other. Given the previous creativity best described by not
only how quickly or efficiently the brain works around a problem, i.e. IQ, but how the
brain utilises the full capacity of the brain, i.e. brain lateralisation.
3.3.5 Language
The performance in the creativity tasks can be language dependent so it is important
to take this into account. A question asking the participants to name the postcode they
lived in as a child was added to the exit survey. Participants were reluctant to give such
detailed information and from the ones that did the information was extremely varied.
This made it hard to control for how wealthy the individual’s family was directly but did
allow to control for the likely first language. Since it was not possible to combine the
information into a wealth endowment measure the measurement was instead converted
to a dummy variable which was 1 if they were raised in an English speaking country and
0 if they were not. Thus there were some variables which could take into account some
of the variability due to differences in upbringing and mother tongue.
3.3.6 Nature and Nurture of Creativity
There has long been a nature versus nurture debate when it comes to fields of research
such as athletics and academics, and the field of creativity research is no different. Just
like in other areas creativity is influenced by both nature and nurture. When it comes to
the genetic or hereditary influences on creativity there is evidence that psychopathology
or mood disorders are associated with creativity (Kyaga et al., 2013; Rybakowski et al.,
2008). Mental illnesses for example schizophrenia and bipolar disorder have been as-
sociated with creativity and along with the previously mentioned, suggests there is an
inherited aspect to creativity (Kyaga et al., 2013). Although, except for bipolar disorder,
individuals in the creative professions were not more likely to have mood disorders com-
pared to other professions (Kyaga et al., 2013). However psychopathology, whether in
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creative or non-creative industries, was associated with creative achievement (Ludwig,
1992), which suggests that creativity or creative traits can be inherited. This is further
supported by findings where genes linked to neuroplasticity were found to be associated
with psychiatric disorders and musical perception (Ukkola-Vuoti et al., 2013). A system-
atic review of creativity and psychopathology research also shows support for the posi-
tive relationship between creativity and psychopathology with 67.6% of studies finding a
positive relation compared to a 9.9% of studies finding a negative one (Thys, Sabbe, and
De Hert, 2014). There was also support found for the relationship between first-degree
relatives of psychiatric patients and creative occupations (Karlsson, 1970; Kyaga et al.,
2013).
Nurturing creativity is also an important aspect of creativity, the physical environ-
ment that surrounds an individual affects creativity which is widely found to be the case
in management literature (Amabile, 1983; Amabile and Pillemer, 2012; Amabile, 1997;
Nonaka and Konno, 1998; McCoy, 2005; Duttweiler, 1984; Chong and Ma, 2010; Oksanen
and Ståhle, 2013) and the social environment is an important factor in inducing creativity
and creative performance, but also to avoid hindering it (Amabile, 1983; Amabile and
Pillemer, 2012; Amabile, 1997; Edmondson and Mogelof, 2006; Hennessey and Amabile,
2010; Nonaka and Konno, 1998). In terms of the social environment a key aspect of induc-
ing creativity is to be in a social environment that supports and encourages risk taking
in the context of exploring new ideas (Chong and Ma, 2010). Specifically in the context
of problem solving this can be useful since exploring new solution pathways can help in
finding new and novel solutions to old problems (Amabile, 1983). Risk taking also me-
diates the intrinsic motivation on creativity (Hennessey and Amabile, 2010), which adds
an indirect effect of a social environment by supporting risk-taking through its effect on
individual’s willingness to take risks. Psychological safety, the feeling that the environ-
ment or team is a safe place for interpersonal risk taking through providing a safe place
to express ideas and criticisms and further mitigate risk taking and creative thought (Ed-
mondson and Mogelof, 2006). There is a strong link between social environment and risk
taking which is a key constituent of creativity because breaking social norms whether it
is through art or otherwise, can be risky.
To advance the thought that where and in what kind of environment a person is
brought up influences their creativity later in life one must look at the physical environ-
mental factors in addition to the social factors. Creative students have high energy levels
and their underachievement can be minimised when they can be involved and when
their physical environment is not too restrictive in forcing them to be inactive for long
periods of time (Kim, 2007). The physical space also supports the accumulation of tacit
knowledge which is available only to the people working or living there (Oksanen and
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Ståhle, 2013). This is exemplified in the theory of “ba” which roughly translates to space,
this theory suggests that space, or shared space, be it physical, virtual, and or mental is a
foundation for knowledge accumulation (Nonaka and Konno, 1998). This suggests that
if, an individual is in an environment which is not too restrictive and in a physical envi-
ronment which supports the creation of tacit knowledge, it will facilitate learning. Taken
at face value this does not seem so relevant in the context of creativity but knowledge
has a fundamental role in problem solving (Forgeard and Mecklenburg, 2013) which is an
element of creativity (Glover, Ronning, and Reynolds, 1989 p. 5) meaning any increase in
knowledge, be it tacit or otherwise, increases creative potential. A similar argument has
been put forward by Teresa Amabile in the context of organisations were she found that
the presence or absence, depending on context, of salient external restrictions in the social
environment can hinder workplace creativity (Amabile, 1983). The argument was that the
external constraints would hinder task motivation by crowding out intrinsic motivation
which is the motivation that the individual derives from within themselves.
Taking into account the influence of nature through factors like genetics and nurture
through its influence on the social and physical environment of an individual it would
be fitting to conclude that an individual’s family could affect their creative potential both
through in terms of genetics and environment. If there was one aspect of an individual to
look into to predict how creative they might be, family would be the most fruitful. This
could conceivably consider anything from IQ to the learning environment of the individ-
ual. This would need far more resources and time to take into account than was available
for the research at hand. Even so it does indicate the importance of one’s family and fam-
ily environment when it comes to creativity. Hence there is a dummy which asks if there
are close family members who are in the creative industries. It gives an indication about
how creatively oriented the family is and so gives an indication about how conducive to
creativity the individuals living environment was15. The family dummy variable for the
individuals was 1 if they had close family who work in the creative industries and 0 if
they did not. Close family included uncles/aunts, sisters/brothers, fathers/mothers or
first cousins. Admittedly the variable is not fully taking into account the nature or nurture
aspect but it is none-the-less useful information to take into account when controlling for
individual characteristics. The discussion regarding IQ and Nature and Nurture and their
influence on creativity gives a good indication to the complexity of creativity and its con-
stituents. Creativity is clearly a very complex construct and as such motivating creativity
can be difficult using a single incentive. It also points to the multiple influences a single
incentive can have, as it might motivate individuals to work harder but can also influence
15A question regarding and the mental health of family was likely to cause problems when applying for
ethical approval and the idea of such a question was dropped.
72 Chapter 3. Methodology
the environment negatively and crowd-out or negate the incentive to work harder. This is
precisely why care was taken when designing the stylised market16 to take into account
the multiple possible effects of the introduction of tournament pay or public information.
3.3.7 Self-Efficacy
Self-efficacy can be defined as the degree of confidence an individual has in their capa-
bility to perform a certain task (Balsvik, 2004) so if an individual has a high degree of
self-efficacy in the creative domain, they perceive their ability or capability to perform to
be high in that domain. The relevant domain of self-efficacy for the research at hand is
creative self-efficacy, which is the individuals perceived capability in the creative domain.
Creative self-efficacy is not a constant but it is dependent on, and can be influenced by, the
environment (Beghetto, Kaufman, and Baxter, 2011) and by creative or domain relevant
skills (Mathisen and Bronnick, 2009). This is similar to Locus of control or LoC17. Locus
of control was also considered to observe how peoples’ perception of the effectiveness of
ones effort in influencing their environment. Individuals can have an external or internal
locus of control, that is to say they can feel as if their circumstances are largely dictated by
external forces or through their own decisions, respectively. However self-efficacy is more
specific as it can be domain specific and is a closer measure to confidence and perceived
ability compared to LoC.
Self-efficacy is relevant toward explaining not only creative behaviour (Lemons, 2011),
but creative performance as well (Tierney and Farmer, 2002; Tierney and Farmer, 2011)
which is why it is important that it is to consider when attempting to measure the effect
of external incentives on creative performance. Could it be that incentives influence cre-
ativity differently depending on efficacy? This is especially relevant in a context where
there are increased expectations on creative performance. This has been found to decrease
creative performance, even though the same study found a positive relationship between
creative role identity and creative expectations as well as the enhanced sense of capac-
ity to work creatively (Tierney and Farmer, 2011). This could be explained by findings
which suggest that creative self-efficacy is related to job complexity. So if the creative ex-
pectations are increased it will not increase creative self-efficacy in a job where creativity
requirements are low while it can increase self-efficacy if the jobs creativity requirements
are higher (Tierney and Farmer, 2002). This suggests that if people complete a creativity
test and be judged based on performance in that test, people who are in a profession that
16Described later in detail.
17LoC is the degree that people believe they have control over outcomes in their lives. LoC can be either
internal or external, where internal LoC means the individual believes they can influence outcomes in their
lives and that the control over these situations are internal. While external LoC simply means the person
believes that control for the outcomes in their lives exists outside of themselves.
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requires high levels of creativity would have a higher creative self-efficacy compared to
those in jobs with lower creativity requirements. In turn this suggests that individuals in
jobs or studying where creativity requirements higher are likely to perform better. This
can be controlled for by eliciting creative self-efficacy scores and also by asking where
the individual studies18. The institution of study can also influence creativity relevant
skills and therefore is important to take into account in its own right independently from
creative self-efficacy. Thus the self-efficacy measure will pick up the influence of the in-
stitution on self-efficacy. The institution measure will, in turn, pick up any influence of
changes in creativity or creativity relevant skills due to institution.
Creative self-efficacy can also increase innovation behaviour (Micheal, Hou, and Fan,
2011), which if someone has been brought up in an environment that fosters creative
domain relevant skills, can have a long lasting positive effect of creative self-efficacy
(Mathisen and Bronnick, 2009). It can be theorised that upbringing of an individual has an
impact on the creative self-efficacy of the individual19. Meaning it is important to control
for both creative self-efficacy and upbringing. It allows for the direct effects of domain
relevant skills, due to upbringing, to be taken into account. The direct effect of upbringing
is taken into account using the family members’ career choices as a proxy for the creative
environment of the individual growing up20. The indirect impact of the environment on
the creative-efficacy will be considered using the self-efficacy measure as differences in
self-efficacy due to environment will be reported in the measure for self-efficacy.
The relationship between extrinsic motivation and creative performance can, at least
partly, be explained using creative self-efficacy since monetary incentives have been found
to increase creative performance for individuals with a high creative self-efficacy (Malik,
Butt, and Choi, 2015). This is a very interesting result since monetary incentives and
creative performance have been studied in (Buccafusco et al., 2014) where the authors
found that strong monetary incentives boosted creative performance which could also be
a function of creative self-efficacy. Self-efficacy affects whether people take part in a task
(Bandura, 1977) and so can be a useful measure to gain information about possible dif-
ferences in effort levels. There were three creative efficacy questions added to the entry
survey of the experiment. They were added to the entry survey as there is evidence of the
creative task influencing the creative efficacy of an individual. To avoid the tasks affect-
ing the stated creative efficacy all questions relating to efficacy were in a survey which
was given to the individuals before they took part in the tasks. Self-efficacy measures
18Participants were students the level of creative self-efficacy is more likely to be influenced by the cre-
ativity requirements of their study and not their work. In fact it is likely they have not even worked yet.
19As discussed in the previous section it also influences individuals creativity and creativity relevant-
skills.
20The specifics of the dummy "creative family" is considered in the Nature Versus Nature of Creativity
section.
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for creative efficacy, job-search efficacy, and math efficacy were all added (Bandura, 1977;
Tierney and Farmer, 2002; Tierney and Farmer, 2011). Creative self efficacy was added be-
cause of its potential to explain creative decision making. The math self-efficacy measure
was likely to explain differences in math performance.
3.3.8 Risk Attitudes
Perceived risk can be affected by many aspects such as framing (Tversky and Kahneman,
1986), which is the way that a risky decision is presented to the subject. If a risky decision
is framed as a loss people are less likely to choose a risky option compared to a safe op-
tion, but if an option with the same risk and expected value of the pay-out is presented in
a way that makes the risky option seem like a gain then people are more likely to choose
the risky option (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). What is meant by risk aversion is the
willingness to sacrifice an economic payoff in order to avoid a potential loss (Krugman
and Wells, 2015, p. 266) while risk loving is the exact opposite, risk neutral is being com-
pletely insensitive to risk (Krugman and Wells, 2015, p. 586-87). For example assume a
situation where an individual has the choice between either £100 for sure or a 50-50 coin
flip where the pay-outs are £0 with 50% probability and £200 with 50% probability. A
risk-averse individual would choose the £100 for sure a risk-neutral individual would be
indifferent between the two options and a risk loving individual would choose to gamble
and get either £0 or £200 depending on the outcome of the coin flip. If the individual is
risk-averse they are willing to take a certain outcome that is below the expected pay-out
of the gamble, so in afore mentioned case they might accept a certain payment of any-
where below £100 depending on how risk-averse the individual is. Hence risk averseness
can be seen as a dependence or a want for security (Szpiro, 1986). If the individual was
risk-loving they would be willing to take a gamble with a lower expected utility, but a
higher maximum pay out. In context of the afore mentioned case the individual would
be willing to take a gamble with an expected utility of anywhere under £100 but a small
chance to make a higher gain than 200. Just how much higher the maximum payout,
and lower the expected utility of the gamble would be, depends on how risk-loving the
individual is.
Understanding risk profiles and how risk is relevant in context of creativity and mar-
ket output is important in order to fully understand the participants decisions and deci-
sion making process. Risk taking is context or domain specific (Ding, Hartog, and Sun,
2010; Weber, Blais, and Betz, 2002) this could be partly explained by risk taking being
associated with the differences in an activities risks and benefits and not perceived risk
(Weber, Blais, and Betz, 2002). So a professional skydiver could still not invest in a risky
asset, even though they in essence take risks for a living, if the benefit from the risky stock
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is outweighed by the risks of investing in it. However perceived risk has been found to
affect what sort of payment schemes individuals opt into. Overall the more risk averse in-
dividuals avoid tournament payment schemes and opt for fixed payment schemes while
the tournament scheme attracted workers who believed their performance was high rel-
ative to others (Dohmen et al., 2011). The participants will not be able to choose the
treatment they are allocated to. This can give risk loving individuals a leg up in the
tournament groups while simultaneously cause a decrease in the performance of the risk
averse.
Risk attitudes can influence creative performance for a few possible reasons. Risk
averse individuals could be less likely to take creative risks which can cause the expres-
sions produced to be bland and uninteresting and so unpopular as well. The assumption
being that, there is some risk in going against what the individual might perceive as be-
ing a market trend or popular. Even though they might be just as qualified or talented as
someone who is risk neutral or risk loving. Conversely the "bland" ideas could also ap-
peal to a common taste which cause the expressions to be popular. Although the previous
are possible reactions of the risk averse or risk loving, to the market demands, risk aver-
sion is more likely to affect productivity. This is because, depending on how individuals
perceive the situation, could increase the pressure to succeed and thus cause distraction
to the market participants. Risk attitude is likely to change type of investment decisions
people make or types of gambles they take. Ultimately whether it influences creative per-
formance is dependent on how salient the risk aspect of the stylised market situation is
to the participant.
A risk aversion measure used in the regressions shown in chapters 4 and 5 was ques-
tion number 18 and 19 found in the exit survey21. The risk attitude questions in the exit
and entry surveys are not identical, although it can be argued they should be. The reason
is to make sure the responses were genuine in the exit survey rather than a copy of what
the participant remembered answering in the entry surveys. In hindsight there is a low
probability the answer would of been exactly the same because the participant remem-
bered what they answered in the entry survey. In addition, the direct comparability of
the responses to the risk attitudes questions would have increased the reliability of the
risk attitude measurement along with making it possible to observe differences in risk at-
titudes before and after the tasks. It is also important to either have the probability of the
risky options constant and change the expected values or to change the probability of the
risky options and keep the expected value the same in order to measure risk preferences.
This increases the reliability of the risk preference measure and avoids possible confusion
from both probabilities of the options and the expected value of the options changing.
21Full surveys can be found in the chapter 3 section of the appendix
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Although it can be argued that in question 18, for example, since both the expected value
decrease and the probability decrease for option c makes that option very obviously dif-
ferent compared to the other options with the same higher expected value. Thus it can be
argued that only individuals who were very risk loving would have selected that option.
3.4 Experimental Design
The effectiveness of IP and TP as a motivator for creativity are studied using an exper-
imental setup mimicking the structure of the markets for creative goods. Expressions
produced during the two creativity tests used in the experiment are used as a proxy for
production, songs paintings etc., in the market for creative goods. Participants from other
groups are asked to give their subjective judgments on these expressions which then dic-
tates the performance of the agent. These subjective judgments proxy demand in the
market as individuals largely base their spending decisions on their own subjective judg-
ments. These two aspects guarantee that there is a supply and a demand in the market.
3.4.1 Creativity Tests
The experiments were piloted and there was no evidence of participants misunderstand-
ing the aim of the tasks mentioned or finding the directions for the tasks confusing. This
is why there was no practice task during the experiment itself as the directions for the
tasks were deemed sufficient during the pilots.
Verbal/Thought
The Unusual Uses Test, similar to the Brick Uses Test created by Guilford, asks individuals
to come up with alternative uses for an everyday item such as tin cans or books in order
to assess the creativity of the subject22. The Unusual uses Test is a part of a wider range
of creativity tests called Torrence Test for Creative Thinking or TTCT tests. The tests
originally used a scoring system that takes into account originality, fluency, and flexibility
used to judge the creativity of answers for figural and verbal and creative tests (Torrance,
1962, p. 238-239). These measures can be combined to create an overall creativity score
(Clapham, 1998) which can then be used to compare the performance of the test subjects.
However TTCT can be seen as a controversial measure for creativity since it is a divergent
thinking test which has been found to test divergent thinking and not creative thinking
(M. Baker, 1978). However since 1962 when this test was published it has been improved
22An example of what this task looked like in the experiment can be found in the chapter 3 appendix
figure A.7
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and a review of TTCT tests from 1966 to 1998 found that flexibility, fluency and originality
correlate highly with creative performance (Kim, 2006) which means the use the Unusual
Uses Test is an appropriate test to measure an individuals.
Figural
The figural thinking task was a “line Meanings task” developed by Wallach and Kogan
in their book “modes of thinking in young children” (Wallach and Kogan, 1965, p. 34-6).
The participants were asked to come up with meanings for the given line in other words
they were given a line or shape and asked what it reminded them of or what it could be
a part of23. The example given was a horizontal line which then was said to be a side of
a flag. For both the creative tasks there was the completion stage, similarities stage, and
the favourites stage.
Creativity is judged by two independent and blind judges, meaning they have no con-
nection to the research at hand and did not know anything about who were the partici-
pants or which treatment groups they were allocated to. Using two independent judges is
common practice when judging creativity for creativity tests, such as, the divergent task
(Silvia, Beaty, and Nusbaum, 2013; Shobe, Ross, and Fleck, 2009; Jones and Estes, 2015;
Eisenberger, Haskins, and Gambleton, 1999). Thus there exists a robust president of us-
ing only a two judges compared to say tens of judge or even more. Both judges received
the same rubric for the creativity test which was based on the same theory as the crite-
rion used in the above cited studies. This was created in order to give a consistent base
for the creativity scores. The judges also gave subjective scores from 0-5 and were only
told to give at least half of the expressions score of 0. This means that it was up to the
judges themselves what they wanted to give 1-5 to, the aim of the score was to be purely
subjective. These subjective scores could then be correlated to the scores given by the
participants to gain some information about how closely related subjective scores might
be. These subjective scores given to judges also allowed for the scores between treatments
and between groups in the same treatments, to be compared. This was essential to see if
there were differences in the perceived subjective quality between groups.
Entry and Exit Survey
Individual differences are controlled for using the information elicited using the entry
and exit survey which each participant completes. The survey is divided into two to elicit
information about the participants, such as, self-efficacy measures without the influence
23An example of what this task looked like in the experiment can be found in the chapter 3 appendix
figure A.1
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of the results from the experiment. The entry survey includes questions relating to all
the measures which can possibly be affected by the participants performance during the
experiment. The exit survey on the other hand includes questions regarding variables
which do not change due to the experiment, such as age or the year of the degree, or
are questions specifically about the participants performance regarding the experiment.
These questions are questions concerning variables, such as, performance satisfaction,
how much fun the participants perceived having, how fair the reward scheme was, and a
proxy for envy.
The measure which acts as a proxy for envy is based on a question which elicits the
individual’s willingness to trade places given that they would also need to put in the
same effort as the person who they would like to trade places with. This is according to a
basic definition of envy-freeness where the individual is or is not envious of others given
the necessary levels of effort to achieve such position24. This is a binary ’would you like
to change places given the effort the other person made’ yes or no.
The questions for reward fairness, performance satisfaction, and fun are more straight-
forward. They exist simply to gauge a subjective feeling which can be used to compare
overall differences between treatment groups or between high and low performers, for
example. How satisfied was an individual with their performance from what is essen-
tially a scale from 1 to 6, ranging from very unsatisfied to very satisfied. This can be
simplified into a satisfied or unsatisfied but for a more nuanced observation it has 6 op-
tions with a forced answer, meaning to option to answer ’I don’t know’. The same scale
is used for the scale of reward fairness ranging from very unfair to very fair. The final
subjective judgment question was, on a scale of 1 to 10, how much fun did you have from
1 being ’no fun’ and 10 being the highest amount of ’fun’. These questions can seem in-
consequential but inform differences in the perception of the environment present in the
different treatment groups and what this perception might be dependent on.
Questions regarding age, university experience, gender, and hobbies are included in
the exit surveys. These are relatively standard questions present in surveys tied to ex-
periments as they can dictate things like maturity or experience both in life and in art
which can influence the performance of the individual. There is a question about what
hobbies participants have which is divided into two dummy variables ’sports hobby’ and
’arts hobby’. The intuition here being that the more practice individuals have. i.e. if
they have an arts related hobby, the more creative a person could potentially be. The
’sports hobby’ variable was included because some studies link physical activity with in-
creased cognitive performance and a reduction cognitive decline (Wang and McClung,
2012; Ruthirakuhan et al., 2012). Since creativity is also closely linked with cognitive
24This was originally introduce in gamov and stern 1958 book of math puzzles
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performance it makes sense to add the question to observe if it can explain variance in
creative behaviour.
3.4.2 Lab Setting & Artists Participating in the Market
The computer labs used for the experiments are located in the main campus of the Uni-
versity of Glasgow and data stored and backed up of University servers. The computer
labs used had dividers constructed from cardboard to fit the specification of the com-
puter lab in use. The participants were isolated into cubicles and their line of sight is
obstructed in the front and in the sides to protect the screen of the participant and in or-
der to reduce possible distractions. This is important in order to decrease the possible
differences between sessions. There were 8 sessions ranging from 20 to 34 participants,
lasting anywhere from 1 hour 20 minutes to 1 hours 40 minutes. Session dummies were
used when regressing the results in order to take into account any remaining variation
between sessions which could result from anything from weather to time of year.
The artists in the experiment market are art students, in total 198, from Glasgow
School of Art, The Royal Conservatoire, and the Arts Department at the University of
Glasgow. Participants were recruited from art schools to recruit a population of partic-
ipants who would have a high probability to use or be in contact with copyright or in
copyright industries in the future. Art students were used in order to maximise external
validity of the results when comparing the sampled population with the population of
individuals who use or are affected by copyright. This is in order to address the possi-
ble differences between populations of artists to non-artists as theories suggest these two
populations could be significantly different (Abbing, 2011, p. 89-91,115).
The participants are a mixture of art students and so the participant population is
designed to mimic the artist population as a whole. The implicit assumption is that art
students are more likely to become artists involved in the market for creative goods. In
addition there is a possible difference in how artists, compared to the overall population,
respond to the incentives present in the markets for creative goods as it could be the in-
centives themselves which drive individuals to be a part of the market for creative goods.
Thus the focus of the study was not a subset of artists but artists more generally.
3.4.3 Structure
Before the experiment even starts everyone reads the plain language statement and signs
a consent from. This is followed by an introduction session where all individuals intro-
duce themselves and say a bit about themselves, what they study and why. Next the
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participants walk into the lab and sign in to the system. After which they start the exper-
iment itself, order found below. In each of the two creativity tasks there is three stages.
Stage 1 is the Creation the Market, stage 2 is the rights enforcement, and stage 3 is the
popularity decision & results. Each participant is informed about the experiment struc-
ture in the experiment instructions, before the first task i.e. first creation stage begins. This
means that individuals are aware of all relevant information 25. The complete structure is
as found below.
3.4.4 Creation in the Market
FIGURE 3.1: Screen Shot of the Divergent Task with Attribution
To simulate creation in the market there are two creativity tasks. The two creativity tasks
are a divergent thinking task called the ’Unusual Uses Test’ or the ’Alternate Uses Test’
(Torrance, 1962, p. 238–240). It was developed by the well-known psychologist J.P. Tor-
rance and the second of the two "Line Meanings Task" developed by Wallach and Kogan
(Wallach and Kogan, 1965, p. 34-36). Both tasks are mechanically similar, participants
are asked to create ideas/expressions based on a stimuli presented. The difference be-
tween the tasks is that the "Unusual Uses Task" is a divergent thinking task, while the
’line Meanings task’ is a figural creativity task. The two tasks are chosen in order to incor-
porate different types of creativity and creative production into the experiment. Below
is a screenshot which shows the screen of participants completing the divergent thinking
25pay structure, information available about the performance of other participants, and the risks of cre-
ating an idea which is similar to any existing entry, observable during the creation stage.
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task in the condition with public information26. On the right is the list of already existing
expressions and on the left the area where to submit new expressions (Torrance, 1962,
p. 238–240; Wallach and Kogan, 1965, p. 34-36). It should be noted that in figure 3.1 the
screen shot says ’7 minutes per task’, this is a misprint and it was made clear that the tasks
were 5 minutes long and instructed to view the countdown clock found in red in the top
left corner to see how much time they had left.
Structure of Experiment
Plain Language Statements and Consent form.
Introduction session
Lab Introduction and Entry Survey
Experiment Instructions
First Creativity Task
1. Divergent Task Instructions
2. Divergent Task
A. Creation the Market Stage (Task)
B. Rights Enforcement Stage
C. Popularity Decision
D. Results
Second Creativity Task
1. Figural Task Instructions
2. Figural Task
A. Creation the Market Stage (Task)
B. Rights Enforcement Stage
C. Popularity Decision
D. Results
Math/Control Task
1. Math Task
Instructions
2. Math Task
A. Task Itself
B. Results
Exit Survey
26The screen does not look different depending on whether participants are in the tournament pay group
or not.
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3.4.5 Rights Enforcement
After completing the task, the expressions generated by a group are sent to another ran-
domly generated group whose ideas are in tern sent to a randomly selected group. This
is done so that every groups expressions are judged by another group. Individuals in the
groups are then asked to identify any two expressions they deem to be similar27. The par-
ticipants are given instructions how to judge similarity and are primed into a copyright
frame i.e. the directions on how to judge similarity is modelled on how infringement of
copyright is worded and defined. If an idea is judged to be similar to another already
existing idea, by at least two judges, then the idea which was created last will be dis-
carded i.e. only the original remains. The similarity judging is completely anonymous
and does not affect how each individual’s expressions are judged by others. This is com-
mon knowledge for all participants. The creators of the ideas do not know which ideas
were voted as similar and discarded.
3.4.6 Mechanism of Deciding Popularity
The pay an individual receives in the TP conditions is dictated by the popularity i.e. the
amount of stars a participants ideas receive in the final stage of each creativity task. The
pay structure for the TP group, shown below, is created in order to simulate the winner-
takes-all pay structure in creative industries, such as, music and book publishing (Abbing,
2011; Kretschmer and Hardwick, 2007; Kretschmer, 2012, p 113). It should be mentioned
that the below structure is more equally divided compared to the winner-takes-all pay
structure found in the book or music industries. This is in order to make recruiting easier.
If the pay structure strictly mimicked the pay structure of the creative industries then it is
likely it would of been difficult to recruit for the later sessions as individuals could have
deemed it too unfair or too risky to even take part.
Pay Structure
1. £5.55
2. £2.1
3. £1
4. £0.5
5. £0
27If none were deemed to be similar no expression pairs would need to be submitted. There was no
upper or lower limit to how many pairs would be submitted
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The minimum guaranteed earnings is £3 and participants in the TP groups could earn
a maximum earnings per task of £5.55 and in total £5.55x3+£3 =£19.65. Non-TP groups
were all paid a flat fee of £8.49 which included the guaranteed £3 for participation.
There is a final task, math task, where participants are asked to solve as many addi-
tion problems, of the 30 presented, as they can in the 5 minutes given. The problems were
simple addition problems which had 4 numbers which range from 1-15 and the partici-
pants simply added them up. Each correct answer gave the participant a point and the
participant that got the most points or a certain number of points the fastest was judged
to have performed the best. The point of this task is to judge differences in effort between
treatment groups. The task can also be used as a control in order to observe how the two
creativity tasks might be similar or different to the control task28.
3.4.7 Measuring Creativity
If creative performance is to be measured it also has to be judged, which could cause
some problems. This is because whoever is judging the creative performance or output
might have different idea of what is “new”, “novel”, “original”, or “unique”. In fact, the
difficulties caused by defining and measuring uniqueness, novelty, or originality of ideas
has influenced creative task performance to be assessed using (only) fluency or the num-
ber of expressions. However an alternative could be using an external rating procedure
with trained raters (Fink et al., 2007). Using only fluency or productivity as a measure for
creativity can be problematic because it might not be a comprehensive enough measure
of creativity on its own to include enough different factors which makeup creativity. The
goal of the creativity tests as a part of this study is to include several different measures
of creativity with and trained raters/judges to rate the creative product of participants.
The alternative uses test participants are asked to list different uses for everyday items,
such as a brick. Judges then rate the expressions submitted by the participants based on
fluency, flexibility, humor, and originality. Fluency which is the number of different rel-
evant answers, flexibility which is the amount of different answer categories used, and
originality which is the number of rare relevant ideas were used to asses creativity of
products in the alternative uses test (Clapham, 2010; Torrance, 1962, p. 239). Humor was
also added because it has been used as a rating category by previous research and is es-
pecially relevant for the research as humour is likely to be widely used by participants
(Kim, 2006). This type of measuring system would be more convincing because it takes
28For example, if handedness preferences influenced performance in one of the creativity tasks and the
math task, it could be concluded that these two tasks could have some similarities in the way the partici-
pants approached the tasks. Other existing data could then be used to strengthen or discard the theory.
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into account a larger amount of categories which creativity could be affected by, and not
only, for example, fluency or the amount or type of ideas.
Fluency represents the number of ideas or responses the participant has come up with.
Flexibility is the ability to generate ideas from different categories and from different
points of view. Originality is the ability to generate ideas away from the obvious and
common place. Lastly humour is simply a score given for any idea which was judged
to be humorous according to a given definition29. The author has used a subjective mea-
sure of novelty compared to a more commonly used statistical rarity measure to measure
originality 30.
Fluency, flexibility, and originality are shown to have a significant link with creative
performance (Torrance, 1962, p. 214-216) as well as creative performance later in life (Kim,
2006). Similar methods for measuring creativity to the ones detailed above is used in a
wide range of studies on creativity (Fink et al., 2007; Runco et al., 2010; Runco and Albert,
1986; Charness and Grieco, 2014; Moore et al., 2009). Humour as a criterion was added in
order to capture a the effect of the technique or tool often used in the creative industries.
The measure has also been mentioned as a measure of creativity in a paper exploring
expansions to the traditional TTCT criterion (Kim, 2006).
What type of judge it is also matters as there has been found to be a significant differ-
ence between expert and non-expert judges (Cropley and Kaufman, 2012; Hekkert and
Wieringen, 1996) and experts scores have been found to correlate strongly between one
another (Hekkert and Wieringen, 1996) which means that expert scores can be compared
with each other more effectively. Some variation has been found between experts and
quasi-experts (Hekkert and Wieringen, 1996) the evidence was not strong enough to sug-
gest using quasi-experts compared to experts even though it would be less expensive
since the variance in rating of quasi-experts was too high. This would make it hard to
compare scores between judges and thus also between different scores given in different
tests. Thus all the final expressions from all of the sessions were judged by individuals
from the creative disciplines in order to have the results be comparable between judges
and between conditions. This also allows for the judging or the expressions to happen
closer to how it might happen by "gate keepers" in the market. These are individuals who
make the best-newcomers lists or are critics, for example.
The combined score given by the judges is the creativity score given to the ideas. With
the creativity score individuals and treatment groups can be compared between each
other in terms of creativity. The judgment criterion will be similar for both tasks and
29Definition found in the appendix section "Creativity Instructions"
30The specific instructions can be found in the appendices added at the end of the paper
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so it could even be possible to compare the overall scores between tasks. The only dif-
ference between the scoring criterion will be the categories used in the flexibility score,
for both tasks there will be 7 categories however these categories will be different and
so not directly comparable. All other criterion will have the exact same wording and the
criterion which can be directly compared between each other. Judges were also asked to
submit a subjective judgments of all the ideas from both tasks by giving them anywhere
from 5 to 0 stars. Subjective judgments have been forwarded as an alternative to creativity
measures (Silvia et al., 2008) and so one has been added to complement the more formal
creativity score. 0 stars are given if an individual does not like the idea and anywhere
from 1-5 starts were given if they liked the idea. The more stars an idea was given the
more the judges liked that idea. They were told to leave at least half of the ideas blank or
with 0 stars.
TABLE 3.2: Inter Rater Reliability
First Rater DT First Rater FT
Second Rater DT 0.8104
Second Rater FT 0.8321
The score is from 0 (low inter rater reliability) to
1 (high inter rater reliability). DT is the divergent
task. FT is the figural task.
The Cronbach’s alpha is a measure or a coefficient of consistency/reliability. Cron-
bach’s alpha is measured using the number of observation compared between raters, a
measure of the variance between the scores given by the two raters and an inter-item
covariance measure. The measure gives a score between 0 and 1 where 1 is perfectly
identical data and 0 which shows no similarities between the data points compared31.
Both the correlations and the Cronbach’s Alpha are high when comparing the creativity
ratings given by the two raters, as indicated by the correlations in table 2 and Cronbach’s
Aplha in table 3. Importantly the Cronbach’s Alpha scores were above 0.7 and below
0.9 which is high enough for the score to be reliable but low enough to show that using
multiple raters was not redundant (Peterson, 1994). The scores indicate that the relia-
bility between and of the raters in rating creativity according to the rubric given. Thus,
indicating the overall reliability of the creativity score used to judge creativity. Subjective
judgments had lower correlations but were also based on personal judgments and not a
rubric which is likely the cause of the lower correlation between subjective scores.
31Cronbach’s alpha is measured using the following formula /alpha = (n ∗ C)/(v + (n− 1)C.
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TABLE 3.3: Cronbach’s Alpha
First Rater DT First Rater FT
Second Rater DT 0.8871
Second Rater FT 0.8934
The score is from 0 (low inter rater reliability) to
1 (high inter rater reliability). DT is the divergent
task. FT is the figural task.
3.4.8 Limitations and Improvements
The number of participants is a common constraint in experimental research and in the
case of the research presented was an especially restricting as the minimum participant
number per session was 20 and the pool of participants was arts students only. In future
experiments it would be interesting to add non-arts students and see if the environment
or the pay-per-performance influenced the two groups differently. Switching the order
of the tasks would is also an improvement which can be added to future research. This
would allow for a clearer picture of the effect of the market feedback, however this is
something that would need a larger participant base to implements and as such was not
implemented in the experiments. This would also allow for a clear distinction between
the two tasks and how external motives influenced the two tasks.
It could also be interesting and useful to add some measure of what a participant’s
intrinsic motivation for the type of tasks present in the experiment. This would allow
for a more specific interpretation of effects. Pay can also be altered to be higher and/or
more unequal thus mimicking the pay structure of the creative industries more accurately,
however this can be very expensive. The effects of attribution could also be strengthened
by having participants be split into groups and then asked to introduce themselves and
talk a bit about their interests etc.,in the same groups in which the participants complete
the task. Allowing participants in each group to be more familiar with each other before
the task thus making any effects from attribution stronger.
Given the complexity of the programming the program was an absolutely essential
and fit for purpose too for the study. It was compiled using state of the art coding tech-
niques especially on the back end32 and was improved to the point that it ran instantly
and without hesitation even when the amount of data at the end of the experiment was
32Programs such as the one used in the experiment include a back end and a front end. The front end
is the user interface which the participants can observe and the back end is the part of the program which
communicates between the computer used by the participant and the server which compiles the data of all
participants taking part in the experiment.
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very large. This being said there are some details regarding the experiment and the pro-
gram itself which ought to be discussed. Firstly the procedure can be improved by adding
a forced answer to all survey questions in order to receive fuller data. Although the data
did show significant results it is imperative that the data gathering process is as good as
can possibly be to maximise the amount of data available. It would also be good to add
extra information for each question so that if individuals had a question about the ques-
tions asked they could consult this information thus speeding up the survey completion
process. The math section have had either harder questions, of more of the simpler ques-
tions as the top end of the math performers was condensed and cut off at the maximum
of 30 questions answered. Both of these improvements would increase the quality of the
data.
The rank for the experiment was automatically calculated by the program based on
the performance of the participant in each task. In the two creativity tests the performance
was calculated based on how many favorites the individuals received and if they received
the same amount the participant who received the larger number of the larger favourites
would receive the higher rank. The program did not use the full array of favourites given
but a random subsection of the favourites given. This cause some individuals to receive
a rank which was not the correct rank based on all the favourites given. Because the
subsection of favourites used by the program was random there was no systematic bias
in the rank calculated by the program. This caused the rank signal not to fully reflect
the total amount of favourites given. However there is no evidence of the difference in
actual rank and given rank causing any differences in the way participants acted33 and
thus this calculation error did not cause biased results. The fault was only found after
the experiments were fully conducted and the fault was not noticed during the pilot ses-
sions or any of the experimental sessions, which would indicate this was not an issue for
participants at any point of the experimental process. Statistical analysis of differences in
performance/behaviour between the participants who received the correct and incorrect
ranks, concluded that this mistake did not have consequences for the reliability and qual-
ity of the data. This was not a problem for the math task where the ranks were based on
the number of correct answers given and the speed at which they were given.
3.5 Conclusion
The methodology used is designed to amalgamate a combination of arts research, psy-
chology, law, cultural, and economics research in order to gain insights into how creativ-
ity is influenced in a market environment. The methodology is perhaps closest to the
33Full calculations and working can be found in the appendix for chapter 3.
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methodology used in experimental economics although the background literature on cre-
ative markets derives largely from law, arts, cultural economics, and economics of law.
Existing literature on the subject of creative markets is very comprehensive especially
when outlying the market structure and the power dynamics within the market between
different actors. However there exist a gap where the effects of incentives within the mar-
ket for creative production are not fully understood. This gap in understanding is the
inspiration for the methodology described in this section. There exists creativity research
and market research separately, as detailed in the literature review section, but little re-
search on how market incentives and the market environment. Thus the methodology
combines the tests for individual creativity with the incentive structures in the markets,
along with controls, to observe the impacts of varying market environments which are
influenced by copyright.
The creative process is extremely multifaceted and is not like any other production
process, even compared to other winner takes all markets. This is where psychology lit-
erature contributed a large portion of research on the impact of different variables, such
as handedness or risk-attitudes, on creativity. The information in turn helped to sculpt
the two surveys used to control for as many variables regarding individual differences in
creative potential. Insuring the quality of the surveys helped to compare each individual
on a level basis taking into account individual differences in creative potential. This al-
lowed for each individual to be compared on a level basis, when interpreting the impacts
of environment, on the overall production of creative output along with the impact of
different individual characteristics in varying market environments.
Admittedly the research subject of creativity is largely subjective and the measuring
of creativity is itself subjective. This however does not mean that the methodology can-
not produce reliable research. Rather this means that the results presented in the next
chapters will need to be analysed in context of existing literature and corroborated with
future research in order to gain a fuller understanding of the impact of the market envi-
ronment on the creative process. Although the methodology will not create results which
can, on their own, be used to inform policy the methodology will contribute to furthering
the understanding of creativity and how the market environment influences it. The new
methodology does help to fill a gap in existing creativity research and the results pro-
duced are both novel and able to be interpreted. Importantly this is the case in context
of existing literature regarding creativity, copyright incentives, and market structures of
markets for creative goods.
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Chapter 4
Creative Output in a Market Context
4.1 Introduction
This section will focus on the analysis of market mechanics in the creative markets and
their affect on output, creativity, and the subjective performance individuals of this out-
put in varying market settings. The analysis will be in context of the economic effects of
the market mechanics in the creative markets with discussion about the impact of copy-
right law on creativity. As discussed previously the set up of the experiment is mimicing
the creative markets specifically to gain insight in to how attribution and economic rights
, i.e. public information and tournament pay, influence creativity with a focus on the pos-
sible effectiveness of these rights on promoting creation and creativity. Thus the focus of
this chapter will be the economic analysis of law and how the treatments influence per-
formance in general and the next section will then focus on individual characteristics and
how these interact with the treatments.
The aim of all market participants is quite straight forward, make as much money
as possible. Competition thus exists between creative and non creative markets where
different entities, such as, restaurants, nightclubs, and movie theatres compete in order to
maximise the total amount of disposable income spent at their establishment or on their
songs etc. Thus in reality the creation process within a creative industry can be dynamic
process where the size of the market which producers are competing in can expand or
contract depending on the relative demand or attractiveness of this industry or market
to the consumer. However to simplify the market setting the assumption is made that
the market value remains constant and only the rank within the market determines ones
payoff. This is to say that participants in one creative market are not competing with
participants in another creative market or any other market competing for disposable
income spending in order to maximise the total demand both personally and indirectly
of the market they operate in themselves. This can be argued to not be realistic as there
needs to be some base level of quality compared to other competing sectors in order
gain any demand. It could be that the overall industry/market product is so poor that
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no one would demand it. This criticism would be true, but the point of the research is
not to observe the overall market size of the creative markets given varying amounts of
public information, or the existence of tournament pay or not, but rather to observe if
production within that industry is higher or lower given the existence or lack of such
motives. Although it can be an interesting angle to observe as thee incentives largely
exist in order to keep the arts and creative industries alive, i.e. the existence of copyright
to motivate creation. Such arguments were discussed in terms of the justifications for
copyright when the first copyright laws were being created.
The market participants/creators have two avenues which they can compete in, the
number of units produced and the quality of those units which are produced. The cre-
ators cannot succeed without having some of both, that is to say even if a creator had an
infinite amount of output, if the quality of this output was non existent then they would
not perform well in the market, visa versa. Thus the strategic decision making of the
creator is confined into manipulating these the ratio between the two to find the most
effecive ratio for maximising market success. It is worth mentioning that advertising or
promotion could play a role as a third variable when observing the market for creative
goods as it can influence the creation of a fad and thus increase demand for a particu-
lar artist even though the quality of the work might not otherwise attract such demand.
This exists in the music, book, and visual art industries and is used in order to signal
quality to the consumer in order to increase demand (Caves, 2002, p. 47-48, 151, 288).
However the only signal of quality in the stylised market is the work itself and is akin to
the small scale producer of creative goods as they do not have the resources to promote.
To a large extent this is who copyright law, and the incentives of public information and
tournament pay within it, are designed to induce to create as most creators in the indus-
try can be considered ’small scale producers’. This is because of the tournament nature
of the market, where the median market participant is likely to earn far less than average
wage both in the creative industry they take part in and compared to other jobs outside of
the markets for creative goods (Abbing, 2011, p. 113; Kretschmer, 2012; Kretschmer and
Hardwick, 2007). Thus this simplification of competition to only on quality and quantity
can be argued to not abstract significantly from the reality of most artists.
In the next sections the regression model used to analyse the results of the experiment
will be introduced followed by the results section. This section includes a histogram
detailing performance separated by treatment group for the variables of interest. These
variables are output, which is the total number of creations in both creative tasks. Cre-
ativity overall and creativity per idea for both tasks and an overall subjective score and
a subjective score per idea. The results are organised into totals and per idea in order
to observe the overall impact of the treatments on creativity and subjective scores along
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with the average quality of the product in each of the treatments. The subjective scores
are simply to supplement the creativity scores and also function as a type of check on the
overall quality of the judges scores. If the judges subjective scores did not correlate with
the subjective scores of the 198 participants then it could be argued that the judges did
not put in adequate effort, or are not suited to judge creative output, as their judgments
deviate so strongly from the overall judgments of others. However since there is strong
correlation between the subjective judgment of the paid judges and the experiment par-
ticipants there is no evidence of negligence or laziness on the part of the judges and so
their scores, according to this check, are reliable.
There is also a third task which is a control task where the participants were asked
to complete 30 math questions. This is designed to observe some baseline effort levels
between groups which can give some information about how exactly the participants
have responded to the incentives. The regressions are separated into two groups, one
where all participants are taken into account and one where only participants with less
than 30 total solved answers were observed. This is designed to observe if there are
any patterns of behaviour which are not as easily observable with all participants taken
into account. There is a relatively large number of observation with 30 solved and this
causes the data to have a sealing and can make it harder to observe patterns in the data.
Restricting the data to the individuals who did not complete all 30 questions cuts out
of the upper part of the distribution which is capped at 30 and thus dampens some of
the patterns that can otherwise be found in the data and makes it easier to find potential
differences in the patterns of the data between the treatments.
4.2 Regression Model
The general form of the OLS regression, as seen below, takes into account differences
between individual factors and sessions. An OLS was used as wider range of variables
could be used in comparison to an ANOVA. It also allowed for the use of multiple dummy
variables to be used without larger complications on the reliability of the results which
an ANOVA might bring if multiple dummy variables are used. The individual treatment
groups are public information only (PI) only or β1δi, tournament pay (TP) only or β2ηi,
and the combination of both (IP & TP) or β3κi. The OLS includes a matrix of controls
for individual differences β4Ci and the matrix of session dummies β5Si. All dependent
variables were logged in order to reduce heteroskedasticity and to maximise estimation
accuracy.
yi = α+ β1θi + β2γi + β3κi + β4Ci + β5Si + εi
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When Regressing subjective scores the better suited OLS model was to treat each treat-
ment group individually. Thus there is no interaction affect but rather shows whether
each individual treatment group is significantly different from the control group. This
type of OLS does not show information about possible cross effects, which is possible
using an OLS with an interaction, however it was found to give more reliable results
compared to using interaction effects which returned results which did not correlate with
the data.
The dependant variables were logged so that the problem of heteroskedasticity was
minimised which in turn decreases standard errors in the regressions. When the depen-
dent variables were not logged the results did not reflect the changes in the means accu-
rately and in some cases returned non-sensical results, even when the dependant variable
was only regressed against the treatment dummies on their own. This points to potential
problems where the OLS specified is not accurately estimating patterns in data. 1 Thus
the decision was used to use logged dependant variables and dummies for the individ-
ual treatment groups along with the session dummies and control variables for individual
characteristics.
The regressions shown in the paper are not taking into account the rank or perfor-
mance in previous task. Taking into account rank could be used as a way to take into
account changes in performance due to the rank observed in the previous task as indi-
viduals could loose motivation as they received a rank lower than expected. The perfor-
mance in the two creativity tasks is strongly correlated and thus adding a rank variable
would also change the regression to show differences in how individuals changed their
production from one task to the other in the different treatment groups. In this chapter
each regression demonstrates the difference in performance between treatment groups for
each task separately. Compared this to differences in how people would react differently
from one task to the other between treatment groups and it becomes clear that adding a
variable for rank would change the interpretation of the regression to a significant degree,
which is why these regressions are not included.
Results will be shown in a histogram which depicts the averages for the dependant
variable for each of the 3 treatment groups and the control group. If there are significant
differences they are shown using stars and the key found in the description of the his-
tograms. The tables associated with the regressions shown in the diagram are added to
the two regressions associated with each histogram. All differences between the treat-
ments are added except for the differences between the two PI groups as there is little
1This can be due to many reasons but is likely due to heteroskedastisity in this case, as the estima-
tion given by the OLS using logged dependant variables returned results which correspond closely to the
changes in the means between treatment groups.
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difference between the means generally and no statistical differences between any of the
two PI groups2.
4.3 Results
The interpretation of results is relatively straight forward as the dependent variable is
logged but none of the independent variables are. Thus the coefficients show the impact
of each independent variable in percentage terms, i.e. if the coefficient is .1234 for exam-
ple would indicate a 12.34% increase in the dependant when the independent variable
increases by one unit. The controls for individual differences will be added but the inter-
pretation of those results will be left for the next chapter. In this section close attention
will be paid to the results in order observe any possible differences in overall quantity
and quality measures and using these measures to gain insight into participant decision
making between treatment groups. Particular attention is paid to the potential for the
quantity quality trade-off between the overall creativity or subjective score, i.e. quality,
and the number of ideas produced in each task, i.e. quantity. These will be compared
to the results of the control math task which can give some insight into why there might
be differences in how individuals perform between treatment groups but also between
tasks. If there are differences in how individuals react to incentives in different tasks why
might this be, are some tasks similar to each other which might explain this? The control
task can be used to help answer these questions by comparing the performance in the
control to the creativity tasks to see if there are similarities in how participants perform
in these tasks.
4.3.1 Descriptive statistics
The following is a general overview of the variables being used in the regression. 4.1
shows the range of each variable and a short hand for the interpretation of the variables
low and high bound. The majorty of the variables are dummy variables with a 0 or 1
value or a no or yes answer respectively.
2This can be checked in the appendix.
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TABLE 4.1: Ranges of Control Variables
Variable Range Low Bound High Bound
Male 0 or 1 No Yes
Creative Efficacy 0 to 100 No Efficacy Full Efficacy
Creative Family 0 or 1 No Yes
English Speaking 0 or 1 No Yes
Risk Aversion 1 to 4 Risk averse Risk Loving
Ambiguous Risk 0 to 100 Risks 0% Risks 100%
Right handed 0 or 1 No Yes
Famous 0 or 1 No Yes
More in Creative Fields 0 or 1 No Yes
Arts Hobby 0 or 1 No Yes
GSA 0 or 1 No Yes
Age 0 to 45 18 45
Math Efficacy 0 to 100 No Efficacy Full Efficacy*
If no it means that the value reported for the dummy was 0 or not
true. For example, if 0 for male it means not make or if 0 for Arts
Hobby then person did not have a arts hobby. * Math Efficacy is
only used in chapter 5.
Table 4.2 shows the mean values for all the control variables. The means are given for
each treatment group and overall to give a general idea of the distribution of participants
between treatment groups. There were more males randomly selected into tournament
pay groups compared to non-tournament pay groups. There also seems to be fewer na-
tive English speakers in tournament pay groups. Excluding the distribution of males and
possibly native English speakers the distribution of participants between groups is rel-
atively even. The variable for males and native English speakers are controls and even
though there is a difference in the distribution between treatment groups any effect this
might have will be taken into account in any regressions presented.
The dependent variables are continuous variables as observed in table 4.1 and some
values are 0. This causes problems when using a log transform as the log transform would
not be able to deal with the 0 value and thus the observation would be lost. This is why
0.00001 was added to each value in order to keep the relative values between observa-
tions essentially the same. This allows for all values to be added into all regressions thus
maximising the number of observations in each regression.
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TABLE 4.2: Descriptive Statistics for Controls
Variable Control PI TP PI & TP All
Male 0.226415 0.204082 0.34 0.355556 0.279188
Creative Efficacy 70.66667 71.2585 73.34667 70.62963 71.48562
Creative Family 0.415094 0.44898 0.34 0.311111 0.380711
English Speaking 0.566038 0.571429 0.48 0.488889 0.527919
Risk Aversion 2.716981 2.387755 2.92 2.888889 2.725888
Ambiguous Risk 38.39623 34.65306 26.3 35.77778 33.79695
Righthanded 0.679245 0.795918 0.76 0.777778 0.751269
Famous 0.660377 0.571429 0.48 0.577778 0.573604
More in Creative Fields 0.792453 0.714286 0.82 0.8 0.781726
Arts Hobby 0.660377 0.693878 0.5 0.644444 0.624366
GSA 0.45283 0.469388 0.48 0.422222 0.456853
Age 22.20755 20.71429 22.32 21.02222 21.59391
Math Efficacy* 41.35849 42.77551 37.78 40.51111 41.35849
Mean values for all control variables used for all regressions for chapter 4
and 5. * Math Efficacy is only used in chapter 5.
4.3.2 Number of Ideas Produced
FIGURE 4.1: Output for the Two Creativity Tasks
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. The stars are derived from regressions
using Heteroskedastic Robust standard errors. Each bar has small vertical brack-
ets indicating standard errors of the means calculated. Each horizontal bracket
represents statistically differences between the indicated treatment groups which
were found using regressions found in tables 4.3 and 4.4 below.
The only directly incentivised action is to create as many expressions which gain as many
stars as possible. In other words to maximise the overall popularity of their ideas. The
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generation of ideas on its own was not directly incentivised by the market, rather it was
indirectly incentivised as each unit of output increased the potential to maximise ones
popularity and thus their chance of success. In the divergent task the highest average
number of ideas was in the control group, as figure 1 indicates, however only one of two
regressions indicated a statistically significant difference between the control group and
the TP only groups at 5% sigificance level. This difference was estimated at 26.1% fewer
ideas in the TP only treatment compared to the control group, as seen in table 4.3. In
the figural task there was a steady increase in the number of ideas but no significant dif-
ferences between individual treatment groups. There was a significant difference when
comparing all groups with tournament pay to all groups without. This difference was
estimated to be 9.7% at a 10% significance level, as seen in table 4.4. Thus there is a sig-
nificantly lower production in the TP group only for the divergent task but an increase in
production for TP groups overall in the figural task. This suggests there could be differ-
ences in how individuals react to incentives which is dependent on the type of creativity
task.
TABLE 4.3: Regressions Differences in Output Between Treatment Groups
Control Included.
Divergent Task (logged) Figural Task (logged)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PI -0.139 -0.191 -0.004 0.010
(0.126) (0.152) (0.092) (0.086)
TP -0.261** -0.230 0.061 0.068
(0.113) (0.147) (0.079) (0.075)
PI & TP -0.503 -0.417 0.135 0.143
(0.358) (0.345) (0.087) (0.093)
Obs. 102 103 99 197 103 103 99 197
r2 0.220 0.331 0.328 0.160 0.199 0.204 0.214 0.132
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Heteroskedastic Robust standard
errors in parenthesis. The regression shows the treatment groups being compared
to the control both individually and with all dummies combined in the same
regression
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TABLE 4.4: Regressions Differences in Output Between Treatment Groups
and PI and TP Overall, Controls Included
Divergent Task (logged) Figural Task (logged)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Overall PI -0.191 0.043
(0.201) (0.064)
Overall TP -0.230 0.101*
(0.176) (0.059)
PI v. TP 0.166 0.012
(0.137) (0.079)
TP v. IP&TP 0.209 0.054
(0.358) (0.097)
Obs. 197 197 99 95 197 197 99 95
r2 0.150 0.153 0.335 0.231 0.115 0.127 0.331 0.166
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Heteroskedastic Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. The regressions show the overall affect of both public information (i.e. PI)
and tournament pay (i.e. TP) on the top two rows respectively. In the bottom two rows
the show how the TP only treatment differs from the PI and also the PI&TP treatment
group respectively.
4.3.3 Creativity Score
Overall there is little evidence of overall creativity being affected by the treatments. There
is some evidence that in the divergent task there is lower overall creativity in the TP only
treatment group with an estimated 15.7% decrease in creativity at a significance level of
10%, as table 4.5 indicates. However this was when the TP only group was compared to
the control directly. When dummies for the two other treatments were taken into account
this effect became insignificant, indicating a void of significant effects. In the figural task
there was no evidence of a significant difference between any of the treatment groups.
Although it should be mentioned that the overall creativity is increasing similar to the
increase in the number of ideas created in the figural task. Thus there is some indication
that the increase in average creativity in the figural task is powered by the increase in
the number of creations/ideas. No such patterns are observable in the divergent task al-
though there is a higher overall creativity in the control group compared to other groups,
even though none of these differences are statistically significant.
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FIGURE 4.2: Total Creativity Scores for the Two Creativity Tasks
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. The stars are derived from regressions
using Heteroskedastic Robust standard errors. Each bar has small vertical brack-
ets indicating standard errors of the means calculated. Each horizontal bracket
represents statistically differences between the indicated treatment groups which
were found using regressions found in table 4.5 and table 4.6 below.
TABLE 4.5: Regressions Differences in Total Creativity Between Treatment
Groups, Controls Included
Divergent Task (logged) Figural Task (logged)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PI -0.136 -0.199 -0.011 -0.005
(0.119) (0.150) (0.074) (0.070)
TP -0.157* -0.135 -0.033 0.046
(0.094) (0.141) (0.063) (0.060)
PI & TP -0.502 -0.423 0.0101 0.106
(0.382) (0.363) (0.076) (0.078)
Obs. 102 103 99 197 102 103 99 197
r2 0.194 0.334 0.310 0.149 0.196 0.136 0.178 0.110
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Heteroskedastic Robust standard
errors in parenthesis. The regression shows the treatment groups being compared
to the control both individually and with all dummies combined in the same
regression.
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TABLE 4.6: Regressions Differences in Total Creativity Between Treatment
Groups and PI and TP Overall, Controls Included
Divergent Task (logged) Figural Task (logged)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Overall PI -0.245 0.033
(0.207) (0.053)
Overall TP -0.181 0.074
(0.181) (0.048)
PI v. TP 0.035 0.012
(0.113) (0.066)
TP v. IP&TP -0.302 0.045
(0.369) (0.083)
Obs. 197 197 99 95 197 197 99 95
r2 0.143 0.139 0.346 0.233 0.096 0.106 0.268 0.116
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Heteroskedastic Robust standard
errors in parenthesis. The regressions show the overall affect of both public infor-
mation (i.e. PI) and tournament pay (i.e. TP) on the top two rows respectively. In
the bottom two rows the show how the TP only treatment differs from the PI and
also the PI&TP treatment group respectively.
4.3.4 Per Idea Creativity Score
Per idea/unit of output creativity is a quality measure which is simply the creativity score,
not taking into account the number of units of output over the number of units. There
is evidence the quality of the output was significantly higher in the TP only group com-
pared to all other treatment groups. The TP group had higher quality of ideas compared
to the control and the IP only group at 5% significance level and an estimated quality of
18.8% higher compared to the control group. This is the only treatment which is signifi-
cantly different to the control group. Table 4.5 shows that when dummies for all treatment
groups are added this effect is no longer present.
TP only group has an estimated 23.4% higher per idea creativity at 1% significance
level compared to the PI only group. There is no statistical significance between the two
TP groups, although there is evidence this could be the case if there number of observa-
tions was higher. This gives some indication that the performance in the TP only group
is higher fro per idea creative performance. The quality between the figural task was
relatively similar with no significant differences in output quality between them.
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FIGURE 4.3: Per Idea Creativity for the Two Creativity Tasks
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. The stars are derived from regressions
using Heteroskedastic Robust standard errors. Each bar has small vertical brack-
ets indicating standard errors of the means calculated. Each horizontal bracket
represents statistically differences between the indicated treatment groups which
were found using regressions found in tables 4.7 and 4.8 below.
TABLE 4.7: Regressions Differences in Creativity Per Idea Between Treatment
Groups, Control Included
Divergent Task (logged) Figural Task (logged)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PI 0.017 -0.069 -0.024 -0.013
(0.067) (0.117) (0.048) (0.094)
TP 0.188** 0.135 -0.056 -0.055
(0.076) (0.108) (0.055) (0.055)
PI & TP -0.292 0.027 -0.059 -0.071
(0.330) (0.304) (0.046) (0.052)
Obs.s 102 103 99 197 102 103 99 197
r2 0.500 0.359 0.257 0.146 0.274 0.364 0.271 0.198
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Heteroskedastic Robust standard
errors in parenthesis. The regression shows the treatment groups being compared
to the control both individually and with all dummies combined in the same
regression.
4.3. Results 101
TABLE 4.8: Regressions Differences in Creativity Per Idea Between Treatment
Groups and PI and TP Overall, Controls Included
Divergent Task (logged) Figural Task (logged)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Overall PI -0.235 -0.015
(0.169) (0.036)
Overall TP -0.033 -0.057
(0.150) (0.038)
Only PI v. Only TP -0.234*** 0.005
(0.076) (0.053)
Only TP v. IP&TP -0.447 -0.015
(0.292) (0.056)
Observations 197 197 99 95 197 197 99 95
r2 0.165 0.169 0.335 0.340 0.188 0.197 0.385 0.362
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Heteroskedastic Robust standard
errors in parenthesis. The regressions show the overall affect of both public infor-
mation (i.e. PI) and tournament pay (i.e. TP) on the top two rows respectively. In
the bottom two rows the show how the TP only treatment differs from the PI and
also the PI&TP treatment group respectively.
4.3.5 Subjective Score
The subjective scores are based on the scores submitted by 2 judges which were then
correlated with the scores given by participants during the experiments. The judge scores
correlate significantly with the scores given by participants during the experiment as seen
in the correlation between participant and judge scores in table 4.9.The strong correlation
between the judges scores and the scores given during the experiment by the participants
indicate the scores given by the judges represent a level of consensus in the quality of
ideas. The similarity of the subjective judgments between the judges and participants
indicates there is consensus on what is a high quality or low quality expression of an idea.
Thus although there are two judges for subjective creativity there is evidence that their
judgments of creativity likely do represent what subjective creativity is widely considered
to be 3.
3In past research the researchers themselves have scored the participants creations using a criterion
chosen by the researcher which often rely on statistical rarity (Runco and Albert, 1986; Kitto, Lok, and
Rudowicz, 1994). Using two independent judges, as in the case of the current research, is common practice
when judging creativity for creativity tests, such as, the divergent task (Silvia, Beaty, and Nusbaum, 2013;
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TABLE 4.9: Correlation Coefficients between the Judges and Participant in
Each Task
Judges Score Participants Score
Total Scores Divergent Figural Divergent Figural
Divergent, Judges Score 1
Figural, Judges Score 0.4844* 1
Divergent, Participant Score 0.4962* 0.3737* 1
Figural, Participant Score 0.3699* 0.4008* 0.4197* 1
FIGURE 4.4: Total Subjective Scores for the Two Creativity Tasks Between
Treatment Groups Including.
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. The stars are derived from regres-
sions using Heteroskedastic Robust standard errors which can be found in the
appendix. Each bracket represents statistically differences between the indicated
treatment groups. Relevant regressions shown in tables 4.11 and 4.12 below.
There are no significant differences between treatment groups in the either the diver-
gent or the figural task. In the divergent task the PI only group has a higher subjective
score compared to the control group. This difference was estimated at 108.6% lower in
the TP only group with a significance level of 10%. This large estimated difference in
table 4.11 compared figure 4.4 is due to the differences is the distribution of participants
between the control and TP only groups which has underestimates the real difference
between groups in figure 4.4. This difference was not significant when variables for all
3 treatment groups were added im comparison to just comparing the TP only group to
the control group. For the divergent task the average subjective score was highest in the
Shobe, Ross, and Fleck, 2009; Jones and Estes, 2015; Eisenberger, Haskins, and Gambleton, 1999). In the case
of the research at hand, the 2 judges were added to divorce the creativity rating and the experiment.This
would decrease any possible bias that the researcher themselves could introduce and thus work towards a
more objective score.
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TP group and second highest is the control group with both PI groups being close to
equal and lower than the non PI groups. The subjective scores have the similar pattern
compared with output levels in the figural task with all of the means for the treatments
being higher than the control group and increasing from PI only to TP and finally to PI
&TP. This pattern is similar to the pattern found for the overall creativity for the figural
task. The averages are higher in the two PI groups for the figural task which is largely
explained through individual differences explained by the control variables and not due
to the treatment.
TABLE 4.10: Regressions Differences in Total Subjective Scores Between
Treatment Groups and the Control
Divergent Task (logged) Figural Task (logged)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PI -0.569 -0.522 -0.083 -0.039
(0.424) (0.480) (0.115) (0.110)
TP -1.086* -0.967 0.032 0.069
(0.595) (0.596) (0.124) (0.099)
PI & TP -0.713 -0.655 0.116 0.136
(0.470) (0.493) (0.124) (0.191)
Obs. 103 103 99 197 102 103 99 197
r2 0.294 0.209 0.215 0.085 0.169 0.245 0.245 0.138
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Heteroskedastic Robust standard
errors in parenthesis. The regression shows the treatment groups being compared
to the control both individually and with all dummies combined in the same
regression
The means for per idea subjective scores figures in figure 4.5 have similar pattern to
the means of the per idea creativity scores in figure 4.3. However there are no statistically
significant differences between treatment groups. When disregarding the 0 scores there
is some evidence that the TP only groups has higher per idea subjective scores as seen in
the appendix for chapter 4. The per output subjective scores are similar to the per output
creativity scores for the figural task. This is likely due to individuals choosing a strategy
of focusing on output father than quality of the ideas and thus the subjective scores and
creativity scores where highly dependent of the overall output rather than differences in
quality.
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FIGURE 4.5: Per Idea Subjective Scores for the Two Creativity Tasks
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. The stars are derived from regressions
using Heteroskedastic Robust standard errors. Each bar has small vertical brack-
ets indicating standard errors of the means calculated. Each horizontal bracket
represents statistically differences between the indicated treatment groups which
were found using regressions found in table 4.12 and 4.13 below.
TABLE 4.11: Regressions Differences in Subjective Score Per Idea Between
Treatment Groups and PI and TP Overall
Divergent Task (logged) Figural Task (logged)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Overall PI -0.115 0.015
(0.429) (0.083)
Overall TP -0.557 0.117
(0.407) (0.083)
PI v. TP 0.384 -0.054
(0.759) (0.115)
TP v. IP&TP 0.408 0.065
(0.728) (0.129)
Obs. 197 197 99 95 197 197 99 95
r2 0.074 0.082 0.191 0.141 0.123 0.135 0.292 0.155
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Heteroskedastic Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. The regressions show the overall affect of both public information (i.e. PI)
and tournament pay (i.e. TP) on the top two rows respectively. In the bottom two rows
the show how the TP only treatment differs from the PI and also the PI&TP treatment
group respectively.
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TABLE 4.12: Regressions Differences in Subjective Scores Per Idea Between
Treatment Groups and the Control
Divergent Task (logged) Figural Task (logged)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PI -0.402 -0.385 -0.087 -0.048
(0.351) (0.408) (0.083) (0.080)
TP -0.795 -0.764 -0.030 0.000
(-0.529) (-0.529) (0.087) (0.082)
PI & TP -0.549 -0.541 -0.019 -0.007
(0.404) (0.421) (0.091) (0.084)
Obs. 102 103 99 197 102 103 99 197
r2 0.294 0.209 0.215 0.085 0.259 0.341 0.260 0.217
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Heteroskedastic Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. The regression shows the treatment groups being compared to the control
both individually and with all dummies combined in the same regression
TABLE 4.13: Regressions Differences in Subjective Scores Per Idea Between
Treatment Groups and PI and TP Overall, Controls Included
Divergent Task (logged) Figural Task (logged)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Overall PI -0.089 -0.028
(0.372) (0.058)
Overall TP 0.465 0.020
(0.354) (0.061)
PI v. TP 0.230 -0.066
(0.667) (0.095)
TP v. IP&TP -0.313 0.012
(0.648) (0.087)
Obs. 197 197 99 95 197 197 99 95
r2 0.074 0.082 0.191 0.141 0.216 0.216 0.272 0.278
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Heteroskedastic Robust standard errors
in parenthesis. The regressions show the overall affect of both public information (i.e.
AR) and tournament pay (i.e. ER) on the top two rows respectively. In the bottom
two rows the show how the TP only treatment differs from the PI and also the PI&TP
treatment group respectively.
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4.3.6 Math Task
The math task is used as an effort/control task in order to observe differences in perfor-
mance due to PI and TP in a non-creative task. The results can then be compared to the
results from the two creativity tasks in order to draw conclusions about the potential dif-
ferences in performance and explain why these differences may occur. Participants were
given 30 simple addition tasks and asked to complete as many as possible in the 5 min-
utes given. However many of the 197 participants included in the study completed all 30
in the allotted time causing a clustering of data at 30. To gain insights into any patterns
in the data the data were organised into two different data groups. One Data group took
into account all data and did not omit any data from the analysis. The other group is
a group where the data from everyone who answered all 30 questions were omitted in
order to observe any potential patterns in the data for participants who submitted 29 or
less answers. This group is called the under 30 group and the averages for all groups are
displayed in the tables below along with the corresponding regressions.
FIGURE 4.6: Math Performance for the Full Participant Population
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. The stars are derived from regressions
using Heteroskedastic Robust standard errors. Each bar has small vertical brack-
ets indicating standard errors of the means calculated. Each horizontal bracket
represents statistically differences between the indicated treatment groups which
were found using regressions found in tables 4.14 and 4.15 below.
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TABLE 4.14: Regressions Differences in Math Performance Between Treat-
ment Groups, Controls Included.
Total Solved (All) Total Correct (All)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PI 0.049 0.058 0.060 0.047
(0.075) (0.064) (0.094) (0.081)
TP -0.099 -0.066 -0.121 -0.095
(0.061) (0.066) (0.076) (0.073)
PI & TP -0.030 0.011 -0.063 -0.044
(0.064) (0.057) (0.083) (0.077)
Obs. 102 103 99 197 102 103 99 197
r2 0.138 0.334 0.266 0.161 0.116 0.330 0.321 0.170
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Heteroskedastic Robust standard
errors in parenthesis. The regression shows the treatment groups being compared
to the control both individually and with all dummies combined in the same
regression
When all observations were averaged there was a significant difference at 10% be-
tween the PI and TP treatments with the TP group having an estimated 12.3% more prob-
lems solved. It is also worth mentioning that the PI groups had an estimated 6.6% more
questions solved compared to groups without PI at a significance level of just above 10%.
There was no statistical differences in the number of problems solved correctly between
the treatments. The TP groups had an estimated 9.2% fewer correct answers compared to
non-TP groups at 10% significane level. Thus there is some evidence of a larger number of
problems solved in the PI only group and an overall lower number of questions answered
correctly in the TP groups. This however is especially interesting as TP only group has
the lowest average for both questions answered and answered correctly. To gain a better
understanding of potential patterns in the data the next histograms and tables only take
into account the individuals who answered fewer than 30 questions.
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TABLE 4.15: Regressions Differences in Math Performance Between Treat-
ment Groups and PI and TP Overall
Total Solved (All) Total Correct (All)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Overall PI 0.067 0.048
(0.043) (0.055)
Overall TP -0.056 -0.092*
(0.041) (0.052)
PI v. TP 0.123* 0.103
(0.070) (0.076)
TP v. IP&TP 0.084 0.037
(0.057) (0.072)
Obs. 197 197 99 95 197 197 99 95
r2 0.152 0.148 0.234 0.306 0.155 0.166 0.251 0.396
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Heteroskedastic Robust standard errors
in parenthesis. The regressions show the overall affect of both public information (i.e.
AR) and tournament pay (i.e. ER) on the top two rows respectively. In the bottom
two rows the show how the TP only treatment differs from the PI and also the PI&TP
treatment group respectively.
Taking into account only the individuals who answered fewer than 30 problems the
effects become stronger. The TP has significantly fewer questions than the two PI treat-
ments i.e. PI and PI &TP at 5% significance. The estimated differences were 14.0% and
10.3% between the TP only and PI only and the PI %TP treatments respectively. The PI
treatments also had an overall 10.0% higher number of problems solved, at 5% signifi-
cance, compared to non PI groups. This corroborates the results found when taking into
account all data and suggests that there are fewer answered in the TP only group and that
the PI groups in general have a higher number of questions answered correctly. These
affects are not as strong for the number of problems solved. There are no statistically
significant differences between any treatments.
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FIGURE 4.7: Math Performance for the Under 30 questions answered Partic-
ipant Population
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. The stars are derived from regressions
using Heteroskedastic Robust standard errors. Each bar has small vertical brack-
ets indicating standard errors of the means calculated. Each horizontal bracket
represents statistically differences between the indicated treatment groups which
were found using regressions found in table 4.16 and 4.17 below.
Overall the results in the output for the divergent task and the control math task show
some similarities when observing total output. This is especially true when observing
only the 3 treatment groups. With the total output in both the math task and the divergent
task being the lowest in the TP only group when observing the 3 treatment groups. It
should be mentioned however that the control group had the highest output level in the
divergent task while the total amount answered and answered correctly in the math task
was highest in the PI only group. This can be observed when observing figure 4.2, 4.6,
and 4.7. These similarities in results show that the way participants behaved in these
two tasks were very similar to each other and diverged strongly from the patterns of
output shown in the figural task. It is also interesting to see that when the under 30 group
were observed the average number of questions answered in the PI & TP group was
statistically significantly higher compared to the TP only group. However, the average
number answered correctly was relatively similar between the two groups thus there is
no difference in performance even though there is in output.
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TABLE 4.16: Regressions Differences in Math Performance for Under 30 Be-
tween Treatment Groups, Controls Included
Total Solved (under 30) Total Correct (under 30)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PI -0.117 0.086 0.159 0.128
(0.087) (0.086) (0.107) (0.090)
TP -0.091 -0.071 -0.039 -0.044
(0.068) (0.063) (0.088) (0.080)
PI & TP 0.023 0.038 0.008 0.004
(0.072) (0.063) (0.097) (0.087)
Obs. 79 76 73 148 148 148 75 69
r2 0.240 0.413 0.301 0.215 0.192 0.362 0.353 0.178
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Heteroskedastic Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. The regression shows the treatment groups being compared to the control
both individually and with all dummies combined in the same regression
TABLE 4.17: Regressions Differences in Math Performance for Under 30 Be-
tween Treatment Groups and PI and TP Overall, Controls Included.
Total Solved (under 30) Total Correct (under 30)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Overall PI 0.100** 0.091
(0.043) (0.059)
Overall TP -0.063 -0.088
(0.042) (0.057)
PI v. TP 0.140** 0.121
(0.064) (0.080)
TP v. IP&TP 0.103** 0.025
(0.048) (0.072)
Obs. 79 76 73 148 148 148 75 69
r2 0.206 0.177 0.296 0.490 0.160 0.160 0.217 0.437
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Heteroskedastic Robust standard errors
in parenthesis. The regressions show the overall affect of both public information (i.e.
AR) and tournament pay (i.e. ER) on the top two rows respectively. In the bottom
two rows the show how the TP only treatment differs from the PI and also the PI&TP
treatment group respectively.
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4.4 Discussion
The results presented is in response to the reported lack of empirical evidence on the sub-
ject of Copyright (Atiq, 2013). Specifically the results deal with the impact of public in-
formation (PI) and tournament pay (TP) structure which derive from the concepts within
copyright research of attribution and economic rights. These results can also be applied to
the discussion of innovation more generally as factors affecting creativity are highly rel-
evant to innovation and to the wider innovation literature. Creativity, when it comes to
the cognitive process, is unique. It is a process which requires a heuristic or open-ended
approach compared to algorithmic tasks which have a single obvious solution (Amabile
and Pillemer, 2012). The focus of the discussion is how do public information about an
agents production decisions (PI) and tournament pay (TP) affect the market for creative
goods? What consequences do these have on the performance of market participants and
why? Do the results support or go against prevailing arguments on copyright incentives
or promoting creativity/innovation more generally? Which avenues might these motives
effect creativity through?
The assumptions of anonymous markets and profit maximisation can be found from
examples of prominent theorists in the field of copyright and IP law. Landes and Posner
make these core assumptions of anonymity4 and profit maximisation when arguing for
indefinitely renewable copyright. The proposed model describes agents in the market
who provide goods in the market or continue to provide goods in the market which have
a positive market value. This theory does not take into account the findings that there is a
overproduction of creative goods in the market (Menger, 2001; Mathieu, 2015). A possible
explanation is the "art for arts sake" principle or the fact that art is largely intrinsically
motivated and subsidised using income from other sources (Abbing, 2011, p. 39, 113;
Towse, 2001, p. 485). The assumptions of anonymity and profit maximisation are also
made by Boldrin and Levine when modelling how a competitive market would lead to an
efficient market outcome5.The authors argue that IP laws create innefficient monopolies
and a competitive market with the use of, for example subsidies, would be more efficient
(Boldrin and Levine, 2006). The paper uses alludes in passing to a reputation affect but
keeps the assumption of the profit maximising agent. These assumptions are derived
largely from classical economic theory and so excludes some of the nuances of the creative
industries.
The two aspects of the creative markets which the paper focus on is the existence of
non-anonymous markets(Abbing, 2011, p. 79) and production which is largely done for
4Although this is done implicitly it does show how the problem is being approached using the core
assumption of anonymity.
5This is compared to a situation with intellectual property rights.
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the sake of the process or "art for arts sake" (Caves, 2002, p. 3) and largely subsidized
through outside income (Towse, 2001, p. 485; Abbing, 2011, p. 39; Kretschmer and Hard-
wick, 2007). These aspects of creative markets would make it difficult to model a creative
market using assumptions of anonymity and profit maximisation, which are two core as-
sumptions of market theorists. This chapter will not focus on modelling the problem but
rather it will discuss the results in relation to existing literature on motivation and mar-
kets in order to analyse what motives are important and how creative production could
be encouraged. Specifically the market structure in most markets for creative goods are
unique in the way there is constant over supply and high individual intrinsic motivation.
Very similar to what one might find in the market for athletic talent, especially in sports
which might be popular and thus have a large amount of people competing for a fixed
number of professional contracts.
There is agreement in psychology literature that intrinsic motivation is an important
part, if not the most important part, of motivating creativityAmabile, 1997; Eisenberger,
Haskins, and Gambleton, 1999; Eisenberger and Cameron, 1996; Grant and Berry, 2011;
Stanko-Kaczmarek, 2012; Shalley and Perry-Smith, 2001; Morningstar, 2012). Empirical
evidence of individuals contributing to non-profit projects, such as open source software,
found the most prominent driver is enjoyment-based intrinsic motivation even though
40% of respondents were being paid for their efforts (Lakhani and Wolf, 2003). When
intrinsic motivators and extrinsic motivators were compared using a cohort of art stu-
dents it was found that intrinsic motivators were more effective in motivating creativity
(Stanko-Kaczmarek, 2012). The extrinsic motives used in the study was non-monetary
and participants were motivated by stating that they should expect an evaluation of their
performance, similar extrinsic motivation present in the PI treatment. This is not to say
that TP, or even IP, are not important when discussing creativity, rather it is important to
recognise the role of extrinsic rewards as a complement, or substitute, to the already exist-
ing intrinsic motivation. Care should be taken to note if market incentives and copyright
support or work against the existing intrinsic incentives.
It is possible that there is no intrinsic motivation to produce and in these circum-
stances there would be no crowding out. However this is unlikely in the creative indus-
tries as market participants earn significantly less on average compared to the average
income(Abbing, 2011; Kretschmer and Hardwick, 2007; Kretschmer, 2012, p. 113). In ad-
dition art is often created for the sake of creating art along with artists feeling the need
or want to serve art (Abbing, 2011; Caves, 2002, p. 79, p. 3-5). This suggests that there
is value for the creator in creating, and not necessarily only selling, their creative expres-
sions/products. The market is also unlikely to be populated by pure profit maximisers as
they would likely have a high opportunity cost and find better paying work outside the
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markets for creative goods. Thus it is as if people are willing to enter the market as the
intrinsic aspect of the process is so appealing that individual market participants would
be willing to take the lower pay, or even subsidies their income from other jobs. However
this might not be the case as artists are thought to know little about the market they are
entering and have also been suggested to be overconfident when calculating their own
probability of success (Abbing, 2011, p. 119).
The results find that TP and PI do have a strong effect on creative and subjective per-
formance. There is some evidence that the TP only group had significantly lower output
compared to the control in the divergent task. For the figural task there is also some ev-
idence that output in the TP groups had lower creativity compared to non-TP groups.
There is no overall pattern in the way individuals performed in the two tasks, but there
is some evidence that pay structure is important when observing pure output levels. Ob-
serving the output in combination with the creativity and subjective scores allows for a
quantity versus quality analysis to be made. Using this analysis it is possible to observe
how strategic game play by the participants can differ between treatment groups. This
suggests that individuals are more likely to compete using quantity rather than quality
when public information about other players/participants actions and performance are
known.
In the divergent task when tournament pay was present but players were anonymous
there was more focus on creative and subjective quality. The is an indication that there is
lower creativity compared to the control group but no other differences in overall creative
performance between treatment groups in the divergent task. The per unit creativity was
significantly higher in the TP only group compared to the PI only group which suggests a
focus on quality of the ideas, which was not present in other groups. These results would
suggest that public information can influence production decisions in the market for cre-
ative goods and how individuals compete in the market. Thus there is some evidence
that creativity per idea in the TP only group is significantly higher compared to the two
non-TP groups but not significantly different to the PI & TP. In fact, if the sample size was
larger it is possible that the PI & TP group had higher creativity per idea performance
compared to all other treatment groups. This makes it very hard to be able to rule out
that the existence of public information in a TP group can negate any incentive which is
presented by a tournament pay structure.
It is important to note that subjective creativity was directly motivated through the in-
centives in the market i.e. it was profitable to create ideas which were liked. Creativity on
the other hand was indirectly incentivised as individuals might like more creative ideas
but a more creative idea might not directly affect the subjective judgment given. The
markets for creative goods are not necessarily promoting objective quality but subjective
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quality. It would stand to reason that supporting production, through laws such as copy-
right, in this environment would reinforce this market incentive. However the effects of
the treatments vary significantly suggesting that these do not necessarily directly support
the already existing market incentives but rather change/distort the way the market op-
erates. For example the overall subjective scores are significantly lower in the PI groups
and the TP only group had significantly higher per unit subjective scores compared to PI
and PI&TP treatment groups in the divergent task.
How these incentives might influence creativity in general however is not as clear
because the results from the two creativity tasks do not corroborate each other. The fig-
ural task results are different compared to the results from the divergent task and seem
to show an increase in overall output as public information or tournament pay is intro-
duced and there is no evidence of any difference between treatment groups in per output
performance either in terms of creativity or subjective judgments. This is likely due to the
fact that these tasks are fundamentally quite different and taking into account the rank in
the divergent task does not change results in a meaningful way. The patterns of output in
the math task and the divergent task also seem to suggest that these two tasks might be
more related in the way participants react to market incentives compared to the figural
creativity test. This further suggests there is something fundamentally different in how
these tasks are completed by the participants.
The results from the first task did not persist in the second of the two creativity tasks.
Tournament pay, regardless of public information, did not significantly influence total
creativity or subjective scores. The number of ideas was larger in the tournament pay
groups which drove the higher averages observed for the subjective and creativity scores.
Thus there was no difference in the quality per unit but rather a larger number of units in
the tournament pay groups. This difference in the results is likely down to two potential
factors; market feedback/learning or differences in the tasks themselves. It is unlikely
learning of the task was any different between treatment groups from one task to the next
as the participants were shown examples before participating in the task and the me-
chanics of the task were known even before the task. It is also the case that market feed-
back can be controlled for using information about each participants rank/performance
in the previous tasks as mentioned briefly earlier in the results section. It is as if the bet-
ter performing individuals would receive higher quality feedback about performance in
the tasks where public knowledge is restricted. This is because participants who ranked
high received better information about what the market considered as a quality input
compared to participants who ranked lower. Controlling for a participants rank did not
change the results significantly indicating that market feedback is an unlikely reason for
the changes in strategies between the two tasks.
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This is also corroborated by the results from the control task indicate that the incen-
tives still have an effect even in the last task which indicates similar behavioural patterns
compared to the divergent task. Individuals in both the public information treatments
had higher output on average compared to the TP only group, indicating a focus on out-
put in both the divergent and math task. If the feedback effect was to persist we should
observe a persistent difference in behaviour when the results are shown after the diver-
gent task. It is more these behavioural differences are due to the type of task compared
to any reaction to information regarding rank. Although it still could be that individuals
react to each set of results and rank information separately, however the similarity be-
tween the behaviours in the first and last task would indicate this is likely not the case.
It is also highly unlikely the difference is from the reduction of the effectiveness of the
incentives as the incentives show evidence that there are significant differences in perfor-
mance/output between treatment groups similar to the ones seen earlier in the task as
well.
It is more likely the case that the type of task matters which in turn influences their
production decisions. For example if individuals see the units of output created are equal
in their quality, it would stand to reason that participants would choose to compete using
quantity and not quality. If participants feel as if they cannot differentiate themselves
through quality they have a better chance of success by grabbing market share through
increased production and thus increasing their overall popularity.
(Rosen, 1981) propose that in winner-takes-all markets "superstars" gain market share
not necessarily through quality but the ability to provide quality more efficiently. The
author also suggests that consumers decrease search costs by choosing for quality sellers
(Rosen, 1981). The results in the first task suggest that when there was public information
in the creation stage market participants were more likely to compete through quantity.
When only tournament rights were present creators opted to compete through quality
in the divergent task. This changes in the second stage/task when market participant in
both tournament pay treatments opted for a strategy of producing a higher number out-
put, although not significantly different, without differences in the quality. This suggests
there is a difference in production strategies in a winner-takes-all markets which can de-
pend on task or type of production. Theory suggests a tournament/winner-takes-all pay
structure is best to induce effort when qualifying output is tough but deciding rank is
easy (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). Qualifying output is tough but deciding rank is relatively
easy in copyright industries, however the results seem to suggest that the type of effort
agents exert can depend on the information they receive in the market and the type of
task they are taking part in.
When participants focused on quality and fewer units of output in the TP only group
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they had higher per unit performance. PI groups also had lower average per idea subjec-
tive scores, although this difference was not statistically significant.. Interestingly there
was limited evidence that TP only treatment had lower creativity scores compared to the
control suggesting there can be a trade off between quality and quantity which would not
necessarily affect the overall creativity or subjective scores. Rather indicate a conscious
decision by the producer which depends on the information available in the market. Sug-
gesting that public information about production decisions pushes individuals to be more
likely to compete using quantity compared to quality. Thus it becomes more important to
recognise what the market is incentivising to fully understand the effect of policies, such
as, copyright which work to support existing market incentives.
When it comes to organizational literature it is difficult to place the results in seam-
lessly a the results are varying between tasks. However there is some evidence of crowd-
ing out in the math task with a similar pattern found in the output for the divergent task.
In the math task the TP only group showed the lowest performance of the 3 treatment
groups and a lower performance compared to the control group. Thus the performance
with only the external incentives of the tournament pay show lower performance on av-
erage. This is similar to the findings of Deci and Amabile where there is a decrease in
performance in the pay groups indicating a decrease in intrinsic incentives (Deci, 1971;
Deci, 1972; Amabile, 1983; Amabile and Pillemer, 2012). However this crowding out does
not occur when there is public information and tournament pay. These results point to
the public information being a stronger incentive compared to tournament pay as the po-
tential crowding out, found in the TP only, group disappears when the public information
is added. However existing literature on the two types of incentives do suggest that the
intrinsic incentive is stronger than the internal incentive (Deci, 1971; Deci, 1972; Amabile,
1983; Amabile and Pillemer, 2012). Thus it could be that public information acts more like
a intrinsic incentive which would explain this difference in results between the two pay
groups. This suggests that the crowding out might only occur in limited situations in the
creative industries and that instead of crowding out intrinsic incentives tournament pay
might simply be a weaker incentive for the math task.
This is more likely to be the case for the math task but the story is different when
observing the divergent task. First off there is no significant difference between overall
production between treatment groups although there is some indication. Based on aver-
age output in the treatment groups, that the same crowding out effect might be taking
place. However the highest average output level is present in the control group and the
two groups with PI are in between the TP only group which has the lowest average out-
put and the control group which has the highest. There is again some indication that the
PI incentive cancels out the incentive from the TP as the effect from tournament pay is
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decreased when PI is introduced.
The previous effects were only for output in the divergent task however, when it
comes to creativity and subjective scores these effects do not take place. In contrast, the
math task both output and quality of the output, i.e. the number of correct answers, were
very correlated and showed very similar patterns between treatment groups. In the diver-
gent task the best quality was found in the TP only group with the conrtol group and the
PI only group have significantly lower quality or per output creativity.Although the per
idea subjective scores closely mirror the patterns seen in per idea creativity scores there
are no statistical differences between treatment groups. Thus there is some evidence of
a quality over quantity trade off in the TP only group which is not present in any other
groups.There does seem to be some crowding out when it comes to motivating output but
not necessarily effort overall. These results point to individuals competing using quality
in the TP only group where no information about the individuals production decisions
were present. These results however are not strong, but when regarding 0’s for creativity
as outliers this patterns becomes more obvious as seen in the appendix for this chapter B.
Based on output means in the divergent task individuals focus more on output in the
PI groups compared to the TP only group. This would suggest a decision to compete
by increasing their output and thus their relative market share cet. par. However the
overall creativity scores show a 15.7% lower creativity in the TP groups compared to
the non TP groups which would suggest this strategy might not be the best to increase
overall creativity even though it does increase the quality of the ideas. Overall the mean
creativity for the control group is the highest of the 4 groups which indicates that the
incentives might not increase creative performance although these differences are not
statistically significant. Thus although there is some indication of higher output in the PI
groups the creativity scores are even with the TP group if not lower. This points to there
being no difference in overall creativity between the treatment groups but a difference in
the quantity versus quality decision making within the groups.
There seems to be no evidence to show the treatments effect overall subjective scores
although the mean per idea subjective scores are the highest in the TP-only groups as it
was for creativity per idea. Overall the means follow a similar pattern as the TP only
group has higher pre idea subjective scores compared to the PI only and PI & TP group.
Since the subjective scores were what decided the rank it indicates that if anything it
can be worthwhile to focus on quality and not necessarily output or market share in
order to maximise ones chances of success. This is because the means for the TP only
group ere the highest for overall and per idea subjective scores. However there is no
evidence of statistical significance, even thought there could possibly be given a higher
number of observations. It should be mentioned that these subjective scores were given
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by the judges which were found to correlate strongly with the subjective scores given by
participants in the experiment. Thus it is not sure that these subjective scores do fully
reflect the overall popular opinion perfectly but it is fit for purpose to the degree that
some conclusions on the overall subjective judgments of the participants can be made
using the judges scores as the proxy.
These results suggest that the strategy on quality over quantity seems to be the best in
order to maximise ones chances at market success in the stylised market. It also indicates
that public information can not be completely disregarded when observing what influ-
ences how market actors operate within a market. Pushing individuals away from focus-
ing on quality to instead focus more on competing through output and market share. The
TP only treatment promotes a strategy which maximises the overall probability of suc-
cess in the market due to the highest per idea and overall subjective scores. However this
market success does not translate fully to creative success as the TP only groups still have
significantly higher per output creativity scores. This indicates that there is likely some
misalignment between maximising overall creativity which would benefit the commu-
nity compared to maximising ones chances to be successful in the market. Importantly
these effects take place in the divergent task only.
The effects present in the divergent task and the math task are not present in the fig-
ural task. In the figural task the control has the lowest overall average output and with
steady increases in production from the control to the PI only group, then to the TP only
groups, and finally the PI & TP group. This is the similar pattern found in the levels of
overall output although there is no statistically significant difference between the output
in the treatment groups. Compare this to the divergent task where there is in some cases
evidence of PI deleting any effects from TP. If anything the TP and PI incentives work
to strengthen each other in the figural task, although there are no statistically significant
differences present in the results. There are some patterns of TP increasing output by an
estimated 9.7% at 10% significance and this same pattern is found when observing total
creativity and total subjective scores although no statistical differences were observed. In
addition the creativity and subjective scores were largely dictated by the output levels.
Thus there is evidence to suggest that the effectiveness of the incentives can truly be in-
fluenced by the type of task. It is possible that the figural task was seen to have been much
easier in terms of its cognitive demand and so the only differentiating factor to maximise
success might have been output or market share which caused the pattern of increased
production in the TP groups. However it is hard to say that this was in fact the case. Evi-
dence of similarity of the results between the divergent task and the math task do point to
this being a possibility as they both might have been cognitively more challenging. This
could cause the availability of public information regarding production in the market to
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influence the way individuals made their production decisions as they could have relied
on quick heuristics due to the combination of pressure and cognitive stress which might
have not been present in the figural task.
4.5 Conclusion
Markets for creative goods have a very distinctive structure, more often than not they
have a winner-takes-all structure which favours the artists who are popular. Popularity
which is largely due to their skill set but also influenced by their reputation visibility
in the market and even luck plays a role as illustrated to the no-one-knows principle of
Caves. These markets are vastly different compared to the "traditional" market where
individuals or firms compete for custom in an anonymous market with rational agents
who base their production decisions on profit maximisation. In the latter case the market
incentives and demands are clearer compared to the market for creative goods where the
market signals are noisy.
This paper argues that the market incentives, such as public information and tourna-
ment pay, can affect market performance differently depending on aspects, such as, the
task or the market conditions. It is likely copyright does not have an uniform affect on
production over the markets for different types of creative goods. Rather copyright influ-
ences the market though guaranteeing rights, such as attribution/public information and
economic rights/tournament pay, which influence the market environment. Experiment
results indicate that there can be a difference between acting anonymously and in an en-
vironment public information regarding a participants production and performance. To
assume copyright is a singular incentive which works through its role as a tool to re-
coup fixed cost of investment in creative goods would be ignoring the complexities of the
markets it is relevant in and the types of creators which exist in it.
Interestingly tournament pay can have a very different affect of the way market agents
compete depending on the task and the whether public information is present or not. In
some tasks they induce production but not necessarily quality, while in other tasks the
impact of tournament pay can depend on the existence of public information. These dif-
ferences strengthen the argument that it is unlikely that these incentives or copyright
have a uniform influence across markets of different goods. This is especially relevant as
copyright is often discussed in terms how the financial incentive of ownership of work
can allow the individuals to recoup their fixed investments of creation and so increase
their overall output. The results do not show this to be the case uniformly, in some cases
tournament pay or the ability to gain financially from ones output did indeed motivate an
increase in output. However there is also some evidence that when there is a task which
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is cognitively more taxing tournament pay on its own can spur quality while sacrificing
quantity, but when combined with the public information can completely change individ-
uals strategy to focus more on output and the overall visibility in the market or market
share. This evidence of interaction indicates that public information can be viewed as
the stronger of the two incentives as the quality over quantity strategy was present in the
tournament pay only groups but there is no evidence of this in the tournament pay and
public information groups when considering per idea creativity and math scores.
Unfortunately there are not strong enough results to say anything definitive about the
impact of Pi and TP in the experiments but there is some indication that performance can
vary based on task as well. There is also some indication there could be an interaction
between TP and PI as incentives for performance which does not completely close the
door for future research. However the variance in all data shows that the observation
numbers need to be far higher for more definitive results.
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Chapter 5
Performance and Satisfaction
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Fairness in Creative Markets
A significant proportion of fairness literature focuses on how fairness considerations
might impact individuals’ decision making in different games such as ultimatum games
or public goods games (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Fehr, Fischbacher, and Fong, 2003; Schot-
ter, Weiss, and Zapater, 1996; Mendoza, Lane, and Amodio, 2014; Kim et al., 2013; Weg
and Zwick, 1994). In general the games are used to better understand decision making
in market conditions and how fairness might influence this. The experimental method is
also used to study whether fairness considerations even exist, or if fairness consideration
might be caused by something else. This is especially interesting as fairness, unlike ef-
ficiency, has no automatic enforcer or forces which move the markets to a fair allocation
(Feldman and Kirman, 1974). This means that the market naturally moves toward an
efficient allocation or equilibrium; essentially forces such as rational profit maximization
and demand for goods act such it is as if an invisible hand is moving the market to an
equilibrium. However fairness has no such influence in the market which would move
the market, like an invisible hand, to a fair allocation. This calls into question what is a
fair allocation, and is this even a conceivable concept?
Fairness is a difficult concept to give a specific and rigid definition to as it can be
subjective and context dependent. For example in labour market, fair can be considered
the equilibrium wage or a wage which is fair only compared to other market participants
(Akerlof and Yellen, 1988). Fairness can also be almost opposite to efficiency as there
are forces which push the market away from a fair allocation. For example, in a market
game with proposer or responder competition, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for fair
players to achieve a “fair” outcome (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). This is especially important
as even small increases in competition can induce large behavioural changes in games
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(Fehr and Schmidt, 2003). Thus as competition increases it is likely the market is driven
further from a fair allocation.
This is especially relevant in markets for creative goods where competition can be very
intense and the market is filled with individuals who subsidise their market participation
through income from other jobs. Interestingly consumers in winner-takes-all markets,
such as the markets for creative goods, are theorised to minimise consumption costs by
choosing high quality producers or brands (Rosen, 1981). This would further concentrate
the competition as effectively only the high quality producers/output would be able to
satisfy demand. The market for creative goods also exhibits the ’no one knows principle’
which, to some extent, illustrates the subjective nature of what quality is. This makes the
prediction of what will be quality or popular hard, if not near impossible. Thus many
producers compete to be perceived as higher quality than others, and only a select few
gain the advantage of this higher quality perception, therefore forcing the large majority
to settle with low or no demand for their products/output.
These factors make the market for creative goods, and winner-takes-all markets more
generally, a difficult terrain for a fair allocation. So why might these fairness considera-
tions be important when discussing markets? There is evidence suggesting individuals
are not self-interested but rather they are strongly motivated by concerns for fairness and
reciprocity (Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt, 2007). Thus the perceived fairness of a market can
significantly influence welfare and future production decisions. In addition, although
reciprocity might not seem relevant, it can be relevant when discussing how only the
efforts of a few are reciprocated with demand and thus can influence an individual’s de-
cision on whether to remain in the market, or leave.
Varian (1974), stated that the fundamental problem is whether envy is due to some
ability which cannot be traded. If this is the case, then a fair allocation of resources can-
not be achieved. However, if lower ability workers can produce the same painting as
Picasso or the same output by exerting higher effort then substituting between the two,
it is possible to define a notion of fairness. Individuals would only be able to complain if
they would be willing to put in the amount of work required to produce the same output
(Smith, 1976). The key question thus becomes is this type of substitution between talent
and effort possible in the market for creative goods? Obviously the market spans many
different types of goods and thus it can be hard to give a generalisation which is true for
all goods, but it is possible to outline some key characteristics which can be used to decide
whether the possibility of a talent effort trade-off is possible.
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Nobody-Knows
The principle of ‘nobody knows’, detailed by Caves 2000, is a principle which states that
there is some unobservable quality of a piece of art which dictates the success of a creative
good (Caves, 2002, p. 3). This does not necessarily have to be a quality, but could be
a combination circumstances that allowed the piece to be successful. A similar theory
is forwarded by Howard Bloom, a successful manager of musical acts in the 70’s and
80’s, who describes the existence of some higher energy or charisma type quality which
somehow channels or taps into the energy of a mass and thus draws people to a person
or a performer1. These two concepts do not completely align with each other, however,
as there is opportunity to learn how to become a better performer or tap into the energy
of the audience, whereas the ‘nobody knows’ principle simply states that there is some
unobservable aspect that influences the potential for success. The key question that forms,
then; is it possible to maximise success through effort, to the extent that talent or luck
could be substituted by hard work? Although it can be possible, at least to some level,
improve the performers’ skills, there is still not enough evidence to suggest that talent,
and perhaps more importantly luck, can be substituted by effort.
Talent or Genes
To see why talent or genes might play a role in the ability to substitute talent with effort,
it is important to recognise the creative industries as individuals competing against all
other market participants to "win" or be successful. Thus if individuals have some ge-
netic advantage which increases their ability to some level where people cannot compete
simply through increasing effort, then it is unlikely a fair outcome can be achieved in the
market. In sport for example, biomechanics are very important and give a large advan-
tage to athletes, such as Usain Bolt who has almost perfect biomechanics to be a world
class sprinter. Similar advantages arise in some creative industries like vocal range and
the ability to paint/draw, which can give significant advantage when producing creative
works. It is also common knowledge that Picasso himself was an artistic savant being ac-
cepted into art school at only 13 while completing the application process in a week when
it normally took months (Rouge, 2005, p. 50). These are very real advantages for artists as
not only do savants gain attention which can help them, but they have an advantage in
producing the works themselves. This would suggest that given the relative advantage
the talented would have in the market, a talent effort trade-off is unlikely in the creative
markets. As a result, a fair allocation in these markets can be impossible to reach. Given
this, a fair allocation or an allocation where there is no envy is not something that should
1found in spin magazine 1995 vol 10 and in roganpodcast 1119.
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be emphasised when discussing effective policy regarding markets for creative goods.
Everyone will not be starting with the same or even a comparable endowment, so much
so that these differences in endowment can be impossible to bridge with effort. The best
that can be done is to make sure the market mechanics are not skewed in anyone’s favour
in order to avoid giving disincentives for effort. This is assuming that the more effort is
put into production, the better.
5.1.2 Small Markets & Market Structure
However, the previous discussion might not hold true for smaller markets as the overall
number of market participants can be so small that large differences in the endowments
of market participants is unlikely. This is not to say that small creative markets are un-
likely to have savants participating in them, rather that this is a relatively unlikely event
compared to markets which have a large population of market participants. This is im-
portant because if the endowments of the market participants are relatively similar then
a talent effort trade-off is more likely, meaning focus on a fair allocation between market
participants is more relevant in smaller or emerging markets. This means it can be ben-
eficial for policy to focus on creating a level playing field with minimal barriers to entry
to promote growth of a new or emerging form of art or other innovation. However it
is important to bear in mind that any effort to maintain "fairness" afterwards would be
counterproductive.
5.2 Fun, Fairness, Envy, and Satisfaction
This section will discuss the individual characteristics of market participants in the mar-
ket for creative goods. The aim is to observe how individual characteristics influence
performance, perceptions of satisfaction and fairness, and what the consequences for in-
dividual utility could be. In a broad sense economics can be described as a subject that
focuses on utility maximization taking into account social and physical constraints such
as a freedom to choose where to work, how to use finite resources to maximize utility,
or the well-being of society. Often mathematical modelling is used to do this, with some
simplifying assumptions to make the model simpler and intuitive. These models often,
although not always, overlook more subjective aspects of utility, such as fairness or sat-
isfaction, as they can be hard to quantify or accurately model. This is not to say they are
completely ignored by economics, but rather that often economics use proxies like wealth
instead of happiness, for example, arguing that the wealthier a person is the happier they
will be cet. par. This can cause over simplification of the problem of utility maximisation
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and ultimately cause people to misinterpret economics as a subject. It could be viewed
as solely interested in the maximisation of wealth at the expense of nuanced problem
solving or a perceived "truer" representation of utility maximisation.
This chapter will address how more subjective judgments such as fairness, fun, satis-
faction and envy are influenced by the market environment and performance and what
other individual factors may influence market performance. Ultimately, discussing utility
from the subjective perspective of fairness, satisfaction, or even fun, and the relationship
these measures have with observed performance. Utility is discussed both in terms of the
producer and the perspective consumer of the creative outputs.
Envy, fairness, and efficiency are concepts that are strongly linked. They are often
discussed in the context of social welfare, and especially fairness and envy relate to the
problem of envy-free, initially introduced by George Stern in 1958 in the pie cutting prob-
lem. Fairness itself is a complex concept, as a result of its subjectivity, which can cause
problems when trying to determine what is "fair" allocation. The problems introduced
by fairness considerations have been previously adapted to areas such as bargaining (Fis-
chbacher, Fong, and Fehr, 2008), contract design (Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt, 2007), and
efficient allocation of resources (Varian, 2006). These studies approach the problem of fair-
ness using varying methodologies and angles of investigation, but the common thread is
how fairness considerations influence economic decision making. This chapter will dis-
cuss what influences fairness perceptions with further discussion in terms of the problem
of fairness relative to solving a fair outcome or allocation in the market.
5.3 Results
The measure for fairness used is reward fairness, and for satisfaction is performance sat-
isfaction, for simplicity they will be referred to as fairness and satisfaction. In addition
to fairness and satisfaction, perception results for envy and the level of perceived fun are
observed. These four variables will constitute our variables of interest. The mean of the 4
variables are observed in relation to three variables: treatment groups, overall rank suc-
cess of all tasks, and the number of times an individual ranked 1st from their group, these
constitute our variables of comparison. The aim is to be able to observe how the 4 vari-
ables of interest are influenced by the three variables of comparison. This is carried out
by observing differences or similarities in how variables change given variation in treat-
ment groups or success. In addition, treatment or control variables can be introduced or
dropped to observe how significance levels or coefficients change. Two most important
variables of interest are reward fairness and performance satisfaction and how the two
variables might be related. To observe basic variations in the data, and their significance,
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there are histograms of the means of the variables, t-tests, and regression results relating
to the histograms to observe the variation in data and whether this variation is significant
or noteworthy.
Differences Between Treatment Groups
Figure 5.1. one illustrates the means of fun, envy, satisfaction in one’s performance, and
perception of reward fairness in the 4 different treatment groups. In this context envy, or
the desire to trade places with other participants is a dummy variable i.e. yes or no, and
as such can be hard to find significant differences between distributions. In the control
group for example, there were about 20% of people who reported to want to trade places
which is close to significantly different to the over 30% of participants who did the same
in the PI group. But even this was only significant at 10.1% significance level observable
in table 5.1. Strictly speaking there are no significant differences in reported envy between
the treatment groups although it is worth noting that the envy is the lowest in the control
group where the consequences of one’s performance and relative rank had no impact on
their pay or how others perceived them.
The means for performance satisfaction and reward fairness are very similar in their
patterns. Both are significantly lower in the groups with TP compared to the groups
without TP. The significance level of the differences between the TP and non-TP groups
were under 8% although 5 out of the 8 total differences measured between treatment
groups for both fairness and satisfaction were below a significance level of 2.5% thus
there is strong evidence that both are significantly lower in the TP groups. Participants
reported a significantly lower level of perceived fun in the TP-only group compared to
all other treatment groups which were not significantly different from each other. The
means reported for fun were very similar at around 7 with the approximate score of 6 in
the TP-only group. Indicating a significantly lower level of perceived fun or enjoyment
in the TP-only group compared to all other groups.
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FIGURE 5.1: Averages between Treatment Groups
TABLE 5.1: T-Tests for Differences in Distributions between Treatment
Groups
CvPI CvTP CvPI&TP PIvTP PIvPI&TP TPvPI&TP
Envy 0.101 0.1743 0.4777 0.7787 0.385 0.5492
Fariness 0.9981 0.0646* 0.0213** 0.054* 0.014** 0.8116
Satisfaction 0.2573 0.0004*** 0.006*** 0.0123** 0.077* 0.6095
fun 0.8708 0.0085*** 0.7662 0.014** 0.8768 0.0416**
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. The table shows which means
are statistically significantly different from one another as seen in table 5.1.
Differences Between Levels of Performance
The data shown in Figure 2 are mean values from 5 different levels of success from the
most successful (1) to the least successful at (5). Each group had 5 individuals2 they were
all ranked based on their performance in each task from 1 being the best, to 5 being the
2For the exception of 2 groups.
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worst performer in the group3. These are 5 subgroups based on the total rank for each
participant based on the combined ranks over the 3 tasks. This can largely explain the
increase in the means for reported envy left to right as participants’ success levels over
the three tasks decrease.
FIGURE 5.2: How Overall Rank in the Three Tasks Influence Fairness and
Satisfaction
The opposite is observed for satisfaction, as the reported satisfaction decreases in line
with decrease in individual success. In general satisfaction decreased as success de-
creased with most distributions between success levels being under 1% significance as
seen in table 5.2. The exception being the success levels between 1 and 2 (high performers)
and between 3 and 4 (moderate to lower performers). There is no statistically significant
different within the pairs. This suggests an overall decreasing trend with some adjacent
success levels not being statistically significantly different. The increase in envy as suc-
cess levels decreased is not as statistically significant since the significance levels from
the t-tests are mostly only under 10% compared to under 1% with differences in groups
when satisfaction is observed. For envy, as further away a subgroup was from another
the higher the significance level. For example, groups 1 and 5 are significantly different
3As mentioned in the method section there was a problem with the ranking which caused the ranking
not to fully coincide with the measured performance. Although the correlation was very high.
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at slightly over 3% while 3 and 5 are significantly different at 7%. Compare this with the
success levels 1 and 2 or 4 and 5 in which the significance level of the difference between
the distributions are highly insignificant. Generally there is a trend that envy increased as
performance decreased but this trend was statistically robust as trends between success
levels for fairness or satisfaction.
TABLE 5.2: T-Tests for Differences in Distributions Between Participant Per-
formance Groups
1v2 1v3 1v4 1v5 2v3
Envy 0.72 0.63 0.0909* 0.0347** 0.90
Fariness 0.83 0.12 0.79 0.0101* 0.14
Satisfaction 0.50 0*** 0.0001*** 0*** 0***
fun 0.11 0.84 0.80 0.0135** 0.12
2v4 2v5 3v4 3v5 4v5
Envy 0.14 0.054* 0.17 0.0672* 0.60
Fariness 0.61 0.0109** 0.0629* 0.20 0.0024**
Satisfaction 0* 0* 0.44 0.0028*** 0.0606*
fun 0.20 0.0135** 0.93 0.32 0.34
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. The table shows
which means are statistically significantly different from one an-
other as seen in table 5.2.
Observing reward fairness there is evidence that the distributions for groups 3 and 5
are significantly different from the distributions in groups 1,2, and 4. That is to say it is
likely the means for rank groups 3 and 5 are not in the same distribution as the means
for rank groups 1,2, and 4. The distributions for groups 3 and 5 for reward fairness are
all significantly under 5% except for the difference between 3 and 4 which is at around
6% and between 2 and 3 where the significance level was 14%. Groups 3 and 5 are statis-
tically significantly different distributions at around 1% compared to groups 1,2, and 4.
This indicates that although fairness and satisfaction has a very similar pattern between
treatment groups, the same pattern is not as evident when comparing between different
levels of success. Furthermore, there is no significant difference between the levels of fun
individuals reported having and the levels of success, with one exception. This exception
is between group 2, of relatively high performers, with the highest reported level of fun
and group 5, the worst performers, who reported to have the least fun. The significance
level between reported fun for group 2 and 5 is around 1% but this hardly shows any
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trend between reported fun and performance. If anything, there is almost no relation to
reported fun decreasing as performance decreasing apart from group 2 being significantly
higher in its mean compared to group 5.
Differences Between Winners and Losers
Levels of fun, envy, satisfaction, and reward fairness were compared between participants
who ranked first in their group 0 times (group 0), once (group 1), twice (group 2), and
ranked first in all 3 tasks (group 3). The distributions here were by no means even as
group 0 is by far the largest group and group 3 by far the smallest with only 3 participants
in the group. These groups are referred to as win groups and can be useful to consider
group 2 and group 3 as a part of the same group due to the small size of group 3.
There is no statistical difference between win groups in the level of reported fun, in
fact all the means reported are within 0.4 of each other, when the mean is approximately
6.2. Although there is a steady decline in envy as the number of times a participant ranked
1st, or wins, increased. Only groups of 0 wins and 2 wins are statistically different at 5%.
Participants who won every time showed no envy but this is not statistically significant
in group 0 or even 1 because of the relatively small size of the sample. Thus, one can
conclude that there is evidence of decreasing envy as the number of wins increases. There
is significantly lower envy reported for the very successful, groups 2 and 3, compared to
the unsuccessful group 0.
Satisfaction in one’s own performance increased steadily from one win group to an-
other with only group 2 and 3 not being statistically significant at least 5%, this is unclear
whether it is because of the relatively small sample size in group 3, but it can be said with
confidence that as success or the number of times a participant ranked first increased their
self-reported satisfaction in their own performance increased with it. Lastly, results ob-
served for reported reward fairness seem to show that for winners of 0 or 1 the reported
reward fairness level was relatively similar and the same can be said for groups 2 and 3.
Thus overall groups 0 and 1 are statistically different from group 2 but given the small
sample size and a slightly smaller mean in group 3 they are not statistically significant to
group 3. It should be mentioned however that it is likely very accurate to separate the
reported fairness into a low fairness group of 0 and 1 and a high reported fairness group
consisting of group 2 and 3. A similar but reverse trend was found for envy and the data
is as if there is a threshold between one and two wins for both envy and fairness. There
is not a clear increase from one group to the next for reward fairness as there was for
satisfaction.
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FIGURE 5.3: Screen Shot of the Divergent Task with Attribution
TABLE 5.3: T-Tests for Differences in Distributions between Winners
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
0v1 0v2 0v3 1v2 1v3 2v3
Envy 0.2719 0.0385** 0.2434 0.1999 0.3457 0.5512
Fariness 0.6905 0.001*** 0.3953 0.0067*** 0.4914 0.601
Satisfaction 0.0337** 0* 0.0169** 0.0007*** 0.0288** 0.4539
fun 0.8451 0.9003 0.8539 0.9815 0.8205 0.8208
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. The table shows which means
are statistically significantly different from one another as seen in table 5.3.
5.3.1 Regressions for Satisfaction and Fairness
Reward fairness and performance satisfaction, based on the results, show evidence of be-
ing closely tied to each other. They both show significant decreases in both TP groups.
It is difficult to know, based only on the data above, whether one is causing the other to
change or if there is a possible covariant, such as pay. To find whether the two are influ-
enced by a covariant, a regression where only the possible covariant is used to explain
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changes in satisfaction and fairness could be run. Depending on the results, it would be
interesting to use the IV method, if found necessary or useful, however we will readdress
that later in the section. First, satisfaction can be added to a regression to explain fairness
and vice versa. To start we observe if, or to what degree, does satisfaction explain fairness
perceptions or vice versa.
TABLE 5.4: Fairness and Satisfaction, Including each Other and Pay Only
Reward Fairness Performance Satisfaction
Tournament Pay -0.432*** Tournament Pay -0.609***
(0.145) (0.160)
Controls no Controls no
N 194 N 194
r2 0.044 r2 0.069
Reward Fairness Performance Satisfaction
Performance Satisfaction 0.272*** Reward Fairness 0.330***
(0.063) (0.076)
Tournament Pay -0.267* Tournament Pay -0.466***
(0.144) (0.156)
Controls no Controls no
Obs. 194 Obs. 194
r2 0.1301 r2 0.1511
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
To gain more information about a possible direction of influence between performance
satisfaction and reward fairness perceptions a series of regressions are calculated. These
regressions start off simple with only a few variables and step by step more variables
are added to observe how significance levels of explanatory variables change and what
this might tell us about the dependent variables. First we start with performance satis-
faction and reward fairness regressed against tournament pay4 or TP. This allows for a
benchmark significance level and a coefficient level which can be compared to coefficient
levels once a new variable is added. TP decreased both the perception of reward fairness
and of the individuals own performance. These were highly significant at 1% and quite
large with decreases of 0.432 and 0.609 respectively. Since both fairness and satisfaction
4This variable is a variable which is 1 if the individual was in a tournament pay groups and 0 if they
were in a groups with a set pay.
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were on a 1-6 scale the coefficients constitute about 16% and a 24% drop in fairness and
satisfaction perceptions respectively.
When the satisfaction was used to explain fairness perceptions and fairness percep-
tions used to explain satisfaction levels, the coefficients for pay decreased in magnitude.
They dropped from a decrease of 0.443 to a decrease of 0.267 when explaining changes
in fairness perceptions and from 0.609 to 0.466 when explaining changes in performance
satisfaction. The significance level for tournament pay explaining changes in fairness per-
ceptions also fell to 10% significance from the previous 1%. Performance satisfaction is
highly significant in explaining reward fairness perceptions at 1% SL with a coefficient of
0.272 and fairness perceptions is highly significant in explaining changes in satisfaction
at 1% SL and a coefficient of 0.330. As satisfaction of one’s own performance increased,
the individual’s opinion of the fairness of the reward scheme also improved, and vice
versa. Participants in pay groups thought that the rewards were less fair compared to
their counterparts in the set pay or non-TP groups. This is an intuitive interpretation and
is consistent with the means observed earlier. The significance levels for all regressions
are high except for the TP variable when explaining reward fairness. This is an interesting
point as it would be intuitive to think that pay structure would be one of the main drivers
on the perceived reward fairness.
In table 5.5 the same the regressions are the same as in table 5.4 except all 12 control
variables and session dummies are added and potential changes in the explanatory vari-
ables of interest are observed. The regressions are very similar in the two tables with
both tables start with tournament pay significant at 1% when explaining both fairness
and satisfaction perceptions. However, the results change when the controls are added
to the regression with both TP and either satisfaction explaining changes in fairness or
fairness explaining changes in performance satisfaction. Tournament pay is no longer
significant in explaining changes in reward fairness perceptions, although it is highly
significant in explaining changes in satisfaction perceptions at 1%. TP only significantly
explained changes in performance satisfaction while it no longer is statistically significant
in explaining changes in reward fairness perceptions. Thus, satisfaction and the controls
significantly explain reward fairness while TP, or the reward structure itself, is not statis-
tically significant when explaining changes in reward fairness. This implies that reward
fairness is explained by one’s level of performance satisfaction regardless of pay struc-
ture. While one’s performance satisfaction derives from both reward fairness perceptions
and whether that individual in in a TP group or not.
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TABLE 5.5: Fairness and Satisfaction, Including each Other, Pay, and Controls
Reward Fairness Performance Satisfaction
Tournament Pay -0.367*** Tournament Pay -0.640***
(0.140) (0.169)
Controls yes Controls yes
Obs. 194 Obs. 197
r2 0.203 r2 0.139
Reward Fairness Performance Satisfaction
Performance Satisfaction 0.289*** Reward Fairness 0.390***
(0.064) (0.096)
Tournament Pay -0.199 Tournament Pay -0.491***
(0.134) (0.167)
Controls yes Controls yes
Obs. 194 Obs. 194
r2 0.303 r2 0.245
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Heteroskedastic
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
In table 5.4 TP is statistically significant in explaining both performance satisfaction
and reward fairness when 12 controls are present. When the variable for both perfor-
mance satisfaction and reward fairness are added they both are significant in explaining
each other. However, TP is significant in explaining performance satisfaction while it is
insignificant in explaining reward fairness. This is strong evidence that reward fairness
is explained by performance satisfaction, and would indicate that differences in fairness
perceptions between treatment groups are likely due to performance satisfaction and not
the fact that there is a tournament pay structure. In turn, it is likely that fairness is ex-
plained by performance satisfaction and not the other way around, as the variable pay is
significant in explaining satisfaction5.
5The IV method was used to check if TP could be used as an instrument for satisfaction and satisfaction
then used to explain reward fairness. However the results indicated that pay was not an accurate instru-
ment, furthermore there was no endogeneity in the found in the IV regression. This indicated that a normal
OLS was likely more appropriate.
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TABLE 5.6: Fairness and Satisfaction. Including Each Other, Performance,
Pay, and Controls
Reward Fairness Performance Satisfaction
Performance Satisfaction 0.222** Reward Fairness 0.206**
(0.094) (0.091)
Tournament Pay -0.121 Tournament Pay -0.624***
(0.167) (0.169)
All Production -0.016 All Production -0.007
(0.011) (0.011)
Win Score 0.461** Win Score -0.161
(0.180) (0.174)
Total Rank 0.068 Total Rank -0.190***
(0.045) (.043)
Fun 0.069* Fun 0.113***
(0.036) (0.036)
Combined Quality -0.069 Combined Quality 0.069**
(0.052) (0.034)
Male -0.435* Male 0.083
(0.227) (0.196)
Creative Family 0.355** Creative Family -0.0739
(0.164) (0.146)
Ambiguous Risk 0.008* Ambiguous Risk -0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
More in Creative Fields 0.427** More in Creative Fields 0.001
(0.172) (0.202)
Controls yes Controls yes
Obs. 194 Obs. 194
r2 0.407 r2 0.493
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Heteroskedastic Robust standard
errors in parenthesis.
The 3rd set of regression results, in table 5.5, show the influence of total production6,
6Total number of ideas/production in both creativity tasks and he total number of math questions
solved.
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Win Score7, total rank8, fun, and Combined Quality9. Results indicate that reward fair-
ness correlates with the number of times an individual was ranked 1st while overall rank
was insignificant in explaining variation in reward fairness perceptions. The opposite is
true for satisfaction where the total rank or overall rank was significant, while the number
of wins were insignificant in explaining variation in performance satisfaction. It makes
sense that an incremental increase in performance i.e. rank would increase satisfaction
in one’s performance. On the other hand, the difference in performance satisfaction due
to the number of times an individual ranked first was not significant. This suggests the
difference across the whole spectrum of performance is more significant in explaining
performance satisfaction then the difference between top performers and everyone else.
The overall level of fun reported by individuals significantly explained differences in
both performance satisfaction and reward fairness. The coefficient for the variable fun
is positive in both cases indicating that as fun increases so does reward fairness and sat-
isfaction perceptions. However, the direction of causality is not as clear as it is hard to
say whether the level of perceived fun influences reward fairness perceptions, and vice
versa. The combined quality measure10 is positively correlated with performance sat-
isfaction but not fairness perceptions. This is an interesting finding as the participants
never received any specific feedback on how creative their output was except for indi-
rectly through subjective judgments regarding their output which then dictated their per-
formance. Crucially, performance was already taken into account through rank and the
number of wins. This could indicate the presence of some intrinsic satisfaction generated
from production of quality output. There is no correlation between quality and reward
fairness perceptions and the estimated coefficient for quality when explaining reward
fairness is negative and non-significant.
Overall effort in terms of output or production was not a significant indicator of satis-
faction or fairness perceptions, but did have a negative coefficient as might be expected.
The intuition is that the more effort put in to produce more output, the more was pro-
duced, and the lower the estimated satisfaction and reward fairness was. The estimated
coefficients, although insignificant, are both negative and the same could be expected for
quality. The more effort was put in, the higher the quality would be, and the lower the
fairness and satisfaction perceptions would be. The logic being that higher effort, tak-
ing into account performance from total rank and winscore, would decrease satisfaction
and reward fairness because individuals would be working harder for the same result.
However, the results suggest this is not the case, although the coefficient for quality is
7Which is the total number of times the participant was ranked 1st, maximum 3 minimum 0.
8The combined ranks for each of the three tasks from 3 (1st in all tasks) to 15 (last i.e. 5th in all 3 tasks.
9This is the combined creativity scores for both creativity tasks.
10the combined per output creativity scores from both creativity tasks.
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negative in explaining reward fairness it is again insignificant. Quality increases the sat-
isfaction levels in one’s performance and this increase in satisfaction is significant at 5%
SL. This suggests that there is an intrinsic satisfaction which individuals seem to receive
from higher quality production, independent of their performance in the market. Fur-
thermore, this would suggest that the relationship between effort and satisfaction might
not be the same as between effort and reward fairness perceptions.
Observing the influence of the 12 listed controls (including mathematical efficacy),
none of these influenced performance satisfaction while, gender, willingness to take am-
biguous risk, creative family, and more in creative fields all influenced reward fairness
perceptions. This indicates that performance and perceived performance explains varia-
tion in satisfaction better compared to the controls. This suggests that performance sat-
isfaction is explained by performance measures or perceived performance measures and
individual characteristics do not influence satisfaction perceptions.
This is not the case for reward fairness perceptions. Males were found to have lower
levels of perceived reward fairness with performance controlled for. Creative family, will-
ingness to take ambiguous risk, and the confidence that the person would make more in
creative fields all increased reward fairness perceptions. Interestingly the confidence that
a person would make more in creative fields increased reward fairness perceptions irre-
spective of performance. The size of the effect was relatively large as well at 0.427 or 10%
with 5% SL for the more creative in fields variable. Male, effect size of 8%, SL of 10%, and
ambiguous risk, with an effect size of up to 15%11 were significant at 10% and creative
family, effect size of 7%, at 5%. These differences are interesting as they show that fair-
ness perceptions can vary largely based on individual characteristics independent of per-
formance while performance satisfaction is not dependent on individual characteristics.
Overall the results suggest that rank, the perceived amount of fun, and combined quality
of the output, along with fairness perceptions and TP explained variation in satisfaction.
In addition, fairness perceptions were more likely to be influenced by ultimate success,
i.e. winning, individual characteristics, and satisfaction perceptions. Which seems to sug-
gest fairness perceptions can be more reliant on the individual compared to performance
satisfaction which closely tied to performance indicators and the pay structure.
11This is observing a difference from the lowest level of ambiguous risk 0 to the highest at 100. The effect
if 0.15% per one unit increase of willingness to take ambiguous risk.
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TABLE 5.7: Fairness and Satisfaction Individually with Performance Vari-
ables, Pay, and Controls
Reward Fairness Performance Satisfaction
Pay -0.326** Pay -0.576***
(0.137) (0.148)
All Production -0.004 All Production -0.001
(0.010) (0.010)
Win Score 0.375*** Win Score 0.0573
(0.130) (0.128)
Total Rank 0.011 Total Rank -0.186***
(0.041) (0.040)
Fun 0.073** Fun 0.116***
(0.032) (0.033)
Combined Quality -0.008 Combined Quality 0.042
(0.038) (0.031)
Male -0.315* Male 0.173
(0.180) 0.165
Creative Efficacy -0.008 Creative Efficacy 0.002
(0.005) (0.0057)
Creative Family 0.194 Creative Family -0.0419
(0.144) (0.140)
Ambiguous Risk 0.007** Ambiguous Risk 0.0015
(0.003) (0.003)
More in Creative Fields 0.410** More in Creative Fields 0.211
(0.159) (0.176)
Controls yes Controls yes
Obs. 194 Obs. 194
r2 0.302 r2 0.437
Notes: ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Heteroskedastic Robust standard
errors in parenthesis.
Table 5.6 shows which variables are significant in explaining changes in reward fair-
ness and performance satisfaction perceptions. When reward fairness is the dependent
variable, performance satisfaction is the independent variable and vice versa. This means
the coefficient of the other independent variables shows how they influence the depen-
dent variable, with their influence on all other independent variables taken into account.
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To consider the controls and other independent variables influence on performance sat-
isfaction, for example, independent of their influence through reward fairness, it is nec-
essary to include a regression with all controls and other independent variables without
reward fairness and vice versa. Table 5.7 is the exact same regression, but satisfaction is
not used to explain changes in reward fairness and vice versa. The regressions in table
5.7 make it is possible to observe how variables influence satisfaction or fairness indepen-
dently. This is without taking into account how said variable might influence, for exam-
ple, performance satisfaction differently compared to reward fairness perceptions which
what the regressions in table 5.6 do. In general the regressions are similar in the two
tables except that creative family did not significant in explaining differences in reward
fairness but creative efficacy is at a 10% significance level and with a 2.5% effect size12.
These suggest that creative efficacy explains, to some extent, reward fairness, and creative
family influences reward fairness significantly differently than it influences performance
satisfaction. Although creative family doesn’t explain changes in reward fairness without
the comparison to how it influences performance satisfaction. It is also worth mentioning
that individual characteristics remained statistically insignificant in explaining perfor-
mance satisfaction further indicating that it is not dependent on the individual.
5.4 Discussion
In the results section there is a general overview of how individuals perceived the differ-
ent market environments. These perceptions give some insight into the utility derived
from these different market scenarios, which in turn will enable a discussion regard-
ing some welfare implications of market environments. For example, interestingly the
amount of fun reported was not significantly dependent on performance but was signifi-
cantly lower in the TP-only treatment. Using this it could be argued that individuals de-
rived less utility from the production process in the TP-only group compared to all other
groups cet. par. The relationship between performance satisfaction and reward fairness
were observed in detail to observe what drives changes in the variables and how the two
might be related. Extensive literature on the relationship between satisfaction and fair-
ness already exist, especially when observing how consumers derive satisfaction13. The
motivation for this literature presumably being that the more is known about how con-
sumers derive satisfaction from an exchange, the better suited a business is to deliver
high consumer satisfaction and increase demand.
12Thus, creative efficacy does not drastically influence fairness perceptions.
13This literature will be discussed in detail later in the section.
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The reasoning to observe performance satisfaction and reward fairness perceptions
in the experiment is to be able to comment on how satisfaction and fairness perceptions
are influenced by market participation. Specifically, what influences the perceptions of
the producers of art or creative goods within the market? This will enable a discussion
regarding how producers and consumers derive their perceptions of reward fairness and
performance satisfaction, and whether there are commonalities between the ways they
are derived.
5.4.1 Perceptions
The concepts being discussed are not the more general concepts of fairness or satisfaction
but more specifically reward fairness and performance satisfaction. The experiment fo-
cused on the producers of creative goods and it is the producer’s performance satisfaction
and reward fairness perceptions which were observed. To focus the discussion, a simpli-
fying argument is made which states that overall fairness perceptions are largely derived
from the perceived fairness of the reward scheme within the context of the stylised mar-
ket. In addition, the idea that satisfaction is largely derived from the satisfaction in one’s
market performance. The argument that performance satisfaction is similar as a concept
to performance satisfaction is supported by evidence where overall satisfaction largely
derives from performance. This is discussed in more detail later in the section.
5.4.2 Fun and Envy
Although fun is a purely subjective score it does give some indication of how much in-
dividuals enjoyed themselves given rank performance or treatment groups. This on the
other hand can give an indication of the utility derived in varying circumstances. This
is valuable information about how individuals view the market structures of the differ-
ent treatment groups and whether this utility from fun correlates with measures such as
reward fairness or satisfaction. Overall fun was not affected largely by performance and
was relatively similar in the 4 treatment groups apart from the TP-only group. These re-
sults indicate that performance is not a major indicator of the amount of perceived fun.
Anonymous competitive environment was viewed as less fun compared to completing
the task anonymously with no competition or with competition among known contem-
poraries. This suggests that the social aspect of competition can decrease the decreased
enjoyment found when individuals compete anonymously.
Performance and envy are negatively correlated, as when performance increases, envy
decreases and visa verse. The control task also has the lowest reported level of envy
although in general the differences are not significant between treatment groups. This
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is likely due to the relatively low number of individuals reporting envy as even in the
highest instance there were only approximately 30% who reported they wanted to trade
places, i.e. showed envy. Furthermore, the significance levels and size of the differences
were higher when observing differences in performance compared to differences in treat-
ment groups. There were statistically significant indications that both performance mea-
sures, overall rank over the three tasks and the number of times an individual ranked
first, influenced reported envy. In other words, the differences in performance within the
market are more significant in explaining reported envy compared to difference between
different market conditions.
5.4.3 Effort and Performance
Effort plays a role in the formation of satisfaction as effort has been found to have a neg-
ative effect on satisfaction while job performance has a positive effect on job satisfaction
(Christen, Iyer, and Soberman, 2006). This however was found to be the case in a more
corporate environment and might not be the case in the creative industries where indi-
viduals are often intrinsically motivated to exert effort. Effort should be considered along
with job performance, or in the case of the experiment rank. However, effort cannot be
directly observed, although proxies, such as, number of expressions created, or overall
creativity scores can be used.
These measures only give the indication of the outcome and not necessarily effort. In
addition, the measures do not give a clear sign of higher effort in the pay groups for ex-
ample. If anything they would suggest that there would be higher effort in the PI groups
over the 3 tasks as the first and last task both indicated a higher number of expressions14
recorded. Thus, we can have a series of different hypothesis regarding effort, which is
either based on the observed number of inputs submitted or general assumptions based
on hypothetical argument.
For example, we can assume that in the public information or PI groups individuals
exhibited higher effort as the inputs in those groups were higher in two out of the three
tasks, this could be effort hypothesis 1. We could assume that effort is approximately
consistent across groups as there is no overall difference found when accounting for mea-
sures of both quantity and quality between the groups, effort hypothesis 2. Finally, we
could assume that the individuals in the TP groups exerted higher effort throughout the
experiment, effort hypothesis 3. These hypotheses will be discussed in terms of their
possible consequences on the interpretation of the results if they are correct.
14Expressions created being the number of expressions created in the creativity tasks or the number of
solutions given in the math task.
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Effort Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 = Public information or PI groups individuals exhibited higher effort as the
inputs in those groups were higher in two out of the three tasks.
If effort hypothesis 1 was to be true it would raise interesting questions about how pub-
lic information about rank can influence effort, as discussed in the previous chapter. It
would also render the interpretation of effort and satisfaction as negatively correlated in
doubt. This is because the satisfaction levels are only significantly different when com-
paring TP and non-TP groups. One must remember that in the market being observed
there is not a direct link between effort and performance. This is also known by the par-
ticipants, which could influence the outcome. Even if effort did influence satisfaction, the
expectation that effort might not correlate directly with performance, due to the subjective
nature of the market, would likely dampen the effect. In addition, creative performance,
which the market did not directly reward or incentivise, did increase levels of satisfac-
tion. This effect was present even when controlling for rank and overall production. The
influence of higher effort in the PI groups is likely to manifest itself through this pathway,
i.e. through efforts influence on the overall creativity of output. Thus, as far as effort
hypothesis 1, even though it is possibly a factor it is not influencing satisfaction through
the difference between expected and observed outcome but rather through its influence
on the individually perceived creativity of the output.
Effort Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 = Effort is approximately consistent across groups as there is no overall dif-
ference found when accounting for measures of both quantity and quality between the
groups.
Effort hypothesis 2 assumes that effort is relatively constant throughout the treatment
groups. This assumption is the most likely of the three to be the case, or closest to the
reality of the situation, according to the data on production and creativity scores. As dis-
cussed in the previous chapter there was no consistent difference between the groups in
overall production and quality. There was evidence of the TP only groups, in some cases,
focusing on quality instead of quantity in the first creativity task. In the math task TP-
only group had comparatively lower scores although, and it is unlikely that there was a
consistently lower effort made in any of the treatment groups throughout all 3 tasks. This
is because of evidence of high output in the second of the two creativity tasks in the TP-
only group. In general, however, the assumption that effort was consistent throughout
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groups would indicate that satisfaction was more influenced by whether the individual
was in a group with performance pay or not. This does not necessarily mean that effort is
unimportant in explaining satisfaction, but it does show that the existence of performance
pay can have more influence on satisfaction compared to effort. Potentially effort exerted
in the pay groups was more salient for the participants as there was more at stake, this
could cause the effort exerted, even though the same, costlier.
Effort Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 = Individuals in the TP groups exerted higher effort throughout the experi-
ment.
If Effort hypothesis 3 is true it would mean that the differences in satisfaction levels in
the pay groups are possibly due to effort and not because it is a TP group. There is very
little evidence that this would be the case since only in task 2 were the number of ex-
pressions weakly higher in the TP groups at a significance level of 10%. However, when
regressing the ranks of all three tasks against the reported satisfaction, task 2 was not sig-
nificant in explaining differences in satisfaction which would suggest that the influence
of task 2 on overall satisfaction is small. Thus hypothesis 3 can be discarded. In the case
of the research at hand there is no clear signal that effort does influence satisfaction, al-
though there is some indication that creativity scores influence satisfaction. There is some
indication that effort might indirectly influence satisfaction. However, there was not di-
rect measure of effort and thus a comprehensive discussion on the influence of effort on
satisfaction is not possible. Although it is possible to say that, it is likely that effort itself
is not as significant of a factor as the influence of performance pay, if present.
There is no evidence of consistent and significant difference in performance between
the TP or performance pay groups and the flat rate pay or non-TP groups. There is evi-
dence of some performance differences between groups with and without public informa-
tion (PI) where PI groups showed more focus on production, but which did not manifest
in overall creativity differences. It is likely not the case that performance in terms of pro-
duction or subjective performance significantly influenced the performance satisfaction
of the market participant. Rather, it was the rank or given score which gave them the in-
dication of their performance since this was the only metric which the individuals could
easily observe and compare themselves to others. However, there is evidence that cre-
ative performance positively influenced performance satisfaction indicating there is, at
least to an extent, an intrinsic aspect to performance satisfaction. This was the case even
though individuals did not receive feedback of their creativity directly.
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Satisfaction & Reward Fairness
Results regarding levels of satisfaction show relatively intuitive results. As rank perfor-
mance improves, satisfaction levels improve, however the number of times an individ-
ual ranked first did not significantly explain changes in satisfaction levels when reward
fairness was considered. Interestingly satisfaction regarding performance is significantly
lower in tournament pay groups compared to non-tournament pay groups. This strongly
suggests that, not only is performance satisfaction strongly linked to performance, but it
is also significantly lower when there are monetary consequences to performance. This
points to performance satisfaction being strongly linked to the consequences of the perfor-
mance and not necessarily only the performance itself. This is to say everyone could have
performed extremely well in each group but because success is relative and performance
satisfaction was strongly linked to relative success, at least to some extent, performance
satisfaction is divorced from aggregate performance. Interestingly reward fairness and
performance satisfaction are also closely linked as both are significantly lower in tourna-
ment pay groups. It is not surprising that reward fairness is lower in tournament pay
groups as the distribution of the rewards are highly unequal. However, the relationship
between the two is important as it implies that satisfaction depends on the environment
even when rank or performance is held constant.
Participants in the TP groups indicated significantly lower reward fairness perceptions
compared to flat rate pay groups. Even though the average pay was identical for all
treatment groups, the treatment groups with the winner takes all pay structure reported
20% lower reward fairness scores. The scores did not change based on whether there was
public information but only based on the pay structure. This is also relatively intuitive
because the public information condition did not change the amount of information the
individual received regarding the pay structure and their own pay compared to others.
The reference point or starting point has been found to be an important factor for how fair
individuals thought a situation to be (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). The reference point
has also been found to be important specifically in terms of relative pay as individuals
with lower pay compared to others with comparable education levels showed far lower
levels of satisfaction with their pay15 (Ordóñez, Connolly, and Coughlan, 2000).
Distributive justice, or fairness of a distribution, has also been found to be related to
the level of reported satisfaction with pay level (Jawahar and Stone, 2011). This is espe-
cially relevant in winner-takes-all market structures as the might only be a very small dif-
ference in ability, if at all, between the high and the average paid. This can be especially
true for the markets for creative goods where the "nobody-knows" principle influences
15This is to say if there are two individuals who have comparable skills or training but differ in the
amount they are paid, the lower paid individual will show lower pay satisfaction.
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who does and doesn’t become successful. Overall procedural justice, or the perceived
fairness of a process or allocation, has found to be a strong influence on satisfaction levels
(Jawahar and Stone, 2011; Lau, Wong, and Eggleton, 2008; Sindhav et al., 2006). These
findings are interesting in light of research which suggests that workers well-being was
increased by higher levels of perceived fairness with these effects being the highest for
procedural fairness (Tortia, 2006)16. This is interesting as there is evidence of lower work-
place fairness being a negative externality of bad workplace organisation and unfair prac-
tices.
Procedural fairness perceptions are an important part of what constitutes fair, this is
to say that as long as the "game" or market is no perceived to be rigged or skewed toward
some group or individual, then the market or allocation is fair. However the evidence
discussed earlier also suggests that if there is an element of luck or a perceived element
of luck then the allocation would likely be seen as unfair. Thus the effort and talent of
others needs to be observable and the outcomes need to be contingent on effort in order
for the outcomes to be seen as fair. However this perception of what is fair is problematic
when observing the creative industries as there is a large unknown element to success,
the no-body-knows principle. Thus the market for creative goods is likely to be viewed
as unfair by low performers who view success as random and not contingent on effort17.
Thus striving for a fair allocation within the market, or a fair market, is not worth striving
for due to the inherent randomness or perceived randomness of market success.
As discussed earlier in the chapter the nobody knows principle and the fact that tal-
ent is not distributed uniformly between market participants make a fair allocation and
perceived reward fairness very difficult to achieve in large markets for creative goods.
However these principles are not necessarily as prevalent in smaller markets. It could
be that if the market is new enough that the talent pool is seen as equal in which case
there is likely a feeling that individuals are starting off on the same level. Thus if there
are differences in outcome it could be that these differences would be perceived to be due
to effort. However the results show that satisfaction and fairness are highly dependent
on performance18 even in the small stylised market of the experiment. Performance has
been found to Thus the results point to the inherent perceived inequality in the creative
markets which exists even in the smaller markets.
What consequences do these results have on the utility within the market? First let us
assume that both satisfaction and fairness positively correlate with utility. This assump-
tion is not completely without support as the previous discussion did outline the strong
16higher satisfaction in non profits with high procedural fairness compared to profit seeking companies.
17At least largely not contingent on effort.
18Different types of performance, fairness was more dependent on how many times an individual ended
up ranked first while satisfaction increased incrementally as ranked increased.
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connection between fairness perceptions and well being. In addition satisfaction, almost
by definition, is positively correlates with utility as it is intrinsically tied to human wel-
fare as a concept. Effort a negative effect on satisfaction along with further evidence that
performance has a positive effect on job satisfaction (Christen, Iyer, and Soberman, 2006).
Thus satisfaction is maximised when effort is minimised while performance is maximised
i.e. the best possible outcome for the least possible effort. There is an automatic optimisa-
tion of the allocation of effort to maximise performance. This inspires questions, such as,
what happens to effort if it is hard or impossible to judge its effect on performance?
One might think that the riskier given performance level is to accomplish the lower the
allotted effort is going to be. However given the discussion in previous chapters, there
is significant evidence that individuals are allocating very high levels of effort into the
production of creative goods. Individuals are putting in effort to the point that they are
willing to use jobs outside of the creative industries in order to fund their production in
the creative fields. The key here is that this effort is taking place in a winner-takes-all mar-
ket with a very low probability of success in terms of becoming rich or famous. There is
also evidence tournament pay inducing high effort even thought the probability of mak-
ing the upper echelons of the distribution are small (ref). This high effort can, at least to
some extent, be attributed to over confidence (ref). Thus it has to be so that most individ-
uals putting in this high effort will inevitably be dissatisfied with their performance and
suffer from low utility. This effort is likely increase the quality of the products available
in the market and thus increases consumer utility.
5.4.4 Utility and Satisfaction
In this section the aim of the section is to discuss satisfaction and how it relates to utility.
In the case of the research the variable of interest is specifically performance satisfaction
and not satisfaction more generally. The discussion will start with a more general look
into satisfaction, what might constitute satisfaction, and how it might relate to the eco-
nomic concept of utility. The discussion will then be focused more on performance sat-
isfaction and what aspects might influence the levels of stated performance satisfaction.
Satisfaction will be discussed with reference to utility and so it is necessary to discuss
utility for the concepts in the discussion to be clear for a solid base for the discussion on
satisfaction.
Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin (1996) provide an excellent place to start the discus-
sion of utility, especially utility as it relates to satisfaction. Initially the discussion centres
around what utility is thought of as by economists. They point out that initially the defini-
tion of it was focused on the subjective feeling, such as, pleasure and pain which guide an
individual’s decision making. This interpretation changed to utility which was inferred
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from observed decisions which would then be used to explain the choices made. The two
utilities were referred to as experienced utility and decision, respectively (Kahneman,
Wakker, and Sarin, 1996). These concepts have also been used satisfaction research to
observe how satisfaction relates to utility, and specifically how does satisfaction manifest
itself in the overall discussion of utility. Satisfaction perceptions has been found to ex-
plain how well experienced utility has been maximised. This essentially means that the
difference between decision utility and the experienced utility dictates perceived satis-
faction (Levy-Garboua, Levy-Garboua, and Montmarquette, 2018). If experienced utility
is higher than the decision utility, i.e. the expected utility from a certain decision, then
satisfaction will be high, and vice versa. Similar findings indicate that a satisfaction gap,
the difference between expected and actual enjoyment, dictated how much individuals
were willing to pay in a pay what you want system (Rey-Biel et al., 2016). To simplify
satisfaction can be boiled down to the following.
Satis f action = Experienced Utility− Decision Utility
Where negative satisfaction is simply dissatisfaction. To use the same logic and ap-
ply it to performance satisfaction the equality can be changed to account for expected or
decision utility from performance and experienced utility from performance.
PS = EPU − PSU
PS = Per f ormance Satis f action
EPU = Experienced Per f ormance Utility
PDU = Per f ormance Decision Utility
Thus, the proposition is that the pathways of satisfaction would be constant, but the
concepts would differ slightly. This is to say that the idea that the gap between expec-
tations and experienced outcome dictate satisfaction in different domains, be it general
satisfaction or satisfaction in one’s performance or purchases. The key is that the gap
between expectations and outcomes dictates satisfaction. Observing the results there is
evidence of a discrepancy between satisfaction levels in the pay for performance groups
and the groups which received a flat rate. If satisfaction is indeed dictated by the equation
above then there is evidence that individuals have either higher expectations in the pay
groups, or significantly lower performance in the performance pay groups. In short the
gap between expectations and reality are wider in the performance pay groups.
Based on the previous discussion on effort it is likely the case that individuals in the
pay for performance groups have a higher expectation of performance compared to flat
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rate pay groups. Although strictly speaking the case is more likely the fact that the per-
formance has more salient consequences for the individuals utility.
5.4.5 Satisfaction as indicated by the Results
For a performance satisfaction gap to occur we would need to observe overconfidence or
an indication that expected performance was high while the actual outcomes would be
low, or visa versa. For this we observe, whether individuals thought they were more cre-
ative that 50% of the individuals and whether they thought they were more creative than
80% of the individuals. If the levels exceed 50% and 80% respectively, overconfidence can
be said to exist because it isn’t statistically possible for there to be more that 50% of peo-
ple who are more talented than 50% and 20% more talented than 80%. Results indicate
that there is overconfidence at both levels which suggests a consistent level of overconfi-
dence19. Approximately 36% of participants stated to be more creative than 80% of other
participants while approximately 68% of individuals stated being more creative than 50%
of other participants20.
Next overconfidence is compared to the pay-out structure which exists in the TP
groups and the explicit ranking which exists in the PI groups. This comparison would
suggest that, if people cared about the outcome of the experiments or tests, individuals
should be exhibiting lower satisfaction in the lower ranks. This indeed is the case as satis-
faction decreases as rank decreases. Interestingly the satisfaction levels in the TP groups
are significantly lower than in the non-TP groups. This suggests that overall satisfac-
tion levels are influenced by rank but are also significantly lower in pay groups, where
the rank has a higher consequence on their earnings. Similar effects have been observed
where under flat-rate compensation rank feedback had no effect of satisfaction but under
piece-rate or performance pay satisfaction depends on the feedback about relative posi-
tion (Azmat and Iriberri, 2016). In addition, as pay rank has been found to influence job
satisfaction with the lower earners, people who earned lower than the median, reporting
lower job satisfaction (Card et al., 2010). Although this is not strictly the case in the current
research there is evidence satisfaction was significantly lower in the pay groups although
performance was positively correlated with performance satisfaction in all groups.
The influence of rank on satisfaction is an interesting one and it is important to be
clear about the hypothesised direction of the effect. It is hypothesised that high perfor-
mance may lead to higher satisfaction, and not the reverse (Ramser, 1972). Although
the relationship has also been found to be bidirectional in nature (Factor, 1982). This has
19Admittedly the overconfidence measures are not specific to their expected performance but they do
non-the-less give some indication of overall confidence or expectation of high relative performance.
20Results shown in appendix.
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also been supported, at least partly, by findings that satisfaction and motivation have a
positive relation between each other (Snoeker, 2010). Thus exactly what influences satis-
faction can be difficult to measure as positive feedback loops, like discussed earlier, can
exist. Positive feedback loops, such as the previous, further strengthen the influence of
performance on performance satisfaction as early success influences satisfaction which
in turn positively influences later performance. This feedback loop could cause further
inequality in the market as the rich or successful get richer and more successful and can
make mobility within the market more difficult.
5.4.6 Fairness and Satisfaction
Based on only the results from the previous section there is evidence that there is a strong
relation between reward fairness and performance satisfaction. The general relationship
between fairness considerations and reported satisfaction is widely studied. The general
concept of fairness was discussed earlier with the conclusion that, in the market for cre-
ative goods, it is impossible to find a “fair” or equitable allocation. This is due to the
distribution within the market cannot be changed so that everyone is better off. The con-
ditions of pareto efficiency are always violated when there is an attempt to redistribute
earnings or modify the pay-out structure.
The results indicate a strong relationship between reward fairness perceptions and
performance satisfaction. Existing literature shows a strong causal link between fairness
perceptions and perceived satisfaction (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Lau, Wong, and
Eggleton, 2008; Tortia, 2006). This is interesting especially as the results suggest this is
only the case when performance pay is present, which would strongly suggest that there
is a relationship between rewards fairness perceptions and the satisfaction in one’s own
performance. This effect is present even when multiple performance measures are con-
trolled for. The consequences of this relationship on the individuals experienced are not
as clear as the reported level of fun were not influenced as strongly by the existence of
performance pay. The TP-only groups showed significantly lower fun compared to all
other treatment groups, thus there was no consistent effect of tournament pay on the re-
ported levels of fun. This would suggest that even though satisfaction was lower it does
not necessarily mean that overall experienced utility was lower in those groups.
Fairness and satisfaction have been found to show similar “loss aversion” character-
istics to what is detailed in Kahneman and Traversky’s Prospect Theory in 1979. Specif-
ically, the pain associated with receiving a lower salary was greater than the pleasure
associated with receiving a higher salary but with the same magnitude of difference to
the reference salaries. The same study also found that if a salary was lower than the
reference salary it was viewed as much less fair while if the salary was higher by the
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same magnitude it was only seen as less fair (Ordóñez et al., 2009). These findings are
in line with later findings from paper by Traversky and Kahneman 1986 which found
that individuals used a reference point to compare outcomes to, and this reference point
could be manipulated using framing (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). Thus, there is a
strong indication that the reason there is a difference in satisfaction is that there is a dif-
ference in the frame of the experiment such that there is an increase in an individual’s
expectations of success overall. In turn this would increase the gap between experienced
performance utility and performance decision utility which is highly dependent on the
expectations set. Since there was no difference in relative rank between treatment groups
the difference in expectations between these groups would cause the observed difference
in performance satisfaction levels.
Finding that fairness perceptions are related with job performance might not on their
own be surprising. However, uncertainty has been found to moderate the positive rela-
tionship between job satisfaction and job performance, as uncertainty rises the stronger
the relationship between job performance and job satisfaction (Diekmann, Barsness, and
Sondak, 2004). This would suggest that not only was the stylised market seen as quite
uncertain as there was a strong link between the two, but also that decreasing this un-
certainty could have positive influences on the willingness to take part in the market for
creative goods as a producer.
What policy makers can do in terms of fairness is to focus on a level playing field
between market participants where there is not systematic bias toward any group of mar-
ket participants. For example, a policy objective which could increase fairness within the
market would be to guarantee the possibility of moving up the hierarchy of the payment
distribution by working for an egalitarian market set up as possible. Copyright is seen as
violating this egalitarian market competition by allowing for a monopoly of an expression
which can tilt the market or game in the favour of the copyright holder. This is evident
in the discussion of copyright consequences in chapter 1. This is claim does have support
in existing literature which highlights the importance of procedural fairness perceptions
on satisfaction (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Tortia, 2006). This could potentially also
be extended to the bargaining situations within the market so that systematic differences
in bargaining power which could manifest “unfair” outcomes could be minimised when
possible to do so without distorting the market.
Fairness, and in this case reward fairness, does influence the market experience in-
directly. Fairness perceptions influence job satisfaction within the market through two
general processes, one is through outcomes, the other through trust in the superior or
organisational commitment (Lau, Wong, and Eggleton, 2008). This further supports the
claim that a “fair game” or equal opportunity in the market is critical as the role of the
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organisation is to maintain advancement possibilities in to secure high productivity and
satisfaction. Otherwise there is a risk that the individual will think that their effort is not
likely to be recognised in the form of a raise or increased opportunity and thus put in less
effort (Perista and Quintal, 2010).
In the context of copyright policy this is crucial as there is a distinct conflict between
securing a motive to create through copyright and incentivising future after the copyright
because the copyright itself restricts future creation and potential sequential innovations
based on the copyrighted work. There conflict between the constituents at the top of the
hierarchy who have the motive to monopolise the market and the constituents at the bot-
tom of the hierarchy who want open access to increase the possibility to innovate and
carve up their own peace of the market. It is best for the market for these two forces to be
in equilibrium where no one force is controlling the market to maximise the incentive. If
there is a monopoly then the market is inaccessible and there exists no motive to create,
while if there is no way to carve out market share it is equally catastrophic to the mo-
tive to create. The main aim of policy should be to work toward a level or fair playing
field between the two forces are in an equilibrium where it is possible to carve out some
market share but impossible to force out competition which inevitably works to promote
innovation and overall welfare. Although some suggest that fairness may be tempered
or decreased by the fight to survive in the market (Schotter, Weiss, and Zapater, 1996).
5.5 Conclusion
The chapter has focused on the copyright markets and how individual perceive such mar-
kets. The focus was largely on satisfaction and fairness with mentions about envy and
perceived fun. There is a strong relationship between satisfaction and fairness percep-
tions where fairness perceptions are found to positively correlate with satisfaction (Sind-
hav et al., 2006; Christen, Iyer, and Soberman, 2006). Although these might not sound
like terms economists might be interested there are studies in economics which indicate
they have very real consequences for individual utility and so have very real economic
consequences. Low job satisfaction, for example, can cause individuals to decrease effort
or even quit a job (Mitchell and Albright, 1972; Devonish, 2018; Eidukaite, 2016; Perista
and Quintal, 2010). These studies are largely done with organisations, but the results
translate to the largely freelance world of the creative industries as well.
The results discussed in earlier sections indicate there is a lower level of satisfaction in
pay for performance treatment groups. Suggesting that this type of pay structure could
suffer from lower effort and even higher rates of turnover compared to a flat rate pay
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structure in the long run. These lower levels of satisfaction strongly correlate with re-
ward fairness. These results strongly mirror similar findings in business organisation and
consumer research reaffirming the relationship between fairness and satisfaction. Inter-
estingly however the relationship was only present with performance pay and not when
there was fixed rate pay. This is not to say satisfaction was only tied to performance
when performance pay was present, as similar effects took place in non-performance pay
groups. However the overall satisfaction level was lower in the performance pay groups.
This strongly points to reward fairness perceptions strongly influencing the individuals
satisfaction levels. There is strong evidence that lower satisfaction in performance pay
groups is an economic reality which is likely to also influence individuals effort and pro-
duction decisions in the long-run.
Ensuring that there are more than just the market to fund projects involving creativity,
and which extends to innovation more generally, has a clear advantage. As discussed
in Klamer 2007 it is important to have different funding methods for the arts. The paper
focuses on three main methods: First. The market, second. Government grants, and third.
Patronage (Klamer and Petrova, 2007). The third, patronage, is fast becoming popular
even as a funding method/opportunity as sites, such as, Patrion or GoFundMe connect
interested patrons with creative types and innovators. One can go out on a limb and
say that the market for creative and innovative goods will always exists. Public funding
for the arts is highly dependent on the country and sometimes even which party power.
However, results in this chapter and in existing literature on satisfaction do suggest that a
fixed or flat pay can work to increase satisfaction levels and influence effort and retention
of talent within the market.
If there is an effort to have some grants in these markets it could work to help retain
talent in the market who, might otherwise exit the market, and who have experience
and skills from previous involvement in the market. This could help to provide a wide
range of possible funding sources and help to increase creative production. In terms
of copyright policy the best government can do is to balance the monopolising aspect
of copyright with its incentivising aspect in order to provide a level playing field for
incumbents and new market arrivals where the two can compete fairly. There is evidence
this is not the case as copyright terms are sub optimally long (Pollock, 2009). There is
even some evidence that disregarding copyright could increase overall welfare (Handke,
2010). Hence a more flexible or industry specific copyright could also be beneficial as the
blanket incentive is inflexible.
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Conclusion
The results gathered will be discussed here in terms of their contribution to the existing
research and how they are relevant toward the analysis of markets for creative goods.
The methodology is discussed and a case made for the legitimacy of the methodology
as an instrument to study the markets for creative goods. This is relevant specifically to
the markets for creative goods, as they exhibit unique production processes which rarely
exhibit the same mechanical production process found in more traditional markets for
goods. Obviously there is a spectrum of different types of goods, from music for example,
which is produced once and then copied multiple times as compared to a painting, which
is one of a kind and not reproduced1. The heterogeneous nature of the market is likely a
reason why the experimental method is not widely used, as it can be difficult to generalise
results from experiments. However, it will be argued that the methodology can offer new
insights into markets for creative goods research.
The research presented in this thesis is most relevant to the field of applied or em-
pirical economics. Although the methodology is heavily influenced by copyright and
more generally the philosophy behind intellectual property law, the thesis contribution
lies largely in the methodology created and used for the purposes of the thesis. Though
the results lacked conclusiveness, they did show potential for a research agenda in the
empirical research on copyright law and related markets. Issues such as the small size of
the sample caused the results to lack the statistical strength necessary for stronger more
definitive results. In addition, a field experiment or a natural experiment coupled with
results from an experiment with more conclusive results would be necessary for any ro-
bust policy recommendation to be possible. There is some indication that both pay struc-
ture and the availability of information regarding the actions and performance of other
competitors can influence creativity. There is even evidence that there is some interac-
tion/crowding out of these incentives, where pay structure on its own influence produc-
tion/creativity but would not necessarily have the same effect when combined with the
availability of information.
1There are prints and pictures of the painting but these can be convincingly argued to be separate goods.
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These results are not definitive but rather should be viewed as feedback about the
methodology. This feedback indicates that if some of the weaknesses, such as sample
size, were the methodology would have a good chance of producing statistically stronger
results. Different disciplines of research in the social sciences can have a different view
of what constitutes a contribution to new knowledge. The interdisciplinary nature of
the research presented requires some discussion in order to gain perspective on what
is considered a contribution to new knowledge in each discipline. It may also highlight
where and why there are differences in the way the problems of motivating creativity and
motivation more generally would be viewed between the disciplines. The philosophy
of two important disciplines to this thesis, economics and law, will be discussed in the
context of the scientific philosophy of Karl Popper, Thomas S. Kuhn, and Imre Lakatos
and how they relate to the creation of knowledge in economics, law, and the economics
of law. This discussion is designed to give a general context of where this research might
fit and what its contributions might be within these disciplines.
6.1 Scientific Philosophy of Law and Economics
In previous sections there has been discussion about the philosophy behind the utilitarian
justifications for copyright and Lockean labour theory in common law countries versus
the Kantian natural rights justifications for copyright in civil law countries. Philosophical
differences between the fields of economics and law offer a good window into how the
fields differ in their approach to science. Key scientific thinkers, such as Popper, Lakatos,
and Kuhn, have greatly influenced the way researchers approach the scientific method
and what method or knowledge is considered to be “scientific”.
Karl Popper argued for what was called ‘falsification’, essentially stating that proper
scientific method allows for a theory or hypothesis to be falsified, i.e. a theory is set out so
that is can be proven wrong or ‘falsified’. The reason falsifiability was important to him
was because it did not allow for the theory to be circular and thus allowed it to be open to
scientific scrutiny (Popper, 1992, p. 32-42). As a continuation of the falsification principle
and as a key part of scientific honesty, Popper argued that it was important for authors
to specify in advance under which conditions the authors would be willing to give up
their theory (Lakatos, 1978, p. 125; Popper, 1992, p. 198-199). Popper also warned that the
‘classical’ system might not be taking evidence against their theories into consideration
or were disregarding their findings using ad hoc adaptations of their theory. Here Popper
advocated that the scientific community hold on to the idea of falsification (Popper, 1992,
p. 59-60). The main focus of these theories is to create some guidelines for a generalised
scientific method so that the same formula can be used to create new scientific knowledge.
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This is especially important when compared with the circular arguments, which cannot
be proven wrong and are similar to a belief which cannot be scrutinised for its reliability
like a falsifiable theory or statement can.
Thomas S. Kuhn had some ideas about scientific knowledge differing from Popper’s,
and his approaches leaned heavily on the idea of consensus in the scientific commu-
nity and the history of scientific knowledge. There was great focus on what he called
paradigms2 and how they changed within a paradigm, according to what he termed
‘normal science’, and how one scientific paradigm changed to another, a phenomenon
he referred to as a ‘revolution’. When referring to normal science, Kuhn emphasised the
role of history and the scientific community in the progression of science. He stated that
normal science was research based on historical scientific achievements which the given
scientific community has acknowledged as the foundation for further scientific discovery
(Kuhn, 1970, p. 10). Note the role of the scientific community as the gate keepers of new
knowledge, since without the acceptance of the scientific community something cannot
or should not be considered science according to Kuhn. For Kuhn a revolution was a
significant shift resulting in a new paradigm that changes the most elementary theoreti-
cal generalisations, paradigm methods, and applications in the field (Kuhn, 1970, p. 84).
This type of change within a field indicates a developmental pattern of a mature science
(Kuhn, 1970, p. 12). However, he did also comment that paradigm shifts were unlikely
to be quick and used quotes by Max Plank and Darwin to support his point that these
changes were likely to come about when the new generation of scientists took over from
the established scientific community (Kuhn, 1970, p. 151).
The writings of Imre Lakatos can, at least in some respects, be viewed as a middle
ground between Kuhn and Popper. Lakatos rejects Popper’s ideas about falsifications
through a crucial experiment, stating that what distinguishes science from pseudoscience
is the scientific method not the theories. Thus, an important aspect of science is not the
theories but the method when deciding if something is science or pseudoscience. He con-
tinues by arguing that scientific achievement is not an isolated hypothesis but rather a
research program with a core law or theory and a protective belt of auxiliary hypothe-
ses (Lakatos, 1978, p. 4). Thus, he emphasised the research program over the singular
hypothesis or theory and promoted the idea that a research program is not singular but
rather a body of work. This line of argumentation is strengthened by the statement that
there is no ‘revolution’ as Kuhn suggested, no ‘crucial experiment’ falsifying a theory as
suggested by Popper, but rather an evolution of a research program being taken over by
another over time (Lakatos, 1978, p. 6). However, he does not completely refute Kuhn’s
2An example of a paradigm could be the focus on Newtonian physics pushed aside the previously
prevailing theories on motion and energy. This shows how the field of physics moved from one paradigm
to another caused by new and accepted discoveries in the field.
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theories, as he does view history and science as important and largely agrees with Kuhn
on the idea that programs develop or ‘problem shift’ similarly to the Kuhnian idea of nor-
mal science or changes within a paradigm (Lakatos, 1978, p. 46-47). However, Lakatos
did show apprehension about Kuhn suggestion that the scientific community should be
the judge of research programs, through historical examples Lakatos cited, such as when
the scientific community argued against Galileo’s laws of free fall and Newton’s theory of
gravitation (Lakatos, 1978, p. 86). Finally, Lakatos argued against the idea of a demarca-
tion rule, i.e. conditions which, if met, would lead to a theory being ‘falsified’ in the eyes
of the creator. Lakatos argues that some of the best scientific achievements were ‘unscien-
tific’ continuing that demarcation criterion are difficult, if not impossible, for the author
of a theory or research program to set out in advance (Lakatos, 1978, p. 146-148).
6.1.1 Philosophy of science, Economics, and Law
This discussion focuses on Popper because his scientific philosophy of falsification is a
key aspect of the criticism by many economists of theories in the field of law. These philo-
sophical arguments relate also to the argument that the economics of law is a positive or
normative science, as it is argued that the field attempts to align itself with the natural
sciences but fails in this as a science because their theories are not falsifiable and thus not
positive or Popperian (Crespi, 1991). Similarly, it is argued that prominent authors in the
field of the economics of law often violate the falsification criterion and cannot be con-
sidered science if Popper’s criterion is applied (De Geest, 1996). The author continues by
citing the philosophy of Lakatos and Kuhn and noting that, even if a part of a theory can
be falsified, it can still be considered to be science because it can be a part of a larger pro-
gram of scientific enquiry (De Geest, 1996). Economics is generally closer to the natural
sciences than the approach generally taken in the field of law3 (Posner and Parisi, 2016b,
para. 2; Hovenkamp, 1990; Friedman 1953 p. 3-43). Economics4 is not, at least not uni-
formly, considered a Popperian science due to its unrealistic assumptions and perceived
reliance on universal statements that cannot be observed empirically (Rowley, 1981; De
Geest, 1996). The realism of the arguments themselves is not necessarily relevant either,
as it can be argued that it is enough that they cannot be subjected to empirical testing,
that this in itself makes it non-scientific from the Popperian perspective (Jackson, 1984).
Although there remain questions about the feasibility of the use of falsification and the
Popperian approach, this has been found to remain a popular philosophical backdrop for
the economic approach (Caldwell, 1991). The Popperian approach in the economics of
3The authors specified Anglo-American law traditions in this case is Popperian or positivist
4Thus also neoclassical law and economics
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law derived from its use in economics, even though there remain doubts about its appro-
priateness in the field5.
The theories of Kuhn and Lakatos can be viewed, at least to some extent, as a reaction
to Popper’s philosophy of falsification and demarcation. Legal research methodology
can be thought of as being Kuhnian paradigmatic process (Salzberger, 2007). This is very
different compared to the Popperian approach of Friedman and wider economics litera-
ture. To some extent this juxtaposition of the philosophy of law and economics shows the
difficulties of interdisciplinary research in the two areas, as it is hard to adjust research
to fit opposing philosophical backgrounds. Kuhn has been criticised when discussing
the methodology of economics because of his seemingly ‘ambiguous’ concepts of the
paradigm and the shift or jump from one paradigm to the next. The author continues
by leaning towards the philosophical approach taken by Lakatos as a more appropriate
approach for economics compared to Kuhn, in general viewing Lakatos as a mixture of
Popperian and Khunian philosophies (Blaug, 1975). However, the philosophy of Lakatos
is not necessarily seen as appropriate for economics due to its inability to accommodate
the demands of elegance on the construction of economic theory (Khalil, 1987). In fact,
some go even further and state that the Popperian, Khunian, and Lakatosian approaches
used to justify the research methods used by legal economics all have major shortcomings
(De Geest, 1996). While others argue that the economics of law is still quite a new field
and is in a pre-paradigmatic stage (Boumans and Davis, 2015, p. 116).
The Popperian view of falsification can be seen as a hard and fast rule for the judgment
of scientific truth, which is why it is quite an attractive rule to use. The problem is that it
is as if scientists using the Popperian approach are assuming the existence of an absolute
scientific truth. That all contributions which do not strictly conform to the Popperian
standard would be untrue or worth excluding from the conversation. Kuhn takes into
account the gray area of knowledge in his idea of a research program which includes the
history of knowledge to create scientific knowledge. The problem here is that in order for
new knowledge to be considered scientifically legitimate ,there must be consensus among
the scientific community. This in turn is a problem due to the tendency of the scientific
community to be dogmatic, as pointed out by Lakatos when referring to the example of
Galileo (Lakatos, 1978, p. 86). Thus, the creation of knowledge is much like a Foucault-
like discourse, as described by Lakatos, where arguments evolve and only the strongest
arguments survive the test of the discourse.
It may be difficult to pin down the appropriate philosophical approach in analysing
5It should be said that not all of economics is Popperian, but there is a general tendency in that field to
adopt the Popperian approach.
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scientific rigour or even the legitimacy of theories. A large reason for the heated de-
bate seems to be the clashing of underlying philosophies within the different schools of
thought which ultimately seem to conflict with ideologies held by researchers in differ-
ent fields. Thus, to some extent the philosophical discussion has more to do with the
justification of a methodology or school of thought as science or as compared to a true
philosophical discussion on the reliability of the underlying science or knowledge cre-
ated. This is the philosophical context which this thesis attempts to fit into by combin-
ing approaches from fields with very different philosophical backgrounds into a method
combining knowledge from all related fields into a new potential research program. This
is done by carefully combining aspects of different fields and carefully justifying the ap-
proach as demonstrated in section 3.
The contribution of this thesis fits best into the field of experimental/empirical eco-
nomics, where the method used to recreate a dynamic market is new. In a Popperian
sense the results of the research do not unequivocally falsify existing theories of the role
of incentives such as public information or tournament pay on creativity, although some
perspective can be gained on the topics. It is not clear that the research fits directly into
a Kuhnian type of paradigm either because it is so recent and because of its interdisci-
plinary approach makes it hard to fit into an existing research program. However, this
research does contribute to the general discussion of how interdisciplinary research might
be conducted, the key contribution being the methodology of creating a stylised market
for creative output, as well as for other applications. This contribution is closest to a
Lakatosian contribution to a research program of experimental economics more gener-
ally. The key contribution of the results in this thesis is to contribute to the discussions
taking place on the role incentives such as, public information and tournament pay play
in creative performance. Some results do support existing research programs which in
turn support the legitimacy of the methodology, as it can be used to reproduce existing
findings and so contribute to existing research programs.
6.2 Results
6.2.1 Creative Output in a Market Context
Although the evidence was not conclusive there is some evidence that public informa-
tion or attribution was important to market participants, as it in some cases incentivised
higher production and in other cases deleted an effect which was present when only tour-
nament i.e. economic rights was present. However, the results were not strong enough
to base theories or any policy recommendations on them but rather showed that there is
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evidence of effects which could be stronger if a second improved version of the experi-
ment is run with a larger population. There was some indication that public information
can influence how individuals compete in the market, as under the public information
conditions individuals tended to focus on increasing production or market share. These
incentives can influence decision-making and concern for reputation can drive individu-
als to want to protect their ideas and for these ideas to be presented in certain ways. These
results have no direct parallel in existing theory. Hence this an avenue through which this
thesis shows potential for a new research agenda in the future. There are comparative
studies on the influence of attribution rights has been found to influence the willingness
to sell a good even taking into account the endowment effect Buccafusco and Sprigman,
2010. The experiments in this thesis do show evidence that public information6 influ-
enced creative production by influencing how individuals compete in the market. These
findings support the findings Buccafusco and Sprigman (2010) showing that creators do
place importance and even value on attribution. Similar results were found in Marcin
and Nicklisch (2014), findings indicated that there is an endowment effect when default
rules exist, of which attribution rights could be one. The results from existing studies and
the results in this thesis support further research on the effect of public information and
attribution on the market leading to efficient market outcomes.
6.2.2 Satisfaction and Fairness
Fairness perceptions were clarified in the experiment, not only by performance measures,
but also by whether individuals thought they would do more in creative fields and if
they had family working in the creative fields. The results indicated that perception of
fairness are dependent on performance to some degree but is significantly influenced
by an individual’s familiarity with the creative fields. However, satisfaction which was
affected only by performance measures is highly performance dependent but unaffected
by differences between individuals and fits in with the theory proposed by Kahneman,
Wakker, and Sarin (1996). The authors outlined their proposal that satisfaction is the
difference between actualised utility and the expected utility Kahneman, Wakker, and
Sarin (1996). The lower satisfaction in performance pay/economic rights groups suggests
that individuals experience lower utility which may be caused by overconfidence in their
potential for success, as their expected utility was higher compared to treatments with no
performance pay. This can explain to some extent the oversupply in creative markets, as
there is evidence there could be systematic overconfidence by creators. This could cause
6i.e. Public information was the variable used to model the attribution right
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the market to be filled mostly young artists, as the older artists might leave after a period
of low satisfaction as discussed in chapter 5.
6.3 Contribution
The results were not conclusive but do show potential for a future research program and
for methodology utilising a lab experiment with a dynamic market mechanism. Over-
all there is some support for the theory that there should be an array of funding options
available to creators. This would provide the freedom of the market but also with possi-
ble support from grants and patrons as forwarded by Klamer and Petrova (2007) can also
decrease market turnover and provide an incentive for more experienced market partic-
ipants to remain in the market. Since the results were not consistent between tasks, the
findings also indicated that copyright is not a singular incentive with a universal effect
on all production in the creative industries. Rather there was evidence that incentives
provided by copyright can influence markets in various ways depending on the task or
markets type.
The discussion on satisfaction and fairness does support findings in existing literature
and does provide interesting results on how the market structure influences the individ-
ual experience. Satisfaction was shown to be highly dependent on performance and the
pay structure, which indicates that there were lower levels of satisfaction in tournament
pay groups, which decreased the overall experienced utility. This was likely due to the
participants’ overconfidence in the probability of their success as deduced from survey
results. The findings support existing theories on the potential overconfidence in artists
in the creative industries (Abbing, 2011, p. 199). Although the results are interesting the
most significant contribution of the thesis is the experimentation with the experimen-
tal methodology. The methodology explores how a dynamic market can be created and
highlights how this could be done. This provides potential for a research program that
can work toward simulating more effectively markets such as those affected by copyright.
This methodology can be expanded to lab experimentation aiming to simulate dynamic
markets more generally.
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A.0.1 Controls
Controls Used in All Regressions
Variable Reason Cite
Creative Efficacy Confidence can correlate with creativity Bandura (2006)
Risk Taking Behaviour Risk attitudes correlate with pay preferences Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)
Ambiguous Risk Creative Market exibit ambiguous risk Charness and Grieco (2014 )
Handedness Left handedness associated with creativity Wolman (2012), Coren (1995)
Creative Family Environment has a large effect on creativity Hennessay (2010), Abbing (2010)
More in Creative Fields Do people think they can make more in arts? Abbing (2011)
Famous Due to Art Do people want to become famous due to art? Abbing (2011)
English Speaking Performance can depend on language skills
Age Age can affect creativity
Institution Dummy Environment has a large effect on creativity Hennessay (2010), Abbing (2010)
Art Hobby Dummy Can be a proxy for intrinsic motivation
A.0.2 Multicollinearity Checks
The VIF or variance inflation factor test was used to test for multicollinearity i.e. a VIF
over 2.5. There was high multicollinearity in some session dummies and the interaction
term between ER and AR. The multicollinearity in the interaction term (AR & ER) can be
ignored as the multicollinearity does not affect the p-values. Also the collinearity in the
session dummies can be ignored as they are not variables of interest.
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TABLE A.1: VIF For all Controls When Regressed Against Total Creativity
Variable VIF 1/VIF
Tournament Pay Only (TP) 2.26 0.44208
Public Information (PI) 2.18 0.459513
PI \& TP 3.27 0.305454
Male* 1.13 0.882681
Creative Efficacy Score 1.12 0.895425
Creative family Members* 1.09 0.918787
English Speaking* 1.14 0.877044
Risk Aversion 1.09 0.918026
Willingness for Ambiguous Risk 1.14 0.877584
Righthanded* 1.61 0.622374
Prefer to be Famous not Rich* 1.11 0.898809
Earn More in Creative Industries* 1.17 0.856625
Artshobby* 1.28 0.77854
GSA* 1.41 0.710972
Session 1* 2.32 0.431188
Session 2* 2.47 0.404466
Session 3* 1.88 0.532519
Session 4* 2.21 0.451509
Session 5* 1.86 0.537168
Session 6* 2.54 0.394101
Session 7* 1.88 0.532972
Mean VIF 1.72
* Denotes dummy variables
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TABLE A.2: VIF For all Controls When Regressed Against Total Solved with
Both Ranks
Variable VIF 1/VIF
Session 6* 2.77 0.361149
Session 2* 2.6 0.384615
Session 1* 2.4 0.416685
Session 4* 2.22 0.450765
Session 3* 1.94 0.515275
Session 8* 1.89 0.530403
Session 5* 1.88 0.530777
Public Information (PI)* 1.62 0.616604
Tournament Pay Only (TP)* 1.62 0.617118
Righthanded* 1.58 0.630917
PI & TP * 1.56 0.640882
GSA* 1.44 0.696369
Arts Hobby* 1.27 0.786777
Age 1.26 0.79539
Creative Efficacy Score 1.21 0.827462
Willingness for Ambiguous Risk 1.2 0.834397
English Speaking* 1.2 0.836371
Prefer to be Famous not Rich* 1.17 0.852827
Male* 1.15 0.87118
Earn More in Creative Industries* 1.15 0.871712
Figural Task Rank 1.14 0.876648
Risk Aversion 1.12 0.88891
Divergent Task Rank 1.11 0.898987
Creative family Members* 1.09 0.917417
Mean VIF 1.57
* Denotes dummy variables
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A.0.3 Random Allocation Check
TABLE A.3: Correlation Between Treatment Groups and Individual Charas-
teristics
Treatment Group
Treatment Group 1
Age -0.05
Male 0.1173
Institution -0.0099
Year of Degree 0.0288
There is a relatively strong correlation between being male and being in a group with
economic rights.
A.0.4 Pre Experiment Survey
Entry Survey
N.B. The participants will see this in a program with dropdown menus and proper
examples and so it is visually easier to understand. The participation in this experiment
and questionnaire is optional and the participant can withdraw at any point, no questions
asked. It should take around 5 minutes to complete. All information will be kept confi-
dential and is for research purposes only. Your answers matter to us and help improve
our research.
1. Age =
2. Gender Identification =
3. Do you think you are more creative than 80% of your fellow art students the room?
(yes/no)
4. Year of current Degree =
5. If you had to choose between being rich or famous as a result of the art you create,
which would it be?
a. Rich
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b. Famous
6. Do you think you are more creative than 50% of your fellow art students the room?
a. Yes
b. No
7. Imagine you are presented with the opportunity of taking part in a coin toss. You are
given six different options for how you will be paid depending on if it is heads (low) or
tails (high). Which option would you choose? (choose only one)
Choice of outcomes 50% Low 50% High
Option # 1 £28 £28
Option # 2 £24 £36
Option # 3 £20 £44
Option # 4 £16 £52
Option # 5 £12 £60
Option # 6 £2 £70
8. Imagine that tomorrow you are seeking a job outside the arts, for example, accountant,
social worker. Please use the following scale to indicate your confidence from 0 to 100 in
relation to each question.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Cannot Moderately highly cer-
tain
do at all Can do can
do
Confidence (0-100)
Requesting a job application form.
Completing a job application form.
Producing a curriculum vitae (CV).
General interview skills.
Oral self-presentation at the interview.
Meeting new people.
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Contributing to a work related meeting or discussion.
Working with a team.
Working on your own.
Career progression.
9. Please use the scale to answer how confident you are about the following statements.
Assume the maths being referred to consist of only addition, subtraction, multiplication,
and division problems.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Cannot Moderately highly cer-
tain
do at all Can do can
do
Confidence (0-100)
I’m confident that I can do an excellent job on my maths tests.
I’m Certain I could understand the most difficult material
presented in math textbooks.
I am confident I can do an excellent job on my math assignments.
I am certain I can master the skills taught in my math class.
I’m confident I can understand the most difficult material presented
by my math teacher.
10. Please use the following scale to answer how confident you are about the given state-
ments.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Cannot Moderately highly cer-
tain
do at all Can do can
do
Confidence (0-100)
I feel that I am good at generating novel or innovative ideas.
I am good at finding creative ways to solve problems
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I have confidence in my ability to solve problems.
I have a knack/skill for further developing the ideas of others.
I feel that I am more creative than others on my course.
A.0.5 Post Experiment Survey
Exit Survey
The participation in this experiment and questionnaire is optional and the participant
can withdraw at any point, no questions asked. All information will be kept confidential
and is for research purposes only. Your answers matters to us it would be appreciated if
you would take the time to answer all questions.
11. Do you have any siblings or close family members working in the creative indus-
tries (movies, tv, writer etc.)?
12. Have you been to an art school before the institution you attend now?
a. Yes
b. No
13. Have you gone to a Steiner School or a Waldorf school?
14. Do you think you could make more money in the long run if you chose a field outside
of the arts (for example, student of non-arts or an alternative career) compared to a career
in the arts (painter, musician, etc).
a. Yes
b. No
14b. If yes, give your best estimate of how much more do you think you could
earn per year in pounds?
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15. Please list any previously earned graduate/university level degrees.
16. How satisfied are you with your overall performance in the experiment?
a. Very satisfied
b. Satisfied
c. Quite satisfied
d. Quite unsatisfied
e. Unsatisfied
f. Very unsatisfied
17. Which country and city did you grow up in until you were 18? (please indicate coun-
try or countries along with an approximate postcode)
18. Assuming you gain £200 would you prefer to. . . (Choose the preferred answer)
a. Have a 50% chance of receiving £300 and a 50% chance of receiving £100
b. Have a 50% chance of receiving £400 and a 50% chance of receiving £0
c. Have a 10% chance of receiving £1500 and a 90% chance of receiving £0
d. Stay at £200
19. Assuming you could risk up to £100 but the probability of winning would be un-
known, how many pounds of the £100 would you be willing to risk?
20. Which would you prefer?
a. Receive £180 with a 100% probability
b. Have a 50% of winning £400 and a 50% of receiving £0
21. How much fun did you have or how much did you enjoy the experiment from a scale
of 1-10? (1 being the least possible enjoyment and 10 being the most possible enjoyment)
22. Are you right handed, left handed, or ambidextrous?
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23. What are your hobbies or an activity in which you spend 5 or more hours a week (for
example a sport or club or society you belong to)?
24. Assume you have £200 and had the chance to risk £5 to have a 50% to win £10, would
you either. . .
a. Stay at £200
b. 50% chance of gaining £5 (to have a total of £205) and a 50% of losing £5 (To have
a total of £195)
25. How fair did you find the rewards in the experiment?
a. Highly unfair
b. Unfair
c. Quite unfair
d. Quite fair
e. Fair
f. Very fair
26. Would you wish to change places with any other participant in the experiment, as-
suming you put in the same effort as they did for the pay they received?
A.0.6 Creativity Instructions
Judgement criterion for both tasks
In the excel file given task 1 is market as “0” in the task column and task 2 is market
as “1”. Each participant participated in both tasks but there is one case in session 7 where
an individual only submitted ideas for the second of the two tasks.
Please go through one task at a time, it will make the process easier and clearer.
After each individual there is a table with the 4 criterions Flexibility, Originality, hu-
mour, and sarcasm. The scores can be inserted into the cells of the table when you are
finished. How exactly each criterion will be scored will be explained next.
I will also ask you to rate your favourite ideas from the two tasks by giving them stars
from 5 (the most) to 0 (if you feel the ideas do not warrant stars). Not all individuals need
170 Appendix A. Chapter 3 Appendix
to receive stars and there is no minimum or maximum amount of stars that need to be
given. If you think the idea is very good, or one of your favourites put a 5, then 4 for
ideas which are almost as good, etc. The scale from 5-1 stars is supposed to be a simple
scale to show how much you like an idea. If the idea does not warrant a star simply leave
a 0 or leave the cell blank. At least half of the cells should be blank, i.e. at most only half
of the ideas get some stars. These should not be distributed individually, meaning that
some individuals could have stars for every idea while others receive none. Simply put
the amount of stars you think an idea should have into the cell which is highlighted in
green. This is to speed up the scoring process and also to add some meaning to the stars.
Remember this judging process is anonymous. No one will receive feedback from what
scores they received.
In “sheet 2” in the excel file sent there is a table where you can fill in the scores for
criterions Flexibility, Originality, humour, and sarcasm. You also received the printouts
of the ideas separated by session and task, it might be easier to judge the 4 criterion using
the paper but please fill in the excel table when you are finished scoring.
Flexibility
It will be scored by observing how many categories, from the ones listed, the ideas from
each individual fall into. Note you have been given a file which has the creator identifier
code, the task and the title and the description of the ideas. The fluency categories are
different for the two tasks but there are 7 in total for both. If there is an idea which might
not fit into any category perfectly see where it might fit in the best. The maximum the
fluency score can be is 7 and the minimum is 0 but only if there were 0 entries. If there
was one entry then the fluency score will also be one. The aim is to see how many dif-
ferent categories the individuals ideas fit into. If every idea the person entered fitted into
the weapon category their flexibility score was 1. If the ideas fit into “weapon” and “dec-
orative/beauty item” then the flexibility score would be 2. Thus the maximum different
categories the ideas can fit into is 7 and the minimum 0 (only if 0 ideas are submitted).
Flexibility = How many categories are represented by the individuals ideas You are
given 7 categories.
Divergent Task Flexibility Criterion
1. Weapon (Item which is used to hurt or gain control over another)
2. Decorative/beauty Item (including items such as Knick knacks, art objects)
3. Stationary or adhesive (stapler, paper weight)
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4. Household item (shoe horn, camera holder, pin)
5. Medical item (stress relief, prosthetic limb, ear piercer)
6. Coping tool (printer, printing press, stamp)
Task 2 Flexibility Criterion
1. Non-animal Nature (includes maps, views of nature and descriptions of nature)
2. Life (includes humans, animals, insects etc.)
3. Food ( reference to foods)
4. Feeling, Emotion or theory (humanising or representation of a situation feeling, or
ideas of the object)
5. Aesthetic piece painting or design (includes art works, designs, or reference to clothes)
6. Household objects (includes references to things like yarn, rope, or pipe)
7. Formations or Markings (stains, markings, signatures)
Originality
Example definition of Originality = “The ability to think independently and creatively”.
Simply put down the number of original each participant had.
Humour
Example of a definition of humour = “The quality of being amusing or comic, espe-
cially as expressed in literature or speech”. Simply put the number of ideas which were
humorous or used humour as a devise to distinguish the idea etc. The minimum score
is 0 and there is no set maximum, however the humour score cannot be more that the
number of ideas the participant entered. If there are, for example, 5 ideas and none of
them use humour then the score would be 0.
Sarcasm
Example of the definition of sarcasm = “The use of irony to mock or convey contempt”.
Insert the number of ideas which used sarcasm the description or title of the idea. The
minimum score is 0 and there is no set maximum, however the sarcasm score cannot be
more that the number of ideas the participant entered. If there are, for example, 5 ideas
and none of them use humour then the score would be 0.
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A.0.7 Experiment Intructions for Groups Without Tournament Pay (TP)
and Public Information (PI)
FIGURE A.1: Experimental Structure(No TP or PI)
FIGURE A.2: Figural Task (No TP or PI)
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FIGURE A.3: Similarities Instructions (Same for Both Tasks and All Treatment
Groups)
FIGURE A.4: Similarities Instructions (Same for Both Tasks and all Treatment
Groups)
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FIGURE A.5: Participant Results (No TP or PI)
Experimental Structure
FIGURE A.6: Experiment Instructions For Groups with Tournament Pay (TP)
and Pubic Information (PI)
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Instructions for PI&TP Group
FIGURE A.7: Divergent Task (TP and PI)
FIGURE A.8: Results (PI and TP)
A.0.8 Signals
The code for the program was written to take all the information about the favorites given.
This means that every favourite given would be added together for each individual in a
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group and then compared between individuals within the group and the participant with
the most favourites would receive first place and so on. However there was a problem
with the code and the full amount of information was not taken into account. The in-
formation about who was in each group was all correct which means individuals were
compared to others in their group only. However from all the favorites given only a ran-
dom sample was chosen and calculated by the program when calculating rank/results.
The way the code picked up information was random but it caused some participants to
receive incorrect signals of their rank i.e. being ranked 1st when they should have been
3rd and visa versa. No evidence was found of a difference in how people reacted to the
signal between people who received the correct signal and people who received the in-
correct signal. This means that a person who was ranked 1st reacted the same regardless
of whether the person had the most favourites or if the person was ranked first due to the
coding malfunction. This is evidence of the coding problem did not cause a distortion in
the way individuals acted in the experiment and thus the results.
Below are some basic statistical analysis of how people reacted to the signal.
Let differentrank0 Be the group of people who received the correct signal.
Let differentrank1 BeBe the group of people who received the incorrect signal.
The Mann-Whitney Test will be used to see if distributions are statistically different from
one-another.If the test is significant then the distributions are statistically different from
one another.
Number of Ideas/output
The differences by treatment group are reviewed. I will start with the number of ideas
created in the control group control group.
Control Group Divergent Thinking Task
Mean for the differentrank0 is 6.2.
Mean for the differentrank1 is 7.625.
Ratio = 0.813 Mann-Whitney Test:
z-value = -1.927
p-value = 0.0540
Figural Thinking Task
Mean for the differentrank0 is 8.93.
Mean for the differentrank1 is 9.79.
Ratio = 0.912
Appendix A. Chapter 3 Appendix 177
Mann-Whitney Test:
z-value = -1.200
p-value = 0.2303
There seems to be some difference between the difference in the distribution but it is not
conclusive this difference is because of the difference in signals since the ratio of the dif-
ference is relatively close. We would need to observe other treatment groups.
PI Group Divergent Thinking Task
Mean for the differentrank0 is 6.551724.
Mean for the differentrank1 is 6.25.
Ratio = 1.048
Mann-Whitney Test:
z-value = -0.204
p-value = 0.8380
Figural Thinking Task Mean for the differentrank0 is 9.896552.
Mean for the differentrank1 is 9.05.
Ratio = 1.093
Mann-Whitney Test:
z-value = 0.329
p-value = 0.7422
No evidence that there is a change in behaviour after the differences in signals in the
attribution group (AR).
TP Group Divergent Thinking Task
Mean for the differentrank0 is 6.133333.
Mean for the differentrank1 is 5.95 .
Ratio = 1.03
Mann-Whitney Test:
z-value = -0.204
p-value = 0.8380
Figural Thinking Task
Mean for the differentrank0 is 9.733333.
Mean for the differentrank1 is 10.75.
Ratio = 0.095
Mann-Whitney Test:
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z-value = 0.339
p-value = 0.7349
No evidence that there is a change in behaviour after the differences in signals in the attri-
bution group (ER). The ratio does go from positive to negative however the ratio is close
to 1 both times.
TP and PI Group Divergent Thinking Task
Mean for the differentrank0 is 5.52.
Mean for the differentrank1 is 7.5 .
Ratio = 0.736
Mann-Whitney Test:
z-value = -1.749
p-value = 0.0802
Figural Thinking Task
Mean for the differentrank0 is 9.24.
Mean for the differentrank1 is 12.55.
Ratio = 0.736
Mann-Whitney Test:
z-value = -2.297
p-value = 0.0216
No evidence of differences in behaviour between signal groups.Incorrect signal groups
had more ideas in both tasks (ration is 0.736 in both). Even though the distributions for
the number of ideas between the two signal groups the ration of ideas between tasks is
the same between signal groups in both tasks is similar and so no evidence of differences
in how signals affected performance
Creativity Score Per Idea
Control Group Divergent Thinking Task
Mean for the differentrank0 is 1.33.
Mean for the differentrank1 is 1.19.
Ratio = (1.33/1.19=1.11)
Mann-Whitney Test:
z-value = 1.613
p-value = 0.1068
Figural Thinking Task
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Mean for the differentrank0 is 1.49.
Mean for the differentrank1 is 1.33.
Ratio = (1.49/1.33=1.12)
Mann-Whitney Test:
z-value = 2.038
p-value = 0.0415
No evidence of different direction effects, Both distributions are different at 10%m and 5%
before and after the signal. The ratio before and after is almost identical (1.33/1.19=1.11),(1.49/1.33=1.12).
PI Group Divergent Thinking Task
Mean for the differentrank0 is 1.29.
Mean for the differentrank1 is 1.19 .
Ratio = (1.29/1.19=1.59)
Mann-Whitney Test:
z-value = 0.998
p-value = 0.3183
Figural Thinking Task
Mean for the differentrank0 is 1.46.
Mean for the differentrank1 is 1.45.
Ratio = (1.46/1.45=1.01)
Mann-Whitney Test:
z-value = 0.397
p-value = 0.6915
No evidence of different direction effects, according to the Mann-Whitney test both dis-
tributions are statistically different. (1.29/1.19=1.59),(1.46/1.45=1.01) there is a difference
in the ratios before and after the signal however according to the Mann Whitney Test both
distributions before and after are still statistically not different from each other.
TP Group Divergent Thinking Task
Mean for the differentrank0 is 1.389372.
Mean for the differentrank1 is 1.303177 .
Ratio = 1.07
Mann-Whitney Test:
z-value = -0.545
p-value = 0.5855
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Figural Thinking Task
Mean for the differentrank0 is 1.52899.
Mean for the differentrank1 is 1.354894.
Ratio = 1.13
Mann-Whitney Test:
z-value = 0.723
p-value = 0.4696
Different of effect from divergent to the figural task. However they are not Statistically
different from each other in either task. The ratios before and after are also similar in both
tasks.
TP and PI Group Divergent Thinking Task
Mean for the differentrank0 is 1.30.
Mean for the differentrank1 is 1.28.
Ratio = (1.30/1.28=1.01)
Mann-Whitney Test:
z-value = 0.686
p-value = 0.4927
Figural Thinking Task
Mean for the differentrank0 is 1.47.
Mean for the differentrank1 is 1.24.
Ratio = (1.47/1.24=1.185)
Mann-Whitney Test:
z-value = 2.514
p-value = 0.0119
Some evidence of different direction effects. Statistically different distributions in figu-
ral task but not divergent task but the group with different signals had consistently lower
scores before and after the signal (1.30/1.28=1.01)(1.47/1.24=1.185). However the number
of ideas were also significantly different between groups. This could explain the signifi-
cant different creativity scores per idea.
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B.1 Dependent Variable Descriptive Statistics
The variables in this section with a * next to them indicate a variable for the control math
task.
TABLE B.1: All Participants
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
DT Ideas 197 6.431472 3.318413 0 20
FT Ideas 197 9.903553 3.76962 2 28
DT Creativity 197 14.3198 6.378317 0 33.5
FT Creativity 197 23.02538 6.92171 6 44.5
Per Idea DT Creativity 197 1.334865 0.451192 0 3.5
Per Idea FT Creativity 197 1.402222 0.313172 0.142857 2.625
DT Total Score 197 14.27411 8.880499 0 44
FT Total Score 197 23.15736 10.63018 3 61
Per Idea DT Total Score 197 2.30151 1.307439 0 8
Per Idea FT Total Score 197 2.409294 0.908694 0.384615 5.5
Total Problems Solved* 197 22.80203 5.930412 9 30
Correct Answers* 197 20.07107 6.424207 7 30
Total Solved 29* 147 20.35374 4.841038 9 29
Total Correct 29* 147 17.68707 5.336361 7 28
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TABLE B.2: Control
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
DT Ideas 53 6.811321 3.08256 1 16
FT Ideas 53 9.320755 3.22713 3 19
DT Creativity 53 14.88679 5.579531 2 28.5
FT Creativity 53 21.91509 6.197655 7.5 36.5
Per Idea DT Creativity 53 1.280596 0.40334 0.25 2.125
Per Idea FT Creativity 53 1.421653 0.308162 0.921053 2.625
DT Total Score 53 15.18868 9.104218 0 34
FT Total Score 53 21.30189 10.10443 5 49
Per Idea DT Total Score 53 2.372198 1.296369 0 5.666667
Per Idea FT Total Score 53 2.360913 0.996484 0.625 5.444444
Total Problems Solved* 53 22.81132 6.18328 9 30
Correct Answers* 53 20.15094 6.614077 8 30
Total Solved 29* 39 20.23077 5.142504 9 29
Total Correct 29* 39 17.23077 5.09624 8 25
TABLE B.3: Public Information
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
DT Ideas 49 6.428571 3.696846 1 20
FT Ideas 49 9.55102 3.797265 2 22
DT Creativity 49 13.71429 6.673954 3 33.5
FT Creativity 49 22.73469 7.525721 6 42.5
Per Idea DT Creativity 49 1.252442 0.386167 0.461539 2
Per Idea FT Creativity 49 1.456543 0.310939 0.909091 2.125
DT Total Score 49 12.69388 8.289562 0 44
FT Total Score 49 22.42857 12.5582 6 61
Per Idea DT Total Score 49 2.205427 1.458759 0 8
Per Idea FT Total Score 49 2.385581 0.981197 0.777778 5.5
Total Problems Solved* 49 23.12245 5.596251 11 30
Correct Answers* 49 20.4898 5.895346 8 30
Total Solved 29* 39 21.35897 4.890846 11 29
Total Correct 29* 39 18.97436 5.503526 8 28
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TABLE B.4: Tournamet Pay Only
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
DT Ideas 50 6.06 3.09977 1 15
FT Ideas 50 10.14 3.854549 4 28
DT Creativity 50 14.36 6.178501 3.5 28
FT Creativity 50 22.92 5.413852 10.5 34
Per Idea DT Creativity 50 1.52899 0.540867 0.8 3.5
Per Idea FT Creativity 50 1.354894 0.32283 0.142857 2
DT Total Score 50 16.2 9.833305 0 41
FT Total Score 50 23.64 9.451833 5 45
Per Idea DT Total Score 50 2.578735 1.355758 0 5.75
Per Idea FT Total Score 50 2.389099 0.699142 0.384615 3.714286
Total Problems Solved* 50 21.96 6.353402 10 30
Correct Answers* 50 19.26 6.416846 8 30
Total Solved 29* 36 18.83333 4.538722 10 28
Total Correct 29* 36 16.77778 4.829144 8 27
TABLE B.5: Public Information and Tournament Pay
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
DT Ideas 50 6.06 3.09977 1 15
FT Ideas 50 10.14 3.854549 4 28
DT Creativity 50 14.36 6.178501 3.5 28
FT Creativity 50 22.92 5.413852 10.5 34
Per Idea DT Creativity 50 1.52899 0.540867 0.8 3.5
Per Idea FT Creativity 50 1.354894 0.32283 0.142857 2
DT Total Score 50 16.2 9.833305 0 41
FT Total Score 50 23.64 9.451833 5 45
Per Idea DT Total Score 50 2.578735 1.355758 0 5.75
Per Idea FT Total Score 50 2.389099 0.699142 0.384615 3.714286
Total Problems Solved* 50 21.96 6.353402 10 30
Correct Answers* 50 19.26 6.416846 8 30
Total Solved 29* 36 18.83333 4.538722 10 28
Total Correct 29* 36 16.77778 4.829144 8 27
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B.2 Control Variable Descriptive Statistics
Everything in this section with a * is to signify the variable is only relevant for chapter 5.
TABLE B.6: Control
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Male 53 0.226415 0.422516 0 1
Math Efficacy* 53 41.35849 25.08684 0 86
Creative Efficacy 53 70.66667 14.98746 36.66667 96.66667
Creative Family 53 0.415094 0.497454 0 1
English Speaking 53 0.566038 0.500363 0 1
Risk Aversion 53 2.716981 1.432821 1 4
Ambiguous Risk 53 38.39623 29.10085 0 100
Righthanded 53 0.679245 0.471233 0 1
Famous 53 0.660377 0.478113 0 1
More in Creative Fields 53 0.792453 0.409432 0 1
Arts Hobby 53 0.660377 0.478113 0 1
GSA 53 0.45283 0.502534 0 1
Age 53 22.20755 4.157285 18 38
TABLE B.7: Public Information Only
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Male 49 0.204082 0.407206 0 1
Math Efficacy 49 42.77551 24.22745 4 88
Creative Efficacy 49 71.2585 15.68472 30 100
Creative Family 49 0.44898 0.502545 0 1
English Speaking 49 0.571429 0.5 0 1
Risk Aversion 49 2.387755 1.455111 1 4
Ambiguous Risk 49 34.65306 25.27643 0 100
Righthanded 49 0.795918 0.407206 0 1
Famous 49 0.571429 0.5 0 1
More in Creative Fields 49 0.714286 0.456436 0 1
Arts Hobby 49 0.693878 0.465657 0 1
GSA 49 0.469388 0.504234 0 1
Age 49 20.71429 2.041241 18 25
B.2. Control Variable Descriptive Statistics 185
TABLE B.8: Tournament Pay Only
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Male 50 0.34 0.478518 0 1
Math Efficacy* 50 37.78 23.23903 0 84
Creative Efficacy 50 73.34667 13.12956 38.33333 100
Creative Family 50 0.34 0.478518 0 1
English Speaking 50 0.48 0.504672 0 1
Risk Aversion 50 2.92 1.426284 1 4
Ambiguous Risk 50 26.3 27.01266 0 100
Righthanded 50 0.76 0.431419 0 1
Famous 50 0.48 0.504672 0 1
More in Creative Fields 50 0.82 0.388088 0 1
Arts Hobby 50 0.5 0.505076 0 1
GSA 50 0.48 0.504672 0 1
Age 50 22.32 5.377352 18 45
TABLE B.9: Public Information and Tournament Pay
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Male 45 0.355556 0.48409 0 1
Math Efficacy* 45 40.51111 24.94049 0 92
Creative Efficacy 45 70.62963 11.10833 48.33333 100
Creative Family 45 0.311111 0.468179 0 1
English Speaking 45 0.488889 0.505525 0 1
Risk Aversion 45 2.888889 1.368845 1 4
Ambiguous Risk 45 35.77778 28.26489 0 100
Righthanded 45 0.777778 0.420438 0 1
Famous 45 0.577778 0.499495 0 1
More in Creative Fields 45 0.8 0.40452 0 1
Arts Hobby 45 0.644444 0.48409 0 1
GSA 45 0.422222 0.499495 0 1
Age 45 21.02222 2.606712 18 32
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B.3 Rater Reliability
TABLE B.10: Inter Rater Correlation
Correlation
First Rater DT First Rater FT
Second Rater DT 0.8104
Second Rater FT 0.8321
TABLE B.11: Inter Rater Reliability
Cronbachs Alpha
First Rater DT First Rater FT
Second Rater DT 0.8871
Second Rater FT 0.8934
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TABLE C.1: The Percentage of Individuals Who Stated Being More Creative
Than 80% and 50% of Others
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
morecreat 80 197 .3451777 .4766375 0 1
morecreat 50 197 .680203 .467586 0 1
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C.1 Descriptive statistics
TABLE C.2: All observations
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Performance Satisfaction 197 3.994924 1.145076 1 6
Reward Fairness 194 4.273196 1.029414 1 6
Tournament Pay 197 0.4822335 0.500957 0 1
Envy 197 0.2639594 0.441901 0 1
All Production 197 39.13706 9.514034 21 72
Win Score 223 0.5381166 0.751653 0 3
Total Rank 197 8.944162 2.746413 3 15
Fun 197 6.365482 2.596785 0 10
Combined Quality 197 7.44789 2.042497 3.083333 15
Male 197 0.2791878 0.449743 0 1
Math Efficacy 197 40.60914 24.26395 0 92
Creative Efficacy 197 71.48562 13.85225 30 100
Creative Family 197 0.3807107 0.486799 0 1
English Speaking 197 0.5279188 0.500492 0 1
Risk Aversion 197 2.725888 1.427139 1 4
Ambiguous Risk 197 33.79695 27.64146 0 100
Righthanded 197 0.751269 0.433379 0 1
Famous 197 0.5736041 0.495813 0 1
More in Creative Fields 197 0.7817259 0.414127 0 1
Arts Hobby 197 0.6243655 0.48552 0 1
GSA 197 0.4568528 0.499404 0 1
Age 197 21.59391 3.855497 18 45
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TABLE C.3: Control
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Performance Satisfaction 53 4.377358 0.8820085 3 6
Reward Fairness 50 4.48 0.9089128 2 6
Tournament Pay 53 0 0 0 0
Envy 53 0.188679 0.3949977 0 1
All Production 53 38.9434 9.130286 22 53
Win Score 53 0.603774 0.8166447 0 3
Total Rank 53 8.90566 2.956506 3 14
Fun 53 6.660377 2.385399 0 10
Combined Quality 53 7.43536 2.208596 3.194445 14.19444
Male 53 0.226415 0.4225158 0 1
Math Efficacy 53 41.35849 25.08684 0 86
Creative Efficacy 53 70.66667 14.98746 36.66667 96.66667
Creative Family 53 0.415094 0.4974536 0 1
English Speaking 53 0.566038 0.5003627 0 1
Risk Aversion 53 2.716981 1.432821 1 4
Ambiguous Risk 53 38.39623 29.10085 0 100
Righthanded 53 0.679245 0.4712334 0 1
Famous 53 0.660377 0.4781131 0 1
More in Creative Fields 53 0.792453 0.4094316 0 1
Arts Hobby 53 0.660377 0.4781131 0 1
GSA 53 0.45283 0.5025335 0 1
Age 53 22.20755 4.157285 18 38
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TABLE C.4: Public Information
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Performance Satisfaction 49 4.183673 0.9502953 2 6
Reward Fairness 49 4.489796 0.7394381 3 6
Tournament Pay 49 0 0 0 0
Envy 49 0.326531 0.4738035 0 1
All Production 49 39.10204 9.988003 21 72
Win Score 49 0.612245 0.7307623 0 2
Total Rank 49 8.877551 2.728191 4 15
Fun 49 6.632653 2.369018 0 10
Combined Quality 49 7.299992 2.313708 3.083333 15
Male 49 0.204082 0.4072055 0 1
Math Efficacy 49 42.77551 24.22745 4 88
Creative Efficacy 49 71.2585 15.68472 30 100
Creative Family 49 0.44898 0.5025445 0 1
English Speaking 49 0.571429 0.5 0 1
Risk Aversion 49 2.387755 1.455111 1 4
Ambiguous Risk 49 34.65306 25.27643 0 100
Righthanded 49 0.795918 0.4072055 0 1
Famous 49 0.571429 0.5 0 1
More in Creative Fields 49 0.714286 0.4564355 0 1
Arts Hobby 49 0.693878 0.4656573 0 1
GSA 49 0.469388 0.5042338 0 1
Age 49 20.71429 2.041241 18 25
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TABLE C.5: Tournament Pay
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Performance Satisfaction 50 3.62 1.227076 1 6
Reward Fairness 50 4.08 1.275195 1 6
Tournament Pay 50 1 0 1 1
Envy 50 0.3 0.46291 0 1
All Production 50 38.16 9.782033 22 71
Win Score 50 0.6 0.7559289 0 2
Total Rank 50 9 2.579353 4 14
Fun 50 5.5 2.78663 0 10
Combined Quality 50 7.851718 1.741713 4.061905 11.1875
Male 50 0.34 0.4785181 0 1
Math Efficacy 50 37.78 23.23903 0 84
Creative Efficacy 50 73.34667 13.12956 38.33333 100
Creative Family 50 0.34 0.4785181 0 1
English Speaking 50 0.48 0.504672 0 1
Risk Aversion 50 2.92 1.426284 1 4
Ambiguous Risk 50 26.3 27.01266 0 100
Righthanded 50 0.76 0.4314191 0 1
Famous 50 0.48 0.504672 0 1
More in Creative Fields 50 0.82 0.3880879 0 1
Arts Hobby 50 0.5 0.5050763 0 1
GSA 50 0.48 0.504672 0 1
Age 50 22.32 5.377352 18 45
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TABLE C.6: Public Information and Tournament Pay
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Performance Satisfaction 45 3.755556 1.351019 1 6
Reward Fairness 45 4.022222 1.05505 1 5
Tournament Pay 45 1 0 1 1
Envy 45 0.244444 0.4346135 0 1
All Production 45 40.48889 9.289834 22 60
Win Score 45 0.6 0.8090398 0 3
Total Rank 45 9 2.779797 3 14
Fun 45 6.688889 2.72048 0 10
Combined Quality 45 7.174993 1.820564 4.125 11.5625
Male 45 0.355556 0.4840903 0 1
Math Efficacy 45 40.51111 24.94049 0 92
Creative Efficacy 45 70.62963 11.10833 48.33333 100
Creative Family 45 0.311111 0.4681794 0 1
English Speaking 45 0.488889 0.505525 0 1
Risk Aversion 45 2.888889 1.368845 1 4
Ambiguous Risk 45 35.77778 28.26489 0 100
Righthanded 45 0.777778 0.4204375 0 1
Famous 45 0.577778 0.4994947 0 1
More in Creative Fields 45 0.8 0.4045199 0 1
Arts Hobby 45 0.644444 0.4840903 0 1
GSA 45 0.422222 0.4994947 0 1
Age 45 21.02222 2.606712 18 32
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